Russia and China make up the backbone of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Equating the ongoing search for a positive balance of Russian and Chinese interests with an incessant tug of war for asserting one’s hegemony would be a biased conclusion that would be contrary to the way the SCO is organized and functions.
The final text of Russia’s Strategy-2020, published last week, contains a small but surprising sentence that has not been given the attention it deserves.
With the rapid and continuous growth of the Chinese economy during the past three decades, China’s presence has increasingly been felt on the global stage.
The place of China as a leading actor in Asian regionalism is increasingly understood today and seems almost inevitable for the future. The only controversy about China’s role in regional leadership is not whether it can lead but whether it will dominate others and displace America’s hegemony.
The world crisis has spurred the already high rate of processes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region, forcing its transformation into a major center of world politics.
If Beijing decides to disengage from the global economy in deed, not in word as it did after the 2008-2009 crisis, this will result in a fundamental change in the world order.
The fallout from the turbulent events of the winter and spring of 2011 is gradually subsiding.
The world is preparing for the worst in the next decade, and indeed the next few years promise to be rocky.
The 21st-century imperatives offer a new view of Russia as a Euro-Pacific country, not merely European or Eurasian. This implies Moscow has to come up with strategic initiatives on the continental scale, using the benefits of the European integration experience. These should be economic initiatives in the first place.
The exchange of artillery shells off the Korean Peninsula that seemed to come out of nowhere is fresh evidence of the explosive situation in Asia.
Japanese Ambassador Masaharu Kono, recalled to Tokyo for consultations after President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to one of the disputed Kuril Islands, has returned to Moscow. Some people still wonder what really is behind this diplomatic spat.
Russia should naturally specialize in the economic sectors that require big quantities of land and water. And if the production in these sectors is propped up by a dynamically growing global demand, they have every right to claim the priority status in the national strategy of economic development.
Russian elites are undisturbed by the “creeping Chinese expansion” in the Far East and even facilitate it as best they can, since they are satisfied with the role the Beijing Consensus accords to them. Have the West in general and the U.S. in particular anything to offer Moscow as grounds for “friendship against China” instead of the mythical “Chinese threat”?
Although the military threat posed by China is much exaggerated, there should be no illusions about its determination to change the nature of its interaction with the outside world. While China is by no means ready to lead a new international order, it demands an influential role in the existing one, and it is becoming much more unapologetic in advancing its interests.
The anti-nuclear movement is harmful. Firstly, it may result in the reduction of nuclear armaments to a dangerous minimum, as it opens the Pandora’s Box of negotiations over the reduction of non-strategic nuclear armaments. Secondly, it distracts from the search for new ways of setting peace and stability in the new world.
Russia and China make up the backbone of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Equating the ongoing search for a positive balance of Russian and Chinese interests with an incessant tug of war for asserting one’s hegemony would be a biased conclusion that would be contrary to the way the SCO is organized and functions.
The final text of Russia’s Strategy-2020, published last week, contains a small but surprising sentence that has not been given the attention it deserves.
With the rapid and continuous growth of the Chinese economy during the past three decades, China’s presence has increasingly been felt on the global stage.
The place of China as a leading actor in Asian regionalism is increasingly understood today and seems almost inevitable for the future. The only controversy about China’s role in regional leadership is not whether it can lead but whether it will dominate others and displace America’s hegemony.
The world crisis has spurred the already high rate of processes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region, forcing its transformation into a major center of world politics.
If Beijing decides to disengage from the global economy in deed, not in word as it did after the 2008-2009 crisis, this will result in a fundamental change in the world order.
The fallout from the turbulent events of the winter and spring of 2011 is gradually subsiding.
The world is preparing for the worst in the next decade, and indeed the next few years promise to be rocky.
The 21st-century imperatives offer a new view of Russia as a Euro-Pacific country, not merely European or Eurasian. This implies Moscow has to come up with strategic initiatives on the continental scale, using the benefits of the European integration experience. These should be economic initiatives in the first place.
The exchange of artillery shells off the Korean Peninsula that seemed to come out of nowhere is fresh evidence of the explosive situation in Asia.
Japanese Ambassador Masaharu Kono, recalled to Tokyo for consultations after President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to one of the disputed Kuril Islands, has returned to Moscow. Some people still wonder what really is behind this diplomatic spat.
Russia should naturally specialize in the economic sectors that require big quantities of land and water. And if the production in these sectors is propped up by a dynamically growing global demand, they have every right to claim the priority status in the national strategy of economic development.
Russian elites are undisturbed by the “creeping Chinese expansion” in the Far East and even facilitate it as best they can, since they are satisfied with the role the Beijing Consensus accords to them. Have the West in general and the U.S. in particular anything to offer Moscow as grounds for “friendship against China” instead of the mythical “Chinese threat”?
Although the military threat posed by China is much exaggerated, there should be no illusions about its determination to change the nature of its interaction with the outside world. While China is by no means ready to lead a new international order, it demands an influential role in the existing one, and it is becoming much more unapologetic in advancing its interests.
The anti-nuclear movement is harmful. Firstly, it may result in the reduction of nuclear armaments to a dangerous minimum, as it opens the Pandora’s Box of negotiations over the reduction of non-strategic nuclear armaments. Secondly, it distracts from the search for new ways of setting peace and stability in the new world.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.