Konstantin Kosachev is Chairman of the RF State Duma Committee on International Affairs.
The discussions about Russia’s possible membership in NATO, although not followed up on, once again have created an opportunity to probe positions and see certain changes in the opinions of a growing number of politicians, above all in Europe. These discussions have also prompted people to look at this issue from a more specific point of view: “If Russia cannot join NATO, then why?”
It is clear that no European security model will work without NATO or on the basis of NATO alone – even if all countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok are admitted to NATO.
When Russia stands firm in upholding its interests, or shows evidence of its independence in conduct and thinking, it is treated in the West as a signal for ideological attacks. Conflict of values is a matter of propaganda, rather than ideological, civilizational or psychological realities.
If the West would give up its attitude toward Russia, which is based on the “presumption of guilt” principle, this would enable the former to concentrate on truly pressing, relevant problems, such as the blackmail being waged by politically unstable transit states, as well as Europe’s growing dependency on political opportunists.
Today Russia possesses unique opportunities for switching from a policy of response to to a policy of initiation when considering international events. But to take avail of these opportunities, Russia must adjust its foreign policy mechanism.
The discussions about Russia’s possible membership in NATO, although not followed up on, once again have created an opportunity to probe positions and see certain changes in the opinions of a growing number of politicians, above all in Europe. These discussions have also prompted people to look at this issue from a more specific point of view: “If Russia cannot join NATO, then why?”
It is clear that no European security model will work without NATO or on the basis of NATO alone – even if all countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok are admitted to NATO.
When Russia stands firm in upholding its interests, or shows evidence of its independence in conduct and thinking, it is treated in the West as a signal for ideological attacks. Conflict of values is a matter of propaganda, rather than ideological, civilizational or psychological realities.
If the West would give up its attitude toward Russia, which is based on the “presumption of guilt” principle, this would enable the former to concentrate on truly pressing, relevant problems, such as the blackmail being waged by politically unstable transit states, as well as Europe’s growing dependency on political opportunists.
Today Russia possesses unique opportunities for switching from a policy of response to to a policy of initiation when considering international events. But to take avail of these opportunities, Russia must adjust its foreign policy mechanism.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.