The end of the active stage of the crisis does not mean an automatic return to the old situation. We are likely to see a fundamental overhaul of the global economic system during the next few years. The role of the state as an initiator of development programs may grow to a level beyond which the free market idea may be invalid.
As Russia regained its power, inherent problems of conflicting interests and cultural incompatibility, which were temporarily hidden under the cover of Russia’s powerlessness, have come to the fore. The initial EU reaction to these new circumstances is to find ways to keep Russia at arm’s length, that is, to erect legal protective mechanisms along its eastern border.
Russia generates a weaker gravitational power than the top trade leaders but, nevertheless, it has sufficient “mass” to attract Eurasian states. Apart from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which definitely belong to its orbit, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan weakly gravitate toward Russia. In their turn, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are local centers of attraction for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively, while Ukraine is the local center for Moldova.
Chairing the G8 meeting in St. Petersburg is an important test of the Kremlin administration’s ability to advance its national interests abroad.
If Russia engages other members in a substantive discussion of its proposals,
it will make a significant accomplishment. Comments by Hiski Haukkala and Peter Rutland.
The contrast between Russia and the G7 institutions is so stark as to be uninformative. On the other hand, a comparison with the Big Five group of middle-income large countries – Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa – is more instructive. A "horse race" between Russia and the B5 group allows a prediction as to who among large non-OECD members is likely to increase its political weight and who will lag behind.
The end of the active stage of the crisis does not mean an automatic return to the old situation. We are likely to see a fundamental overhaul of the global economic system during the next few years. The role of the state as an initiator of development programs may grow to a level beyond which the free market idea may be invalid.
As Russia regained its power, inherent problems of conflicting interests and cultural incompatibility, which were temporarily hidden under the cover of Russia’s powerlessness, have come to the fore. The initial EU reaction to these new circumstances is to find ways to keep Russia at arm’s length, that is, to erect legal protective mechanisms along its eastern border.
Russia generates a weaker gravitational power than the top trade leaders but, nevertheless, it has sufficient “mass” to attract Eurasian states. Apart from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which definitely belong to its orbit, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan weakly gravitate toward Russia. In their turn, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are local centers of attraction for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively, while Ukraine is the local center for Moldova.
Chairing the G8 meeting in St. Petersburg is an important test of the Kremlin administration’s ability to advance its national interests abroad.
If Russia engages other members in a substantive discussion of its proposals,
it will make a significant accomplishment. Comments by Hiski Haukkala and Peter Rutland.
The contrast between Russia and the G7 institutions is so stark as to be uninformative. On the other hand, a comparison with the Big Five group of middle-income large countries – Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa – is more instructive. A "horse race" between Russia and the B5 group allows a prediction as to who among large non-OECD members is likely to increase its political weight and who will lag behind.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.