Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili finally got what he couldn’t get for several years: an official visit to the White House.
In an article published early this week, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the end of the post-Soviet era and called for something new.
Russia and USA have exhausted the positive agenda and the election-related political fervor in both countries will only emphasize areas of dissonance.
Given the crisis in the U.S. and the European Union, the continued health of Asia and emerging markets, and Russia’s effort to look East, it is not unimaginable that twenty years hence the world will see the rise of Russia and the beginning of an Asia-Pacific century, potentially impacting Russia, ASEAN and their mutual relations.
Russia should rethink what it has inherited from the Soviet Union in nuclear matters, the role of nuclear weapons, and their relevance in the future. Furthermore, Russia should consider how it can best use to its own advantage the opportunities offered by the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this regime can be modified to meet the realities of the new century.
Since the time of Kievan Rus, Russia has been a key element of the world order through a multitude of circumstances. Therefore, in strengthening Russia we will strengthen the entire world order and render it more durable. In the overall scheme of things, this step will meet the real strategic interests of all responsible members of the international community, including the EU, the U.S., China and India.
Russia has at least one tactical advantage over the other leading players. We are at the beginning of a new political cycle, and therefore have the advantage of medium-term planning – at least for six years ahead. So why shouldn’t Russia try to spearhead the looming intellectual breakthrough?
The collapse of the Soviet Union will remain in the center of public debate until it is replaced by a more meaningful subject.
The interests of Russia and the European countries are so closely intertwined that they will not part ways even if their leaders fail to hit it off on the personal level.
Discussions about the global political shift of Russia from the West to the East are gradually acquiring a more practical dimension in the energy sphere.
Russia may join the World Trade Organization this year, bringing to a close an 18 year accession process.
The summit of the Eastern Partnership that took place last week in Warsaw, Poland, turned into a bombastic event, complete with the ceremonial exchange of solemn words.
For many centuries, rivalry among Turkey, Iran and Russia determined the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. In the 19th and 20th centuries other actors asserted their presence, too.
A mounting dispute has arisen in the past two years between Russia and Japan over a peace treaty that the two countries never signed after World War II.
The Russian authorities have succeeded in easing the consequences of the economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 for the population. At the same time, the crisis has exposed structural weaknesses of the Russian economy. The stabilization of economic growth and revenue in the first decade of the 21st cen- tury did not lay the groundwork for long-term development.
Today is the moment for Russia and NATO to end seeing each other through the Cold War prism
July is a quiet time in international politics, which gives us a chance to tally the results of the most recent season in Russian foreign policy.
For some Russians economic movement towards Asia spells deviation from the European way of development and closer relations with Europe.
History will likely become an important, if not decisive, ideological element in reformatting the entire social and political sphere in Russia – something that is practically inevitable twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and because the related emotions and images are gradually disappearing from most peoples’ short-term memories.
Many Russians today, as they try to assess the role and place of their country in the international community, often proceed not from the global realities of the 21st century, but rather from nostalgia for that “once-mighty power, the Soviet Union,” a country “everyone feared and respected.”
The bottom strategic line could not be clearer: Russia is no longer a superpower, even if some in the Kremlin hanker after such standing. Consequently, Russia must recognize the nature of its decline (just like Britain) and better prepare for today’s challenges rather than re-fighting the old ones.
There is no greater joy for a Russian intellectual than to speculate about a decline of America. The problem is that the Russians still do not see any other worthy role for their country in the 21st century than the role of a superpower, as a state that realizes itself primarily through influence on global processes.
The new configuration of power after the 2011 and 2012 elections will not so much determine a radical change in Russian foreign policy (which is unlikely), but indicate whether or not Russia will become a new source of global turbulence. In the end it is the election, not the winner, that matters, i.e. its ability or inability to secure the legitimacy of the next president.
The fallout from the turbulent events of the winter and spring of 2011 is gradually subsiding.
The 2012 guessing game about the future of the so-called tandem of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin is beginning to dominate the political debate in Russia.
Questions of history prompt heated debate and stir powerful emotions in Russia, as in all post-Communist countries.
Despite all the weaknesses of its development model, this country is viewed as a rising economy, with a prospect of becoming an economic power in the future.
Many IT companies do not need Skolkovo’s Garden of Eden. Far more important to them are financial instruments (for example, lower taxes), mechanisms of interacting with other businesses, institutions and real investors and the selling of ideas. All this can be arranged in a long-distance mode.
The discussions about Russia’s possible membership in NATO, although not followed up on, once again have created an opportunity to probe positions and see certain changes in the opinions of a growing number of politicians, above all in Europe. These discussions have also prompted people to look at this issue from a more specific point of view: “If Russia cannot join NATO, then why?”
Among the respondents favoring Chechen secession only a very small number believe that Chechnya should be entitled to independence by virtue of its right to self-determination. Remarkably, these respondents have Russia’s interests in mind (“It would be better for Russia”), not Chechnya’s.
