A liberal scenario is fairly realistic, yet it is not the one that will help Russia resolve its main task of the day – the transition to democracy. Transition is a huge task for society. The president’s liberal aspirations and steps can facilitate the resolution of this task in the future, but can do nothing more than that.
Putin’s decision marks a step toward the modernization of Russian mentality that was fashioned by centuries of tsarist autocracy, which suggested that “once a Tsar, always a Tsar.” Second, it implies divesting supreme power of the sacral and personified properties. Third, it sets a precedent whereby a ruler submits himself to “a piece of paper” – the Constitution.
The post-Soviet system has acquired its finishing touches now and it replicates the Soviet one in minute details. We have come to the point where distinguished textile workers praise Putin at “history-making” congresses of the party. But a return to the past means a rebirth of intellectual dissent as an element immanent for the past. If “distinguished textile workers” are back in place, then we cannot but get new “renegades” and “neo-dissidents.”
A society that lacks the ability to live in a democracy, as well as having no alternatives to it, produces the sort of political system that has taken shape in Russia. It is a system of presidential power disguised in the vestments of democracy. Yet such a system does not stem from malevolent intent, but rather emerges on its own.
As is the case with the U.S., the Soviet Union or any other country, post-Soviet Russia seeks to create a safe environment around itself, but the highly contradictory nature of Russia’s social arrangements predetermines contradictory requirements to maintain security. If we describe the social system in this country as “managed democracy,” then the dual components of this description dictate a different policy.
The presidential regime in Russia has put an end to opposition parties, both on the left and on the right. There is no room for them in the new system of non-alternative power. It goes without saying that the president and his minions do not need them. Moreover, the electorate does not need these parties, either.
A liberal scenario is fairly realistic, yet it is not the one that will help Russia resolve its main task of the day – the transition to democracy. Transition is a huge task for society. The president’s liberal aspirations and steps can facilitate the resolution of this task in the future, but can do nothing more than that.
Putin’s decision marks a step toward the modernization of Russian mentality that was fashioned by centuries of tsarist autocracy, which suggested that “once a Tsar, always a Tsar.” Second, it implies divesting supreme power of the sacral and personified properties. Third, it sets a precedent whereby a ruler submits himself to “a piece of paper” – the Constitution.
The post-Soviet system has acquired its finishing touches now and it replicates the Soviet one in minute details. We have come to the point where distinguished textile workers praise Putin at “history-making” congresses of the party. But a return to the past means a rebirth of intellectual dissent as an element immanent for the past. If “distinguished textile workers” are back in place, then we cannot but get new “renegades” and “neo-dissidents.”
A society that lacks the ability to live in a democracy, as well as having no alternatives to it, produces the sort of political system that has taken shape in Russia. It is a system of presidential power disguised in the vestments of democracy. Yet such a system does not stem from malevolent intent, but rather emerges on its own.
As is the case with the U.S., the Soviet Union or any other country, post-Soviet Russia seeks to create a safe environment around itself, but the highly contradictory nature of Russia’s social arrangements predetermines contradictory requirements to maintain security. If we describe the social system in this country as “managed democracy,” then the dual components of this description dictate a different policy.
The presidential regime in Russia has put an end to opposition parties, both on the left and on the right. There is no room for them in the new system of non-alternative power. It goes without saying that the president and his minions do not need them. Moreover, the electorate does not need these parties, either.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.