Germany would not “divorce” the U.S. to embrace Russia. Still, a monogamous relationship between Washington and Berlin could well be transformed to a peculiar menage a trois, in which Moscow could find its role in sharing influence and possibly even domination in East/Central European space.
Ukraine today has three systemic problems: national and territorial disintegration, economic insolvency, and social and political chaos. Their further aggravation is fraught with a major threat to stability and to the very existence of the Ukrainian state.
For the United States, at stake is its leader’s declining reputation and the risk of yet another humiliating defeat. The stakes are high also because Russia stands as a symbol of a rising and increasingly anti-Western “non-West.”
The Ukrainian crisis is just ushering in a series of conflicts amid which a polycentric system of international relations will form. An effective multilateral mechanism must be created for preventing and settling crises in Europe and North Eurasia.
The world needs a coalition of sound forces advocating stability – a global anti-war coalition with a positive plan for rearranging the international financial and economic architecture on the principles of mutual benefit, fairness, and respect for national sovereignty.
Moscow appeared to be unprepared for polycentrism as it has not yet grasped its basic rule, which was well known to Russian chancellors of the 19th century: one should make compromises on individual issues in order to have closer relations with other centers of power than they have among themselves.
The Ukraine crisis began as a lingering political contention over a legal document whose essence few understood – an Association Agreement with the EU. Within months it evolved into a regional competition between major players, which catalyzed an internal strife. By the autumn, it has degenerated into a confrontation obviously fraught with global consequences
The ceasefire now in effect in the east of Ukraine is the first serious deal between the parties on a path towards a peaceful settlement
The recent sinking of the Mistral deal, in which France was to have supplied Russia with high-tech assault craft for 1.2 billion euros ($1.66 billion), was heralded as a political victory for the West.
Although many difficulties still lie ahead, from now on the conflict will be resolved through political, rather than military means
Islamic State fighters have plenty of reason to hate Putin in light of Russia supplying their foe Syrian President Bashar Assad with weapons throughout that country's conflict, and it would be a mistake to assume their video warning is an empty threat.
To talk of a “point of no return” is unconstructive and ignores the complex reality of international negotiations and conflict resolution
Turning points in history are rarely recognized as such by contemporaries. Even while following the news and sensing that something has gone wrong, people go about their lives in the usual way.
This year has brought the chilliest phase in relations between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War.
The Ukrainian crisis has two closely intertwined dimensions: a domestic one and an external one, both testifying to the failure to manage the process correctly.
The political crisis that erupted in Ukraine in early 2014 has ended the period in Russian-Western relations that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression.
France currently faces a dilemma in connection with a contract for the sale of four Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.
Putin's departure from his usual realistic approach thrust Russia into a serious international crisis. The civil war in eastern Ukraine brought Moscow back from the global level to the local.
There’s something about Russia’s attempts to establish a strong national identity in the post-Cold War era that clashes with America’s perceptions of its unique role in the world.
The Malaysian Boeing crash in Ukraine – a predictable “black swan” regardless of which conflicting party downed the plane – can further worsen the international political crisis around Ukraine, yet it can also act as a spur to a way out.
Is the Russian leader in the Great Game as a strategic player or trying to be a Russian nationalist?
Before the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, it was hard to see how the Europeans were going to implement serious economic sanctions against Russia.
Russia is learning to live in a new harsh environment of U.S.-led economic sanctions and political confrontation with the United States.
Until Russia can come up with an idea that is attractive to some, if not all, countries, we will have to keep telling ourselves that we’re better off alone.
Russia has been accused of providing military help to the rebels to shoot down the Malaysia Airlines plane
And here's the spin war verdict: the current Malaysia Airlines tragedy - the second in four months - is "terrorism" perpetrated by "pro-Russian separatists", armed by Russia, and Vladimir Putin is the main culprit. End of story. Anyone who believes otherwise, shut up.
The Ukraine crisis was not an isolated spat or a tragic misunderstanding, but rather the last straw—for both sides. The failure to achieve an acceptable post–Cold War settlement produced an unanchored relationship between the West and Russia.
The election of Ashraf Ghani as the next Afghan president will be welcomed by Washington. He might also be able to cooperate effectively with Moscow. Yet his professionalism and skills will not decrease the high level of uncertainty in the country.
The Ukrainian crisis has been raging for four months. What has Russia gained and lost in that time?
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.