Entire generations of people born in the former Soviet Union would wholeheartedly support unification, but a logical question arises: With whom are we going to unite? A country that has assimilated the worst from Western capitalism, rampant with xenophobia and domestic racism, and which is suffering from a demographic and technological decline? A country whose economy is controlled by the mafia and oligarchs?
In an article published early this week, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the end of the post-Soviet era and called for something new.
The intensity of “historical wars in Europe” has decreased since 2009, but the process could still be reversed. It is still very likely that history will be used as a tool for political disputes. Reverting to extremely aggressive, conflict-prone and destructive methods of historical policy is still a realistic threat.
By increasingly becoming a mere servant of the economic-cum-political ruling group, democracy is losing its original appeal and its broader, previously unquestionable, social support. As a consequence, the contemporary market system works by de-politicizing the economy, thus making it less socially accountable and responsive.
Since the time of Kievan Rus, Russia has been a key element of the world order through a multitude of circumstances. Therefore, in strengthening Russia we will strengthen the entire world order and render it more durable. In the overall scheme of things, this step will meet the real strategic interests of all responsible members of the international community, including the EU, the U.S., China and India.
In a world of new transnational challenges created by non-state actors the United States and Russia have much to gain from working together to cope with these new challenges. In short, the U.S. has more to gain from partnership with a strong reformed Russia rather than a weak declining Russia.
It is not our practice to publish special issues devoted to one topic. This time, however, we have made an exception.
The collapse of the Soviet Union will remain in the center of public debate until it is replaced by a more meaningful subject.
The 20th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s disintegration has reinvigorated public debates over the Soviet legacy.
An unsuccessful attempt to galvanize Stalin by declaring him an “effective manager” (incidentally, this is a glaring instance of insensitivity to the Russian language, because the phrase “effective manager” sounds sarcastic today) failed not only because the government stopped it. The campaign bumped into society’s stubborn, albeit silent, resistance.
The geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus has recently been brushed over with new bright strokes.
The developments in the Arab world in the winter and spring of 2011 caused analysts to take a new look at the situation in Iran.
Many analysts believe the dramatic changes that the global international system is undergoing now are a continuation of a long-term reconfiguration of the world that started back in the 1980s.
The role the West played in the collapse of the Soviet Union remains a subject of debate.
We believe that we must build monuments to all victims of the 20th century in Russia. After all, it happened that victims became executioners, and executioners became victims.
History will likely become an important, if not decisive, ideological element in reformatting the entire social and political sphere in Russia – something that is practically inevitable twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and because the related emotions and images are gradually disappearing from most peoples’ short-term memories.
Questions of history prompt heated debate and stir powerful emotions in Russia, as in all post-Communist countries.
For all the obvious differences between the three presidents of the Russian Federation and despite the upheavals experienced by the country over the 20 years of its existence, the goals that Moscow set for itself during this period have changed much less than one might think. The Kremlin, under each of the presidents, has always sought to restore Russia’s role as a leading player in the international arena.
It makes almost no sense to try to publish an analytical journal on international politics in today’s world that would not be removed from current events, but follow them.
The backbone of the Soviet economy was built during the period of industrialization before 1940, and in the post-war period from 1945-1960.Then the system failed after reaching its peak of growth in the 1970s. The decline dragged on until 1998. Russians paid a high price in the 1940s and the 1950s for building the foundation of a national industry, and civil freedoms in the 1990s. It is only now that the new Russia has a truly excellent opportunity to develop into a strong and prosperous country.
The Soviet Union, contrary to many expectations, survived the year 1984 – one of the last years of the industrial age. But it proved helpless in the new conditions, when the development of post-industrial countries demanded greater flexibility and innovation from the rest of the world. As for Russia, over the years since the end of the Soviet era, it has grown, it looks, richer somewhat, but its basic features have remained Soviet all along.
Ten years ago, when the 1990s were coming to an end, many politicians were making plans for the future, trying to predict what the world would be like in 10 years.
The outgoing year witnessed a number of shocks in post-Soviet countries.
The dictionary defines ‘intuition’ as the direct knowing of something without the conscious use of reasoning that is based on past experience and prompts a correct solution. Naturally, people who have enjoyed the benefits of intuition have different experience as intuition is of an extremely personal nature. That is why I, too, will recount my personal experience.
The issue of one of the main roots of Russia's problems – our inability to overcome the legacy of the horrible-for-Russia 20th century.
A meaningful conversation about Joseph Stalin makes sense only in the context of Russian history. However dramatic and intricate the latter might be in the 20th century, there is no way to cross out the industrial and cultural breakthroughs of the 1930s, the victory in World War II and the country’s reconstruction from postwar ruins between 1945 and 1953 amid conditions of a new threat. Whether anyone likes it or not, Stalin cannot be torn away from these obvious achievements.
The ruinous consequences of history politics in Russia may be much tougher than in other countries: the weaker pluralism and democracy, the fewer opportunities society and the guild of historians have to resist history politics. If interference of politics in history continues to develop at such a fast rate and in the same vein as in the past two or three years, Russia will suffer a major setback.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.