An ability to quickly mobilize one’s allies (not only in the military sense) and to deliver a most resolute and prompt strike at one’s enemies or even undesirable countries is becoming an increasingly important requirement for a state’s survival and competitiveness. This is why NATO, the last peacetime military alliance, has very promising prospects.
The human rights debates, which have been high in the past two decades, have proven futile. They increasingly make it clear that it is impossible to change attitudes that are enrooted in centuries-old specific cultural, religious, and other underpinnings.
It is very hard – in most cases impossible – to track down the source of a cyber attack. Since the U.S. and Russia have reserved the right to respond to cyber incidents like they were conventional acts of aggression, the two countries must work out confidence-building measures.
Nearly every detail of the Cuban missile crisis has been exhaustively studied and analyzed in the past 50 years.
The Cuban Missile Crisis marked a turning point in the debate in the U.S. policy-making community over whether the nuclear war was winnable.
There has been an uptick in anti-American sentiment in the Russian blogosphere recently.
By increasingly becoming a mere servant of the economic-cum-political ruling group, democracy is losing its original appeal and its broader, previously unquestionable, social support. As a consequence, the contemporary market system works by de-politicizing the economy, thus making it less socially accountable and responsive.
Rather than a future in which Chinese hegemony will replace that of the United States, we seem to be rapidly entering a world in which no country will exercise anything resembling true world leadership. This bears a sinister resemblance to the 1920s, when the United States replaced Britain as the world’s leading economic power, but was wholly unwilling to shoulder additional burdens of global leadership.
The West and the rising rest are poised to compete over principles, status, and geopolitical interests as the shift in global power quickens. The challenge for the West and the rest alike is to forge a new and pluralistic order – one that preserves stability and a rules-based international system amid the multiple versions of modernity that will populate the next world.
The role the West played in the collapse of the Soviet Union remains a subject of debate.
The priority of U.S.-Russian relations once again, as in the 1970s, is the development of stabilizing rules of conduct in case of an unauthorized military clash or conflict with third countries. The situation, however, may change. Will Moscow and Washington be able to keep the logic of mutual assured destruction, which for half a century has ensured peaceful bilateral relations?
For all the obvious differences between the three presidents of the Russian Federation and despite the upheavals experienced by the country over the 20 years of its existence, the goals that Moscow set for itself during this period have changed much less than one might think. The Kremlin, under each of the presidents, has always sought to restore Russia’s role as a leading player in the international arena.
The exchange of artillery shells off the Korean Peninsula that seemed to come out of nowhere is fresh evidence of the explosive situation in Asia.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan first met in Geneva 25 years ago.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.