China is determined to have its voice clearly heard on Central Asian affairs and to keep the SCO’s attention focused on the region, not diluted. This is evidenced by China’s firm stance on a number of pressing issues.
Maintaining a balance between the Euro-Atlantic vector and the Asian-Pacific vector of Russian foreign policy should not be a game of U-turns one way or the other, but should rather be characterized by flexibility and readiness to adapt to a rapidly changing world.
Political power was the focus of 2012. Three of the world’s most powerful countries underwent a change in government.
China’s new ruling elite, known as the fifth generation, will have to act in a world in which their country can no longer hide in the bushes.
The Asia-Pacific Region’s growing global economic and political importance was a clear priority for all those attending APEC 2012 in Vladivostok.
Отношение к Европе является фактором, из-за которого Анкара и Москва сейчас тяготеют друг к другу.
The Chinese military calls for a transfer from the passive policy of deterring the U.S. to an active course and closest cooperation with Moscow. Russia’s foreign policy is regarded as a positive example of defending national interests and independent opinion.
Deng understood China much better than Gorbachev did the Soviet Union. Also, Deng was incomparably better positioned to manage the risky structural reform – even along just one (economic) dimension – than was Gorbachev.
There seem to be three main ingredients of Russian–Chinese relationship. The balancing of U.S. power has taken place mainly in the UN, through votes or threats of vetoes, often on issues of interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The other two ingredients, energy and arms sales, seem less stable.
Beijing, Washington and Moscow should seize all opportunities for cooperation, increase strategic mutual trust, and jointly seek new paths to peaceful coexistence and cooperation that is beneficial for all.
Russia and China make up the backbone of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Equating the ongoing search for a positive balance of Russian and Chinese interests with an incessant tug of war for asserting one’s hegemony would be a biased conclusion that would be contrary to the way the SCO is organized and functions.
The final text of Russia’s Strategy-2020, published last week, contains a small but surprising sentence that has not been given the attention it deserves.
With the rapid and continuous growth of the Chinese economy during the past three decades, China’s presence has increasingly been felt on the global stage.
The place of China as a leading actor in Asian regionalism is increasingly understood today and seems almost inevitable for the future. The only controversy about China’s role in regional leadership is not whether it can lead but whether it will dominate others and displace America’s hegemony.
The world crisis has spurred the already high rate of processes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region, forcing its transformation into a major center of world politics.
If Beijing decides to disengage from the global economy in deed, not in word as it did after the 2008-2009 crisis, this will result in a fundamental change in the world order.
The fallout from the turbulent events of the winter and spring of 2011 is gradually subsiding.
The world is preparing for the worst in the next decade, and indeed the next few years promise to be rocky.
The 21st-century imperatives offer a new view of Russia as a Euro-Pacific country, not merely European or Eurasian. This implies Moscow has to come up with strategic initiatives on the continental scale, using the benefits of the European integration experience. These should be economic initiatives in the first place.
The exchange of artillery shells off the Korean Peninsula that seemed to come out of nowhere is fresh evidence of the explosive situation in Asia.
Japanese Ambassador Masaharu Kono, recalled to Tokyo for consultations after President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to one of the disputed Kuril Islands, has returned to Moscow. Some people still wonder what really is behind this diplomatic spat.
Russia should naturally specialize in the economic sectors that require big quantities of land and water. And if the production in these sectors is propped up by a dynamically growing global demand, they have every right to claim the priority status in the national strategy of economic development.
Russian elites are undisturbed by the “creeping Chinese expansion” in the Far East and even facilitate it as best they can, since they are satisfied with the role the Beijing Consensus accords to them. Have the West in general and the U.S. in particular anything to offer Moscow as grounds for “friendship against China” instead of the mythical “Chinese threat”?
Although the military threat posed by China is much exaggerated, there should be no illusions about its determination to change the nature of its interaction with the outside world. While China is by no means ready to lead a new international order, it demands an influential role in the existing one, and it is becoming much more unapologetic in advancing its interests.
The anti-nuclear movement is harmful. Firstly, it may result in the reduction of nuclear armaments to a dangerous minimum, as it opens the Pandora’s Box of negotiations over the reduction of non-strategic nuclear armaments. Secondly, it distracts from the search for new ways of setting peace and stability in the new world.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.