The synchronization of Russian and EU policies in information and communication technologies can give Moscow and Brussels a major impetus to eliminate bottlenecks in transport and logistics, border and customs control, currency regulation, and struggle against hacker activity and fraud in the Internet.
It is very hard – in most cases impossible – to track down the source of a cyber attack. Since the U.S. and Russia have reserved the right to respond to cyber incidents like they were conventional acts of aggression, the two countries must work out confidence-building measures.
The general environment of U.S.-Russian relations up to 2020 will remain conflict-prone, especially as Russia and the United States lack a complex of stabilizing economic ties, like those in U.S.-Chinese relations. The nuclear missile parity remains the sole stabilizer.
The U.S. is going through a painful process of shifting from unilateral global domination towards creating a balance of power in various regions of the world in order to preserve its presence and influence. This means that, as before, we can expect ups and downs in U.S.-Russian relations.
What is the power of states today? What determines their might? Money, weapons, or the ability to manage information? Or is it something else?
Russia’s much-anticipated Foreign Policy Concept has finally been released. And while the latest version does not contain anything revolutionary, it does provide insight into how Russia’s leadership sees the world.
Russia’s understanding of soft power differs radically from that of the West.
It is a tradition, as each year draws to a close, to nominate a person of the year: someone who stands out by dint of influence, achievement, or ability to reflect important trends.
The independence of Russia’s foreign policy is our achievement, gained over the preceding centuries of historical development and through the experience of the last 20 years. Russia simply cannot exist as a subordinate country of a world leader.
President Vladimir Putin’s first address to the Federal Assembly since his return to the presidency outlined his vision for the future of Russia.
The gossip about Putin’s health provided new hope for frustrated opponents of the regime both in Russia and abroad.
Twenty years ago, on November 6, 1992, newly-elected US President Bill Clinton phoned his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin.
Russia’s foreign policy is largely bureaucratic. Moscow maintains contacts only with ruling regimes but not with counter-elites and societies – and this is especially fatal in the Middle East. This is why Moscow supports even doomed regimes to the uttermost.
Russia will have a chance, if it quits the existing institutions before they crash down to ruin it. In that case it will be able to give an example for other countries of the world to follow. But that will happen only if Russia’s internal political collapse will occur before the global crash.
The gravitation towards the Soviet past has not only psychological but also social causes, linked with the interests of a considerable part of the ruling elite. In actual fact, there is the same Soviet elite of the Brezhnev time, which has rid itself of the party and ideological control that restrained their desire for unbridled wealth.
Direct benefits from participation in integration projects with Russia most often outweigh “birds in the bush,” promised “at the end of a long journey,” after the aspirant has fulfilled an endless and arbitrarily changed list of conditions.
Sooner or later the international agenda will include the possibility for re-orienting Russian foreign policy from servicing the interests of the state to lobbying for the positions of specific economic and political players.
The degree of accord among the economic, political, and religious elites over national ideology is even more significant in today’s world. A well-functioning and attractive state model secures a place for a country in the global competition of values.
The current developments in the world can best be described by the word ‘uncertainty.’
The U.S. faces an increasingly complex international environment, and the candidates do voters a disservice by failing to articulate their foreign policy visions.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.