One of the reasons for Moscow’s sharp reaction to Washington’s missile defense plans is the arrogance with which the incumbent White House administration makes unilateral decisions on strategic issues. The White House’s policy undermines the possibilities for strategic partnership and trust, vital for countering new threats to global and regional security.
For more than three decades, missile attack warning systems have been major spheres of strategic rivalry in relations between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. In a new environment, with enough common sense and political will, they could become a no less important factor in the consolidation of efforts to meet global security challenges.
The Bush administration seemingly doubts the efficiency of the non-proliferation regime. This may explain why the U.S. administration has opted to resort to the pre-emptive use of force. At the same time, Moscow has developed new approaches toward counterproliferation. These factors are indicative of Moscow’s and Washington’s drift away from control and observance of the non-proliferation regime toward practical measures to prevent WMD from falling into the wrong hands.
To persuade or to bomb? The advent of transnational terrorist organizations on the international scene compels us to change our attitude to countries suspected of developing mass destruction weapons. Being slow in their disarmament means risking that the most deadly weapons might one day turn up in the hands of extremists.
One of the reasons for Moscow’s sharp reaction to Washington’s missile defense plans is the arrogance with which the incumbent White House administration makes unilateral decisions on strategic issues. The White House’s policy undermines the possibilities for strategic partnership and trust, vital for countering new threats to global and regional security.
For more than three decades, missile attack warning systems have been major spheres of strategic rivalry in relations between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. In a new environment, with enough common sense and political will, they could become a no less important factor in the consolidation of efforts to meet global security challenges.
The Bush administration seemingly doubts the efficiency of the non-proliferation regime. This may explain why the U.S. administration has opted to resort to the pre-emptive use of force. At the same time, Moscow has developed new approaches toward counterproliferation. These factors are indicative of Moscow’s and Washington’s drift away from control and observance of the non-proliferation regime toward practical measures to prevent WMD from falling into the wrong hands.
To persuade or to bomb? The advent of transnational terrorist organizations on the international scene compels us to change our attitude to countries suspected of developing mass destruction weapons. Being slow in their disarmament means risking that the most deadly weapons might one day turn up in the hands of extremists.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.