The crisis in Ukraine has become a manifestation of conceptual and legal chaos in the international arena.
What happened in Kyiv was not a protest. There were elements of protest in the actions of citizens, but not in the actions of politicians. It was a planned resistance intended to impress other countries and cause their reaction.
The current violence in Kiev is more reminiscent of Moscow in October 1993 than the Orange Revolution.
Moscow’s policy with regard to its closest neighbors is becoming more and more pragmatic.
If Russia consistently pursues its policy of cooperation with Arctic countries on the basis of the Law of the Sea and with due regard for their common interests in the region, there will be no grounds for attempts to justify NATO’s more active involvement in Arctic affairs.
Eurasia is not the same as the post-Soviet space, and its borders cannot be regarded as fixed once and for all by the Soviet past. Whereas the post-Soviet space can indeed be the best region for integration in certain aspects, other options might envision a different combination of countries.
The Russian geopolitical code is shifting from Western-centric to non-Western-centric, and from global to regional. The formation of a new center of power around Russia may not be smooth. It will inevitably face resistance from countries which Moscow considers to be part of its geopolitical space.
It would be more logical to recognize only settler colonies as colonies per se and refer to all other results of expansion as dependencies. The loss of colonies is incomparably more dangerous for empires than the loss of dependencies. Trying to hold on to dependencies is meaningless, but to neglect the colonies is reckless.
The growing outright rivalry between the United States and China gives Russia more foreign policy weight, enabling it to assume the role of a balancer.
Russia’s goal is to acquire reliable guarantees of its own security with regard to China, while avoiding full involvement in the growing Sino-American global rivalry and reaping all the benefits a third party can expect in such a situation.
Accessing the top tier would be possible apparently on the condition the BRICS countries try to create their own spaces of global importance. These are to include a portfolio of global law ideas and a region of neo-capitalism, protected from the effects of the crisis of the current practices.
From Russian leadership's point of view, the Iraq War now looks like the beginning of the accelerated destruction of regional and global stability, undermining the last principles of sustainable world order.
Following the disintegration of communism in the early 1990s, there occurred what was then referred to as an unblocking of many conflicts.
We should not shut ourselves off from China, but cooperate with it: to identify the competitive advantages of the Transbaikal and the Russian Far East; to find points and areas of complementarity of the two economies; and to work along those lines.
Siberia should re-evaluate its place and role, and start developing itself as an element of the global economy, similar to what the eastern U.S. states did several decades ago and China’s coastal provinces did recently.
Russia has a chance to position itself as a neutral force in the region, which can be capitalized into essential geopolitical and purely economic benefits in conditions of a standoff between two blocs, especially those that hypothetically are equal in strength.
Georgia has entered a new political era that will show how much the “rose revolutionaries” have managed to achieve. Have they laid the foundation for new developments that will endure in a new social environment or is their activity mere labeling and blowing bubbles? In any case, the experience will be instructive.
The independence of Russia’s foreign policy is our achievement, gained over the preceding centuries of historical development and through the experience of the last 20 years. Russia simply cannot exist as a subordinate country of a world leader.
Putin introduced the new notion of “geopolitical demand for Russia,” which “should be multiplied rather than simply preserved.”
The numerous crises of late modernity – of democratic involvement, the social state, education – erode national unity, as well as diminish the grounds of moral consensus and social solidarity in their denominator. This lays out the historical agenda for a new nationalism. Nationalism in its international dimension takes on the form of rightwing anti-globalism.
Former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested for “interfering with witness questioning” on August 5, 2011, during her trial for abuse of power.
The geopolitical changes brought about by the Arab Uprising showed that there is a rivalry between regional actors (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and international actors and great powers (United States, Russia, China and the European Union) to bridge geopolitical and ideological gaps.
Discussions of Russian foreign policy typically boil down to one question: will the pro-Western or anti-Western tendency prevail?
Everything in the world is changing. The fantastically fast – by historical standards – redistribution of forces is especially evident.
At this point the ambitious Eurasian project promising to unite Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus into a single economic space is not so much an attempt to generate an original economic model and, consequently, an economic strategy, but rather is an attempt to integrate into an intensive exchange of commodities between the EU and Asia by offering a shorter route for cargo shipments.
What the UN cannot do is to manufacture and fabricate international consensus where none exists. It cannot be the center for harmonizing national interests – and mediating or reconciling them into the international interest – when the divisions are too deep to be papered over by diplomacy, when the disputes are too intractable to be resolved around the negotiating table.
Rather than a future in which Chinese hegemony will replace that of the United States, we seem to be rapidly entering a world in which no country will exercise anything resembling true world leadership. This bears a sinister resemblance to the 1920s, when the United States replaced Britain as the world’s leading economic power, but was wholly unwilling to shoulder additional burdens of global leadership.
In the post-nuclear age, or rather beginning with NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia, military campaigns have actually turned into international political campaigns. The new strategic logic aims not to destroy an enemy state but to overpower it with a view to subordinating it to the victor’s interests politically and economically.
The new European security architecture from Vancouver to Vladivostok would be the cornerstone in maintaining peace in the whole world.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.