All articles
Alexei Miller

Alexei Miller - Doctor of History, is Professor at the Department of History, European University in St. Petersburg; Visiting Professor at the Central European University (Budapest).

  • 17 june 2016

    Memory Control

    Manipulative use of history becomes one of the central issues in today’s political language. When the Nord Stream gas pipeline is described as a new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, this devalues people’ memory and paralyzes their ability to conduct a substantive political discussion.

  • 15 december 2015

    “A Remedy for National Narcissism”

    National historical narratives describing the grandeur of “our” nation and its struggle for good against evil are the intrinsic ailment of history. But there are also historians who take such narratives with a grain of salt. If society prosecutes historians who lay the groundwork for critical public dialogue about the past, it will lose the only effective remedy for national narcissism.

  • 18 december 2014

    A Year of Frustrated Hopes

    (2)

    Today historical memory policy is facing its deepest crisis of the post-Soviet era. It is quite possible that in the historical perspective 2014 will be perceived as the beginning of the long process of mobilizing civil society on a platform that will be not only anti-liberal, but also nationalist.

  • 21 march 2014

    Historical Memory Policy

    History of Russia narrated as a sequence of only horrors and failures or, on the contrary, as a continuous string of victories and successes is equally unproductive for forming the individual and collective identity.

  • 23 june 2012

    The Invention of Tradition

    (1)

    The Ribbon of St. George, which was re-invented in 2005, modernized the symbolism of Victory Day and focused attention on the heroism of soldiers, an indisputable part of the military myth more acceptable by Russians than the traditional VD symbols tied to the Soviet past.

  • 29 december 2011

    A Challenge from the Past

    The intensity of “historical wars in Europe” has decreased since 2009, but the process could still be reversed. It is still very likely that history will be used as a tool for political disputes. Reverting to extremely aggressive, conflict-prone and destructive methods of historical policy is still a realistic threat.

  • 22 june 2011

    The Labyrinths of Historical Policy

    History will likely become an important, if not decisive, ideological element in reformatting the entire social and political sphere in Russia – something that is practically inevitable twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and because the related emotions and images are gradually disappearing from most peoples’ short-term memories.

  • 7 july 2010

    Russia: Politics and History

    (1)

    The ruinous consequences of history politics in Russia may be much tougher than in other countries: the weaker pluralism and democracy, the fewer opportunities society and the guild of historians have to resist history politics. If interference of politics in history continues to develop at such a fast rate and in the same vein as in the past two or three years, Russia will suffer a major setback.

  • 16 november 2008

    A Nation-State or a State-Nation?

    Nobody knows what may happen if the Ukrainian policy continues developing along the nation-state course. For the more than eight million people who consider themselves to be Russians, the important thing is not the change to Ukrainian identity, but the loss of living comfortably in case they maintain their Russian identity.

  • 9 august 2008

    The Undying Echo of the Past

    There is a great risk of getting mired in counterproductive discussions about the frontiers of the European model of historical development. References to the history of one region or another or one nation or another as “European” or “non-European” are unscrupulously used today inside the EU itself and along its periphery when it comes to discussing whether the region or nation deserves to be a member of a united Europe.

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Publisher's column

A Cold War: A Forecast for Tomorrow

Nuclear deterrence is the only reason why the world did not plunge into a nuclear conflict during the Cold War and is not sliding down that path now as we are living through a new Cold War which is even worse than the previous one.

Editor's column

Atlantic Drift: Russia and the U.S.-Europe Divide

Relations between Russia, Europe, and the United States are in flux as none is able or wants to maintain what it once had. An attempt to revive the Cold War paradigm has failed, and a new framework of relations has not formed. This state of uncertainty will most likely endure until each player achieves a measure of domestic stability.


The End of European Bilateralisms: Germany, France, and Russia

Today German and French positions reflect much more the skepticism ingrained in the EU’s “five guiding principles for relations with Russia” than previous ideas of a strategic partnership with Moscow.

Russia Has Dissolved America’s Uni-Polar Project in the Middle East

The Russian Armed Forces' Chief of Staff announced that “all terrorist units of ISIS on Syrian soil have been destroyed, and the territory is liberated”. Quite an achievement! — brought about by the Syrian Army, by Iran, by Hizbullah, and of course, by Russia’s military forces and its diplomats (the latter playing an important effective part, too). It represents a significant feat of multi-party co-ordination.

Whose Liberal International Order?

The Remaking of Eurasia and the Shifting Balance of International Ideas.

The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation

While the North Korea crisis hangs over regional and global peace, the world calls out to constructive and peaceful cooperation that can halt the ‘conflict spiral’. The Russian-Korean cooperation and Eurasian integration may become a remedy for the problem.

Conditionality Beyond Sanctions

Identifying and Pursuing Interests in the EU-Russia Relationship.

The Demise of Ukraine’s “Eurasian Vector” and the Rise of Pro-NATO Sentiment

Before 2014, the majority of Ukrainians did not view the goal of European integration as a “national idea.” Even so, most Ukrainians had positive views about developing relations with and integrating into the EU.