Alexei Arbatov is a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Director of the International Security Center at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs.
The role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the status and security of the Russian Federation seems to be over-exaggerated. It was the over-reliance on the nuclear potential (and military might in general) that finally ruined the Soviet Union, as it deprived it of an incentive to carry out a profound political and economic modernization. Russia must not repeat that mistake of relying too much on nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security and international prestige.
A “machismo” – completely down-to-earth, highly anti-idealistic and rigidly pragmatic – position by Russia cannot but evoke a strong response from the majority of the national elite and the general public. This hard stance looks especially appealing if one recalls the na?ve idealism of the late 1980s and the political tossing about and humiliations of the 1990s.
The West is faced with the difficult problem of choosing a policy toward Russia in the course of its long, deep and very contradictory transformation. Until now, the U.S. and many of its allies have been going from one extreme to another over this issue: from high hopes to bitter disillusionment, from excessive involvement to utter indifference and disregard, and from enthusiasm to suspicions and hostility.
Putin can with the stroke of a pen fire any government official or the Cabinet as a whole, dissolve the State Duma or a local legislature, or put the squeeze on an oligarch. However, the president is powerless to get rid of a whole class of the Russian post-Communist nomenklatura, or compel them to act contrary to their corporate interests.
It is a question of paramount historical and contemporary political importance whether a military empire is a normal form of existence for Russia. Or, on the contrary, has such a model finally become obsolete after twice bringing this great country to collapse?
The very act of raising the issue of democratic control and accountability in nuclear policy can, at best, evoke bewilderment or, at worst, suspicion of evil intentions. Yet, not only is democratic control a legitimate issue, it is long overdue in Russia’s defense and security policy.
Is there anything in common between the armed conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq? The answer is, practically everything is different: their history, their nature, the composition of the conflicting parties and their goals, the legal basis, social and political consequences, etc. Yet, there are some points that permit us to compare these conflicts and even learn some vital lessons from them.
The world is entering a fundamentally new stage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons – the most destructive and dangerous of WMD. But as distinct from the Cold War years, public opinion in the U.S., Western Europe and Russia has overcome its fear of nuclear weapons and no longer worries about nuclear disarmament prospects.
Russia’s need for a markedly different military organization became obvious, as never before, in the wake of the hostage drama at a theater center in Moscow. The fight against international terrorism and the threats posed by it requires profound changes in Russia’s military doctrine and in the armament of the army and law enforcement forces.
The role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the status and security of the Russian Federation seems to be over-exaggerated. It was the over-reliance on the nuclear potential (and military might in general) that finally ruined the Soviet Union, as it deprived it of an incentive to carry out a profound political and economic modernization. Russia must not repeat that mistake of relying too much on nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security and international prestige.
A “machismo” – completely down-to-earth, highly anti-idealistic and rigidly pragmatic – position by Russia cannot but evoke a strong response from the majority of the national elite and the general public. This hard stance looks especially appealing if one recalls the na?ve idealism of the late 1980s and the political tossing about and humiliations of the 1990s.
The West is faced with the difficult problem of choosing a policy toward Russia in the course of its long, deep and very contradictory transformation. Until now, the U.S. and many of its allies have been going from one extreme to another over this issue: from high hopes to bitter disillusionment, from excessive involvement to utter indifference and disregard, and from enthusiasm to suspicions and hostility.
Putin can with the stroke of a pen fire any government official or the Cabinet as a whole, dissolve the State Duma or a local legislature, or put the squeeze on an oligarch. However, the president is powerless to get rid of a whole class of the Russian post-Communist nomenklatura, or compel them to act contrary to their corporate interests.
It is a question of paramount historical and contemporary political importance whether a military empire is a normal form of existence for Russia. Or, on the contrary, has such a model finally become obsolete after twice bringing this great country to collapse?
The very act of raising the issue of democratic control and accountability in nuclear policy can, at best, evoke bewilderment or, at worst, suspicion of evil intentions. Yet, not only is democratic control a legitimate issue, it is long overdue in Russia’s defense and security policy.
Is there anything in common between the armed conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq? The answer is, practically everything is different: their history, their nature, the composition of the conflicting parties and their goals, the legal basis, social and political consequences, etc. Yet, there are some points that permit us to compare these conflicts and even learn some vital lessons from them.
The world is entering a fundamentally new stage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons – the most destructive and dangerous of WMD. But as distinct from the Cold War years, public opinion in the U.S., Western Europe and Russia has overcome its fear of nuclear weapons and no longer worries about nuclear disarmament prospects.
Russia’s need for a markedly different military organization became obvious, as never before, in the wake of the hostage drama at a theater center in Moscow. The fight against international terrorism and the threats posed by it requires profound changes in Russia’s military doctrine and in the armament of the army and law enforcement forces.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.