The approach toward the Energy Charter reflects the psychological imperative that exists for a large part of the Russian elite, which refuses to bear responsibility for the fulfillment of international rules that it did not establish. Both the Charter and a broad range of political and economic issues concerning Russia’s relations with the outside world are today viewed from the "we don’t want to be bound by any unnecessary obligations" position.
For Russian neo-cons, the idea of entering the energy markets of the largest Asian powers – China and India – is cast almost as an economic basis for a global geopolitical revolution. Russia will restructure its energy supply system away from Europe, leaving it with an acute energy shortage, while providing economic underpinnings to the BRIC as a global geopolitical alternative to the West.
Global energy security will top the agenda of the Group of Eight’s next summit, to be held in Russia’s St. Petersburg in 2006. If Russia considers itself a full-fledged member of the ‘elite club,’ it must approach this discussion from the perspective of objective interests of the international community, rather than try to use the favorable situation on the market in its own interests.
There are no profound grounds for the statement that global oil prices will remain high for an indefinitely long time. Moreover, it looks like the days (or rather years) of oil as a leader among global energy sources are numbered.
Russia has a natural potential for fundamentally modifying its foreign trade structure since it is the only genuinely Eurasian nation. Russia’s geographic location as a transit nation is unique. But any speculation on Russia’s geopolitical intentions will harm its prospects for creating a Eurasian transit corridor.
The approach toward the Energy Charter reflects the psychological imperative that exists for a large part of the Russian elite, which refuses to bear responsibility for the fulfillment of international rules that it did not establish. Both the Charter and a broad range of political and economic issues concerning Russia’s relations with the outside world are today viewed from the "we don’t want to be bound by any unnecessary obligations" position.
For Russian neo-cons, the idea of entering the energy markets of the largest Asian powers – China and India – is cast almost as an economic basis for a global geopolitical revolution. Russia will restructure its energy supply system away from Europe, leaving it with an acute energy shortage, while providing economic underpinnings to the BRIC as a global geopolitical alternative to the West.
Global energy security will top the agenda of the Group of Eight’s next summit, to be held in Russia’s St. Petersburg in 2006. If Russia considers itself a full-fledged member of the ‘elite club,’ it must approach this discussion from the perspective of objective interests of the international community, rather than try to use the favorable situation on the market in its own interests.
There are no profound grounds for the statement that global oil prices will remain high for an indefinitely long time. Moreover, it looks like the days (or rather years) of oil as a leader among global energy sources are numbered.
Russia has a natural potential for fundamentally modifying its foreign trade structure since it is the only genuinely Eurasian nation. Russia’s geographic location as a transit nation is unique. But any speculation on Russia’s geopolitical intentions will harm its prospects for creating a Eurasian transit corridor.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.