Timofey Bordachev - Head of the Eurasian Programme of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club, Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Ph.D. in Political Science, Russia
No one would be served by cutting short the unique European experiment. It should develop and be an example for other regions to emulate.
A hypothetical alliance between Russia and China is based on the assumption that it should serve as a counterweight to the U.S. hegemony. That thinking, however, overlooks the possibility that Moscow and Beijing might build closer relations for dealing with the important challenges they both face.
The SCO summit in Tashkent and Russian President's visit to China which took place in June have provided a good occasion to discuss the need for strengthening multilateral cooperation and ensuring regional security.
Russia is ready for dialogue with the EU on a fundamentally new basis. A return to the relations we had three years ago is pointless and impossible. We must create a new format.
In the fifteen years since the 1998 crisis, the so-called Emerging and Developing Asia has become a new engine of global economic growth.
The historic reconciliation between Russians and Germans that started forty years ago has become a unique phenomenon in international affairs
When you begin writing, be sure about how you both end each sentence and the entire text. Do you happen to know the double-space paradox? Some people single-space words and some double-space them.
For the first time in history, Russia, previously only as a military power, now has a chance to enter the Asia-Pacific region as a factor of peace. And this may make it a unique player, so much needed to balance Asia.
Everything will now depend on future developments and on Russia’s strategy. In my opinion, the Kremlin should plan its strategy very thoroughly and with due regard for the strategic nature of the ongoing confrontation.
An ability to quickly mobilize one’s allies (not only in the military sense) and to deliver a most resolute and prompt strike at one’s enemies or even undesirable countries is becoming an increasingly important requirement for a state’s survival and competitiveness. This is why NATO, the last peacetime military alliance, has very promising prospects.
The experiment to federalize Europe, which many discussed in full seriousness in the 1990s, will be declared unsuccessful, and the European states will gradually shift over to other means of enhancing their viability in the restless and troubled world of the 21st century.
We should not shut ourselves off from China, but cooperate with it: to identify the competitive advantages of the Transbaikal and the Russian Far East; to find points and areas of complementarity of the two economies; and to work along those lines.
A power resource (a component of power) is important not by itself but when applied to circumstances where it can be used, or to a specific form of relations between states. The component of power that plays the key role in specific relations is viewed as the key indicator, and a new balance of power can be defined on its basis.
A handgun on the temple of an equally strong partner has always been the most reliable guarantee of relative stability, and not only in bilateral relations but on the global scale. The fear of each other’s power as the main bond keeping the international system together is vanishing.
Establishing global governance institutions such as an Economic League of Nations might offer a response to the challenge that arises from the growing independence of the global economy. Such institutions should regulate the entire world economy in the same way that they regulate individual economic sectors.
The greatest achievement in Russian foreign policy over the past 20 years has been the renunciation of messianism. Yet today Russia has to choose again between a policy based on global ideas, one that is mainly pursued by the United States, and sovereign pragmatism, which is characteristic of the foreign policies of China, India, and – increasingly – Europe.
It would make sense for Moscow to offer its own package of ideas to Washington regarding the improvement of relations, and this package should be bigger than the one proposed by President Obama. The two countries must take a course towards a “big deal” based on the analysis of vital interests of the sides and their priority ranking. The parties should pledge respect for each other’s interests in the areas where these interests are truly vital, while making concessions on secondary issues.
History is really only made by big deals. It is only a “big deal” – energy in exchange for full-scale common institutions – that can make relations between Russia and Europe stable for a long time.
Russia’s gradual but irreversible return to the global economy and politics opened up new opportunities – and simultaneously set new requirements and structural restrictions to the national foreign policy. Russia emerged a full-fledged player in global politics in the first years of this century and displayed a conduct completely proportionate to that politics.
The regional and global consequences of the present “neighborly” miscommunications between Berlin, London, Paris, Warsaw and Moscow may eventually exceed any massacre, such as in Africa for example, or some other global catastrophe. An unbalanced and weak Europe will itself become a theater of military-political actions for countries and non-state actors, whose conduct is far from the one accepted in the Old World.
The main lesson from the past 50 years of European history shows that a nation’s involvement in the ongoing integration process does not necessarily cause it to lose its sovereignty. However, the next few decades may prove that a country outside the integration process that declares its sovereignty can in effect lose these rights.
By agreeing to extend/renew the PCA, or replace it with another document taken from the foreign-policy nomenclature of the European Commission that reflects its terminology, Russia would be voluntary admitting to its status as a “younger partner,” thus becoming an object for inspection and instruction.
Russia and the European Union have recently experienced a cooling-off in their relations. The partnership model, which the parties adopted ten years ago to achieve their gradual integration, is now obviously in conflict with reality. The reality is that Russia and the EU represent different political and economic systems that are not integrable in principle.
While negotiating with the EU for a common economic area, Moscow must realize that it will have to waive part of its political independence in exchange for the benefits of a common market.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
Contemporary international relations are experiencing a period of turbulence and transition from a unipolar world to a world with multiple centers of power with strengthened role of regionalization. In these circumstances relatively small states try to maximize the resource of geopolitical identity to conduct their foreign policies.
In the old days coal miners took a caged canary down into mines. If the canary suddenly dropped dead, that meant that the deadly gas, carbon monoxide, was slowly seeping into the shaft... An order of magnitude increase in killing rampages in America over the last several decades is like canaries suddenly starting to drop dead all around us. It is an early indicator of much worse troubles to come.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.