Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and Research Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.
Until Russia can come up with an idea that is attractive to some, if not all, countries, we will have to keep telling ourselves that we’re better off alone.
The Ukrainian crisis has been raging for four months. What has Russia gained and lost in that time?
President Vladimir Putin's request last week that the Federation Council revoke his right to use military force in Ukraine marks the end of the first phase of that county's international crisis.
The United States should not expect much help from Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The Russian leadership has been more accommodating to the new president of Ukraine than many anticipated. What will it take for Kiev and Moscow to mend their relationship?
It is already becoming habitual: yet another turn in world politics – and a fondly prepared portfolio of materials has to be shelved, and new ones made in an emergency mode. Witnessing epoch-making events is fascinating, but it takes a lot of nerve…
When he decided to postpone the signing of an association agreement with the EU, Viktor Yanukovich could not have fathomed the problems he was releasing into the world.
Moscow's interests in the region are unchanged, including collaboration with the United States on elimination of chemical weapons in Syria, despite the crisis over Ukraine.
The intention is for the Geneva transaction to be a prototype of how to resolve similar disagreements, as no one doubts that their number will grow.
The crisis in Ukraine has become a manifestation of conceptual and legal chaos in the international arena.
Once again I must start the introductory article by noting that this issue was almost ready for print when events forced us to urgently redo everything.
Russia has started a very big game. The risks are great, but the possible gains are enormous as well.
In the absence of a diplomatic settlement between the West and Russia over Ukraine, Moscow may seek to capitalize on recent gains in the Middle East at US expense.
The nation’s largest neighbouring partners need to pool their efforts
Vladimir Putin's policies in Ukraine are not part of an attempt to expand Russia's empire westwards. He is simply trying to reduce the chaos caused by the massive incompetence of Ukraine's ruling elite
The current violence in Kiev is more reminiscent of Moscow in October 1993 than the Orange Revolution.
The diplomatic epic aimed at stopping the Syrian civil war has reached a critical point.
The energetic and driven McFaul did much to extricate Russian-US relations from the deadlock they were stuck in by the end of Bush’s second term.
The stakes are high for both the U.S. and Russia as Geneva II gets underway.
Moscow believes that Iran's role in the Middle East will only become more prominent in the future, prompting it to further boost relations at the expense of US regional influence.
Much has been written about the success of Russian diplomacy in 2013. And whether you greet it with glee or alarm, there is a sense that Russia is on the verge of something new.
Significant terrorist acts in Russia and the United States usually have the same effect. The same thing happened as recently as last spring, after the terrorist attack in Boston, as a trail was found leading back to the Caucasus.
The dawn of a unipolar world means that countries will have to settle arguments through talks again.
Russia will step into 2014 with stunning foreign policy achievements. It is impossible to deny the increase in its international influence over the past year.
The year 2013 is considered to be a year of Russia’s foreign policy successes. A string of events – from the breakthrough in settling the chemical weapons issue in Syria and the hard line on the Snowden case to contribution to the settlement of the Iranian problem to the convincing explanation to Kiev as to why it should refrain from signing an association agreement with the EU – made the world speak of Moscow’s potent capability to achieve its goals.
In his annual State of the Union this week, President Vladimir Putin for perhaps the first time clearly articulated the philosophy that guides Russia’s leadership – conservatism.
One can only marvel at how quickly things change. Just a short while ago, Russia seemed to be retreating on all diplomatic fronts.
Russia doesn’t deny Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy, on the contrary, Russia hugely contributed to that despite resistance and harsh criticism from the West.
Russian foreign policy in the region has benefited from a steady, non-ideological focus, as well as the missteps and neglect of other powers.
Some crucial changes can pass almost unnoticed, as happened earlier this month, when it was decided to put off the EU-Russia summit from December to the end of January, or possibly even later.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
Contemporary international relations are experiencing a period of turbulence and transition from a unipolar world to a world with multiple centers of power with strengthened role of regionalization. In these circumstances relatively small states try to maximize the resource of geopolitical identity to conduct their foreign policies.
In the old days coal miners took a caged canary down into mines. If the canary suddenly dropped dead, that meant that the deadly gas, carbon monoxide, was slowly seeping into the shaft... An order of magnitude increase in killing rampages in America over the last several decades is like canaries suddenly starting to drop dead all around us. It is an early indicator of much worse troubles to come.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.