Timofei Bordachev is Deputy Dean of the Department of World Economy and International Affairs at the State University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow. He has a Doctorate in Political Science.
A handgun on the temple of an equally strong partner has always been the most reliable guarantee of relative stability, and not only in bilateral relations but on the global scale. The fear of each other’s power as the main bond keeping the international system together is vanishing.
Establishing global governance institutions such as an Economic League of Nations might offer a response to the challenge that arises from the growing independence of the global economy. Such institutions should regulate the entire world economy in the same way that they regulate individual economic sectors.
The greatest achievement in Russian foreign policy over the past 20 years has been the renunciation of messianism. Yet today Russia has to choose again between a policy based on global ideas, one that is mainly pursued by the United States, and sovereign pragmatism, which is characteristic of the foreign policies of China, India, and – increasingly – Europe.
It would make sense for Moscow to offer its own package of ideas to Washington regarding the improvement of relations, and this package should be bigger than the one proposed by President Obama. The two countries must take a course towards a “big deal” based on the analysis of vital interests of the sides and their priority ranking. The parties should pledge respect for each other’s interests in the areas where these interests are truly vital, while making concessions on secondary issues.
History is really only made by big deals. It is only a “big deal” – energy in exchange for full-scale common institutions – that can make relations between Russia and Europe stable for a long time.
Russia’s gradual but irreversible return to the global economy and politics opened up new opportunities – and simultaneously set new requirements and structural restrictions to the national foreign policy. Russia emerged a full-fledged player in global politics in the first years of this century and displayed a conduct completely proportionate to that politics.
The regional and global consequences of the present “neighborly” miscommunications between Berlin, London, Paris, Warsaw and Moscow may eventually exceed any massacre, such as in Africa for example, or some other global catastrophe. An unbalanced and weak Europe will itself become a theater of military-political actions for countries and non-state actors, whose conduct is far from the one accepted in the Old World.
The main lesson from the past 50 years of European history shows that a nation’s involvement in the ongoing integration process does not necessarily cause it to lose its sovereignty. However, the next few decades may prove that a country outside the integration process that declares its sovereignty can in effect lose these rights.
By agreeing to extend/renew the PCA, or replace it with another document taken from the foreign-policy nomenclature of the European Commission that reflects its terminology, Russia would be voluntary admitting to its status as a “younger partner,” thus becoming an object for inspection and instruction.
Russia and the European Union have recently experienced a cooling-off in their relations. The partnership model, which the parties adopted ten years ago to achieve their gradual integration, is now obviously in conflict with reality. The reality is that Russia and the EU represent different political and economic systems that are not integrable in principle.
While negotiating with the EU for a common economic area, Moscow must realize that it will have to waive part of its political independence in exchange for the benefits of a common market.
A handgun on the temple of an equally strong partner has always been the most reliable guarantee of relative stability, and not only in bilateral relations but on the global scale. The fear of each other’s power as the main bond keeping the international system together is vanishing.
Establishing global governance institutions such as an Economic League of Nations might offer a response to the challenge that arises from the growing independence of the global economy. Such institutions should regulate the entire world economy in the same way that they regulate individual economic sectors.
The greatest achievement in Russian foreign policy over the past 20 years has been the renunciation of messianism. Yet today Russia has to choose again between a policy based on global ideas, one that is mainly pursued by the United States, and sovereign pragmatism, which is characteristic of the foreign policies of China, India, and – increasingly – Europe.
It would make sense for Moscow to offer its own package of ideas to Washington regarding the improvement of relations, and this package should be bigger than the one proposed by President Obama. The two countries must take a course towards a “big deal” based on the analysis of vital interests of the sides and their priority ranking. The parties should pledge respect for each other’s interests in the areas where these interests are truly vital, while making concessions on secondary issues.
History is really only made by big deals. It is only a “big deal” – energy in exchange for full-scale common institutions – that can make relations between Russia and Europe stable for a long time.
Russia’s gradual but irreversible return to the global economy and politics opened up new opportunities – and simultaneously set new requirements and structural restrictions to the national foreign policy. Russia emerged a full-fledged player in global politics in the first years of this century and displayed a conduct completely proportionate to that politics.
The regional and global consequences of the present “neighborly” miscommunications between Berlin, London, Paris, Warsaw and Moscow may eventually exceed any massacre, such as in Africa for example, or some other global catastrophe. An unbalanced and weak Europe will itself become a theater of military-political actions for countries and non-state actors, whose conduct is far from the one accepted in the Old World.
The main lesson from the past 50 years of European history shows that a nation’s involvement in the ongoing integration process does not necessarily cause it to lose its sovereignty. However, the next few decades may prove that a country outside the integration process that declares its sovereignty can in effect lose these rights.
By agreeing to extend/renew the PCA, or replace it with another document taken from the foreign-policy nomenclature of the European Commission that reflects its terminology, Russia would be voluntary admitting to its status as a “younger partner,” thus becoming an object for inspection and instruction.
Russia and the European Union have recently experienced a cooling-off in their relations. The partnership model, which the parties adopted ten years ago to achieve their gradual integration, is now obviously in conflict with reality. The reality is that Russia and the EU represent different political and economic systems that are not integrable in principle.
While negotiating with the EU for a common economic area, Moscow must realize that it will have to waive part of its political independence in exchange for the benefits of a common market.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.