Nearly a quarter of a century after US-led coalition forces relied extensively on information technology, hi-tech precision weapons and joined-up military doctrine to comprehensively defeat Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army in Operation Desert Storm, the concept, implications and legacy of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs remains both contested and indistinct.
By creating a mechanism for shaping its own system-wide interest, Russia would make the first major step towards renouncing the uncritical copying of Western forms. In this way, Russia could focus on substantive aspects of Western forms and, at the same time, create its own, in both foreign and domestic policies.
Latin America, the former laboratory for neoliberal experiments, has become in the last 15 years a fascinating territory of alternative policies that pursue a more inclusive and egalitarian society, based on a just wealth distribution and more social rights for vulnerable people.
The National Security Strategy to 2020 is a key element in managing the development of Russia. The plans to update it are not just a prerequisite for making changes to many other major documents but also a good reason to reconsider the current vision of the country’s present and future and its national interests.
Assessing the possible foreign policy consequences of America’s turn toward the right requires a multi-layered approach built around key questions: What happened in the November 2014 mid-term elections — and why? How will America’s political system and government institutions adjust to reflect the election outcome and shifting opinion?
Strategic forecasting is that portion of intelligence that focuses on events that have broad and fundamental effects on the international system.
The documents that President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed in May form the basis of a truly strategic partnership, writes columnist Fyodor Lukyanov.
Theoretically, a convergence of Russia’s and the U.S.’s vital interests may pave the way to mending fences between the two countries, with joint counteraction to the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda being the most evident opportunity to start such a rapprochement.
Society is ready for new national interests to appear that will pave the way for effective and long-term policies “for all.” Now the situation hinges on those who will formulate them correctly.
When trying to underscore the difficulty of predicting the Kremlin’s next steps, many Westerners like to cite Winston Churchill’s famous reference to Russia as “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Few however, recall the remainder of that 1939 adage: “But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”
The combined BRICS market is enough to develop any defense or civilian technology and keep it competitive. The BRICS’ Technological Alliance can ensure the “scale effect” – the main condition for developing technologies.
But sooner or later all crises come to an end, and life goes on. As such, the time is ripe to think of how Russia will build a relationship with the outside world “after Ukraine.”
The global system will not reach any major milestones of development in 2015. However, judging from events in the opening weeks of this year, the general global trends that were already evident will become more clearly defined in the coming months.
In the conditions of real confrontation with external “others” the modality of patriotic ideas is changing: what earlier had a shade of alarmism is now presented as a pressing challenge, to which Russia gives a proper response, thus affirming its independence.
Although the bipolar Cold-War-style mentality is still quite widespread among the rulers of Russian society, it is not a fundamental feature of their global viewpoint. Rather, Russia’s sense of being insulted and disappointed after it failed to join the “premier league” is behind this mindset.
Today even raising the question of an economic integration agreement between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union seems a non-starter. Recent economic sanctions have severely hurt economic cooperation between the two political entities. Yet the foundations of any new institution are frequently set out in times of crisis.
Fettered by Western sanctions, major Russian companies are looking for new opportunities in East Asia, pinning most of their hopes on China. And yet, private businesses and top managers of state-run companies are talking about numerous problems and risks.
Today Russia is confronted by the West which is largely demoralized by its own blunders and no longer a source of moral supremacy and appeal for most people in the world. Sided with Moscow is the rising “non-West” that comprises the majority of countries and most dynamic economies.
The countries with the twenty largest economies are simply too different to effectively work together
As far as I know, this year’s Assembly will focus on prospects for accelerating domestic growth in Russia
Ukraine today has three systemic problems: national and territorial disintegration, economic insolvency, and social and political chaos. Their further aggravation is fraught with a major threat to stability and to the very existence of the Ukrainian state.
The world needs a coalition of sound forces advocating stability – a global anti-war coalition with a positive plan for rearranging the international financial and economic architecture on the principles of mutual benefit, fairness, and respect for national sovereignty.
Moscow appeared to be unprepared for polycentrism as it has not yet grasped its basic rule, which was well known to Russian chancellors of the 19th century: one should make compromises on individual issues in order to have closer relations with other centers of power than they have among themselves.
When he decided to postpone the signing of an association agreement with the EU, Viktor Yanukovich could not have fathomed the problems he was releasing into the world.
History of Russia narrated as a sequence of only horrors and failures or, on the contrary, as a continuous string of victories and successes is equally unproductive for forming the individual and collective identity.
One would think that proponents of the Eurasian choice would seek to build bridges between Russia and the Islamic world, but they often manifest biased attitudes towards the Muslim civilization as such.
Russia’s ideology should be based on the will to defend its traditional values, sovereignty and justice rather than the negation of all other ideas. A positive agenda is more likely to be attractive and influential than a strategy of repulsion.
In the triangle of Iran-U.S.-Russia relations, Russia is likely to strengthen its relations with Iran to equate the role and influence of its rival global power and Iran will attempt to stay in its independent track willing to expand relations to the one that accepts its regional role and global status.
Bilateral relations have always been of tremendous significance to Kazakhstan and Russia, and they always will be. In a sense, they are more important than a multi-party integration. Our relations had existed before the establishment of the Customs Union and will continue.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The world economy enters a new phase of prolonged recession without any breakthrough in sight. International community seems no longer capable of creating new global initiatives
The article reveals causes of the social protest and the emergence of qualitatively new components in relationship between the elite and society.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.