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili finally got what he couldn’t get for several years: an official visit to the White House.
In an article published early this week, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the end of the post-Soviet era and called for something new.
Russia and USA have exhausted the positive agenda and the election-related political fervor in both countries will only emphasize areas of dissonance.
Given the crisis in the U.S. and the European Union, the continued health of Asia and emerging markets, and Russia’s effort to look East, it is not unimaginable that twenty years hence the world will see the rise of Russia and the beginning of an Asia-Pacific century, potentially impacting Russia, ASEAN and their mutual relations.
Russia should rethink what it has inherited from the Soviet Union in nuclear matters, the role of nuclear weapons, and their relevance in the future. Furthermore, Russia should consider how it can best use to its own advantage the opportunities offered by the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this regime can be modified to meet the realities of the new century.
Since the time of Kievan Rus, Russia has been a key element of the world order through a multitude of circumstances. Therefore, in strengthening Russia we will strengthen the entire world order and render it more durable. In the overall scheme of things, this step will meet the real strategic interests of all responsible members of the international community, including the EU, the U.S., China and India.
Russia has at least one tactical advantage over the other leading players. We are at the beginning of a new political cycle, and therefore have the advantage of medium-term planning – at least for six years ahead. So why shouldn’t Russia try to spearhead the looming intellectual breakthrough?
The collapse of the Soviet Union will remain in the center of public debate until it is replaced by a more meaningful subject.
The interests of Russia and the European countries are so closely intertwined that they will not part ways even if their leaders fail to hit it off on the personal level.
Discussions about the global political shift of Russia from the West to the East are gradually acquiring a more practical dimension in the energy sphere.
Russia may join the World Trade Organization this year, bringing to a close an 18 year accession process.
The summit of the Eastern Partnership that took place last week in Warsaw, Poland, turned into a bombastic event, complete with the ceremonial exchange of solemn words.
For many centuries, rivalry among Turkey, Iran and Russia determined the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. In the 19th and 20th centuries other actors asserted their presence, too.
A mounting dispute has arisen in the past two years between Russia and Japan over a peace treaty that the two countries never signed after World War II.
The Russian authorities have succeeded in easing the consequences of the economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 for the population. At the same time, the crisis has exposed structural weaknesses of the Russian economy. The stabilization of economic growth and revenue in the first decade of the 21st cen- tury did not lay the groundwork for long-term development.
Today is the moment for Russia and NATO to end seeing each other through the Cold War prism
July is a quiet time in international politics, which gives us a chance to tally the results of the most recent season in Russian foreign policy.
For some Russians economic movement towards Asia spells deviation from the European way of development and closer relations with Europe.
History will likely become an important, if not decisive, ideological element in reformatting the entire social and political sphere in Russia – something that is practically inevitable twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and because the related emotions and images are gradually disappearing from most peoples’ short-term memories.
Many Russians today, as they try to assess the role and place of their country in the international community, often proceed not from the global realities of the 21st century, but rather from nostalgia for that “once-mighty power, the Soviet Union,” a country “everyone feared and respected.”
The bottom strategic line could not be clearer: Russia is no longer a superpower, even if some in the Kremlin hanker after such standing. Consequently, Russia must recognize the nature of its decline (just like Britain) and better prepare for today’s challenges rather than re-fighting the old ones.
There is no greater joy for a Russian intellectual than to speculate about a decline of America. The problem is that the Russians still do not see any other worthy role for their country in the 21st century than the role of a superpower, as a state that realizes itself primarily through influence on global processes.
The new configuration of power after the 2011 and 2012 elections will not so much determine a radical change in Russian foreign policy (which is unlikely), but indicate whether or not Russia will become a new source of global turbulence. In the end it is the election, not the winner, that matters, i.e. its ability or inability to secure the legitimacy of the next president.
The fallout from the turbulent events of the winter and spring of 2011 is gradually subsiding.
The 2012 guessing game about the future of the so-called tandem of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin is beginning to dominate the political debate in Russia.
Questions of history prompt heated debate and stir powerful emotions in Russia, as in all post-Communist countries.
Despite all the weaknesses of its development model, this country is viewed as a rising economy, with a prospect of becoming an economic power in the future.
Many IT companies do not need Skolkovo’s Garden of Eden. Far more important to them are financial instruments (for example, lower taxes), mechanisms of interacting with other businesses, institutions and real investors and the selling of ideas. All this can be arranged in a long-distance mode.
The discussions about Russia’s possible membership in NATO, although not followed up on, once again have created an opportunity to probe positions and see certain changes in the opinions of a growing number of politicians, above all in Europe. These discussions have also prompted people to look at this issue from a more specific point of view: “If Russia cannot join NATO, then why?”
Among the respondents favoring Chechen secession only a very small number believe that Chechnya should be entitled to independence by virtue of its right to self-determination. Remarkably, these respondents have Russia’s interests in mind (“It would be better for Russia”), not Chechnya’s.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.