Civil society actors have become key players in conflicts, especially in intra-state ones. This has been facilitated by the transformation of conflicts, increasingly characterized by high-intensity intra-border ethno-religious tensions and strong international influence by proxy.
The three pillars of Saudi power projection, namely Islam, oil, and the U.S. patronage, have grown considerably weaker in recent years. The era of checkbook diplomacy is truly over and Riyadh will have to invest more in diplomacy.
In 2002, AKP government came to power, multidimensional and active foreign policy has been their vision. AKP government took politically and economically unstable country that’s why first years of AKP period, TFP was not active as they assumed. Ahmet Davuto?lu can be considered as an architect of new Turkish foreign policy under AKP period.
Civil society actors have become key players in conflicts, especially in intra-state ones. This has been facilitated by the transformation of conflicts, increasingly characterized by high- intensity intra-border ethno-religious tensions and strong international influence by proxy.
Central Asian countries should be prepared for any scenario and should try to prevent the most dangerous upheavals in Afghanistan. In particular, they can strengthen their own defense capabilities and establish close cooperation with Kabul to combat regional terrorism.
If the international community fails to establish acceptable and understandable rules of international behavior in the context of “revolutionary challenges,” the world may slip into a new round of global confrontation, which will be caused not by systemic contradictions but by vain disregard for real common threats.
While the U.S. continues to maintain that it is the world’s only superpower, Russia is at the forefront of a shift to a multipolar world and inclusive global governance
It is essential that Russia avoid unilateral involvement in Afghan affairs, which otherwise would have adverse consequences for Russia’s national interests both regionally and internationally. And this is the scenario the U.S. is likely to try to push forward given current tense U.S.-Russia relations.
Germany would not “divorce” the U.S. to embrace Russia. Still, a monogamous relationship between Washington and Berlin could well be transformed to a peculiar menage a trois, in which Moscow could find its role in sharing influence and possibly even domination in East/Central European space.
Increased terrorist activity in the Middle East has Russia rethink its foreign policy, and support the Arab League's intention of a "comprehensive treaty of collective security."
Islamic State fighters have plenty of reason to hate Putin in light of Russia supplying their foe Syrian President Bashar Assad with weapons throughout that country's conflict, and it would be a mistake to assume their video warning is an empty threat.
The recent dramatic events in Iraq were both surprising and predictable. Their roots run into the recent past – namely, the invasion by U.S. troops and their allies of this country and the ensuing occupation
The values of naive liberalism of the 1990s have been replaced with ideas of realism and statism, and the vacuum in Russia’s foreign policy ideology filled with an idea of gathering the Russian World and giving priority to the protection of traditional Christian values.
In the absence of a diplomatic settlement between the West and Russia over Ukraine, Moscow may seek to capitalize on recent gains in the Middle East at US expense.
Once again, the modern Afghan urban tradition is fighting for its life against a rural Islamist insurgency. Once again, the state is overwhelmingly dependent on aid from a foreign great power for its continued survival.
Significant terrorist acts in Russia and the United States usually have the same effect. The same thing happened as recently as last spring, after the terrorist attack in Boston, as a trail was found leading back to the Caucasus.
The dawn of a unipolar world means that countries will have to settle arguments through talks again.
Attempts to solve the Middle Eastern “cube” have continued for decades. Sometimes it seemed that just one final move was needed to achieve the desired harmony of colors and proportions, but no. Yet it is hard to expect a result when several people manipulate the cube simultaneously.
The United States is backpedaling – reducing the range of tasks, gathering the resources of its allies, separating the timeframes for reaching its goals. An authentic review of the priorities of American policy will occur if and when the resources of adaptation strategy are exhausted.
The developments in the Middle East in 2013 had a number of common features, which I believe will continue into the new year.
The new leadership in Doha is entering a “post-Arab Spring” regional landscape that is almost diametrically opposed to the propitious convergence of Qatari interests and the revolutionary upheaval in North Africa in 2011.
Getting Syria to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and give up its chemical weapons gives new hope for a surge in US-Russian diplomacy to end the war in Syria.
When four years ago Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, he dedicated his laureate speech to the subject of just and unjust wars.
Unlike the United States, Russia can walk away from the Middle East at any time.
If the Arab Spring were to bring about meaningful changes to Arab societies, what is needed is a political order that is not only democratic but also inclusive. To be credible, the Arab world, including its Islamists, will have to tread the long and painful path of consensus building. This method is inclusive and hence more enduring than electoral democracy.
The main impact of the Arab Spring has not been to increase, but to diminish the importance of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict for the broader politics of the Arab World.
The Arab Spring and the crisis in Syria merely aggravated contradictions that had formed a gap between Realpolitik and the observance of the de jure intact norms of international law. Today’s question is this: Is the international community able to take concerted actions or will inflated ambitions of regional centers of power gain the upper hand?
The time must come for the Middle East to witness the dawn of a new era – that of common sense, when all of us finally understand that this long-suffering region can and must be turned from a place of hostility and rivalry into a site for building a new, fairer, and lasting peace. A conflict of civilizations would be the sole alternative to that scenario.
Just as the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan vitiated many of the achievements made by Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East from the 1950s through the 1970s, Moscow’s strong support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria threatens to negate the achievements of Putin’s foreign policy.
Last Tuesday, September 11, while the United States was commemorating the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, anti-American demonstrations erupted at U.S. consulates in Libya and Egypt.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.