Russia has embarked on a military buildup path. The external military threat is record low. But this policy will be continued in this or other form.
Nearly every detail of the Cuban missile crisis has been exhaustively studied and analyzed in the past 50 years.
Russia can be deservedly proud that it achieved its main goals in 1992-1994. The methods employed were almost exclusively peaceful, despite attempts by both parties to drag Russia into the confrontation. By all standards, national reconciliation in Tajikistan remains a landmark event in the modern history of Russian diplomacy.
If the new/old Russian leadership pursues integration in the military-political sphere with the same zeal as it did in the establishment of the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space and the Eurasian Union, hopefully there will be progress in the CSTO’s transformation, as well.
The CSTO has not shown any signs of activity during its two decades of existence. The mechanism to realize its potential remains unclear; i.e., it is unlikely that a Belarus or an Armenian soldier will guard the Tajik-Afghan border, or that a Tajik or a Kyrgyz will intervene between Armenia and Azerbaijan in case of an armed clash.
Uzbekistan’s withdrawal makes one think of a more general problem – the artificiality of the entire structure of military-political security, built around Russia. In fact, the CSTO is now a mechanical combination of three security systems, each based on Russian participation.
Although Moscow has no reasons to be proactive in Afghan affairs, it will probably need to step up its efforts. Ultimately, the Afghans should be given the opportunity to build up a steady balance of forces at home, and then use these forces as a basis for political compromise.
Russia is ready to take into account possible negative effects of its military-technical cooperation with foreign countries and may enter into secret deals, but it will always react highly negatively to direct pressure. This policy is entirely in the interests of the Russian defense industry and Russia as a state.
The current developments in the world can best be described by the word ‘uncertainty.’
America’s influence on the world is now stronger than ever, but its dependence on other countries has also grown.
Отношение к Европе является фактором, из-за которого Анкара и Москва сейчас тяготеют друг к другу.
Analysts have long observed that Central Asian countries are not seriously tackling the growing backlog of problems plaguing the region, and recent events give cause for a gloomy outlook.
The Chinese military calls for a transfer from the passive policy of deterring the U.S. to an active course and closest cooperation with Moscow. Russia’s foreign policy is regarded as a positive example of defending national interests and independent opinion.
Many accuse Moscow of supporting a “force of the past” – the Assad regime which is increasingly losing ground. In return, Russia has accused a number of countries of siding with opposition leaders, while having a very vague idea as to where these people can bring their country. The question arises: What if all the parties to the conflict are not up to the mark?
Georgia was the first sovereign state to recognize the genocide against the Circassians. However, the recognition did not occur all of a sudden; certain steps were made back in the 1990s by parliaments of the North Caucasian republics.
Today, at a time when deep U.S. defense budget cuts are underway, supporters of continued U.S. missile defense development should consider the potential for cutting costs that cooperation with Russia could offer.
The fall of the American influence will finally provoke the reassessment of the U.S. position in the world by the American public. America that understands its true self-interest, with its entrepreneurial spirit, will not need to throw its weight around to succeed.
The turbulent political season in Russia has not brought about dramatic changes in the system, yet it has demonstrated that stagnation should be least expected in the country and that, therefore, its foreign policy will change, as well – especially as the situation in the world keeps everyone in alert and ready for anything.
The joint statement released by presidents Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama after their meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, is a masterpiece of diplomatic correctness.
Hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan were terminated in 1994, but the sides remain divided over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku argues, with reliance on European practices, that the sole way towards reconciliation between the two neighboring peoples lies in the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and the highest degree of self-government granted to it.
The main and only goal of conventional deterrence, used by the Armenian parties, and political containment, owed largely to the positions of the international community and influential external actors, is to maintain stability and fragile peace in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Closed borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey, as well as the absence of functional relations between Russian and Georgia, severely hamper the full potential of the region.
The Arab Spring has entered its second year, and the course of events has vividly proved the predictions of analysts.
The summit of the Eastern Partnership that took place last week in Warsaw, Poland, turned into a bombastic event, complete with the ceremonial exchange of solemn words.
The transformation of strategic relations between Russia and America along the lines of arms control is impossible in principle. The most realistic way to transform U.S.-Russian relations is to build a security community in the Euro-Atlantic area, within which relations between North American and European states, including Russia, would be demilitarized.
The Euronews TV channel quoted a U.S. Marine Corps veteran of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars standing in a crowd outside the White House on Monday.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon addressed an enlarged meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s Permanent Council at its Moscow headquarters on April 22. Analysts view this as an important milestone.
The wave around the idea of the “nuclear zero”, has not calmed down yet. The idea from my point of view was not only unrealistic, but out right dangerous.
Still, even though one can state a decline in the complicated dynamics of Armenian-Turkish normalization, it would be wrong to speak of a total standstill in this process. After all, peace processes practically always have a nonlinear development. The ideas of reconciliation with the neighbor have become part of the internal discourse in both Armenia and Turkey.
There can be no “national” solution to the Caucasus in that a number of ethnic disputes and irredentist claims overlap presently demarcated territorial state borders. Moreover, the membership of these states in either NATO or in the CSTO is not panacea either, in that membership in these separate military camps and command structures, even if these camps can be aligned, would not work to better integrate the entire Caucasus region.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.