Many Russians today, as they try to assess the role and place of their country in the international community, often proceed not from the global realities of the 21st century, but rather from nostalgia for that “once-mighty power, the Soviet Union,” a country “everyone feared and respected.”
The bottom strategic line could not be clearer: Russia is no longer a superpower, even if some in the Kremlin hanker after such standing. Consequently, Russia must recognize the nature of its decline (just like Britain) and better prepare for today’s challenges rather than re-fighting the old ones.
There is no greater joy for a Russian intellectual than to speculate about a decline of America. The problem is that the Russians still do not see any other worthy role for their country in the 21st century than the role of a superpower, as a state that realizes itself primarily through influence on global processes.
The new configuration of power after the 2011 and 2012 elections will not so much determine a radical change in Russian foreign policy (which is unlikely), but indicate whether or not Russia will become a new source of global turbulence. In the end it is the election, not the winner, that matters, i.e. its ability or inability to secure the legitimacy of the next president.
The fallout from the turbulent events of the winter and spring of 2011 is gradually subsiding.
The 2012 guessing game about the future of the so-called tandem of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin is beginning to dominate the political debate in Russia.
Questions of history prompt heated debate and stir powerful emotions in Russia, as in all post-Communist countries.
Despite all the weaknesses of its development model, this country is viewed as a rising economy, with a prospect of becoming an economic power in the future.
Many IT companies do not need Skolkovo’s Garden of Eden. Far more important to them are financial instruments (for example, lower taxes), mechanisms of interacting with other businesses, institutions and real investors and the selling of ideas. All this can be arranged in a long-distance mode.
The discussions about Russia’s possible membership in NATO, although not followed up on, once again have created an opportunity to probe positions and see certain changes in the opinions of a growing number of politicians, above all in Europe. These discussions have also prompted people to look at this issue from a more specific point of view: “If Russia cannot join NATO, then why?”
Among the respondents favoring Chechen secession only a very small number believe that Chechnya should be entitled to independence by virtue of its right to self-determination. Remarkably, these respondents have Russia’s interests in mind (“It would be better for Russia”), not Chechnya’s.
The deterioration of economic behavior will impact not only the population but also (and primarily) the elite, who today are connected with the rules of the “imposed consensus.” This means that the diffusion of the current political system could take place against the background of economic changes that, at first glance, do not look like a crisis.
It makes almost no sense to try to publish an analytical journal on international politics in today’s world that would not be removed from current events, but follow them.
The bombing of Libya has already had unexpected consequences: an unprecedented split between Russia’s ruling tandem.
NATO can survive for a fairly long time in its present condition because it is to the benefit of its participants, especially the Europeans.
In assessing Russia’s policy towards Russians living abroad, the respondents think that Russia is not doing enough. Such an opinion was voiced by every second individual polled in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A quarter of the Russian communities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan feel no support from Russia.
It goes without saying that the “game” being played in the post-Soviet space remains a priority for the Russian Federation in building up its international influence and foreign policy strategy in general. Creation of Russian soft power resources through consolidation and organization of the Russian diasporas is an indispensable condition for effective work on this foreign-policy track.
The backbone of the Soviet economy was built during the period of industrialization before 1940, and in the post-war period from 1945-1960.Then the system failed after reaching its peak of growth in the 1970s. The decline dragged on until 1998. Russians paid a high price in the 1940s and the 1950s for building the foundation of a national industry, and civil freedoms in the 1990s. It is only now that the new Russia has a truly excellent opportunity to develop into a strong and prosperous country.
The Soviet Union, contrary to many expectations, survived the year 1984 – one of the last years of the industrial age. But it proved helpless in the new conditions, when the development of post-industrial countries demanded greater flexibility and innovation from the rest of the world. As for Russia, over the years since the end of the Soviet era, it has grown, it looks, richer somewhat, but its basic features have remained Soviet all along.
Ten years ago, when the 1990s were coming to an end, many politicians were making plans for the future, trying to predict what the world would be like in 10 years.
Preserving the political union of the West is becoming the main function of NATO.
In 2010 Russia made a psychological break with its past and its former status as an empire.
Japanese Ambassador Masaharu Kono, recalled to Tokyo for consultations after President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to one of the disputed Kuril Islands, has returned to Moscow. Some people still wonder what really is behind this diplomatic spat.
Is Russia unpredictable? Perhaps, but one shouldn’t exaggerate – its randomness often follows a consistent pattern.
Russia should naturally specialize in the economic sectors that require big quantities of land and water. And if the production in these sectors is propped up by a dynamically growing global demand, they have every right to claim the priority status in the national strategy of economic development.
Medvedev has begun to chart a radical alternative path that outflanks both liberal and conservative ideology. His proposed “third way” gestures towards a pluralist, associational account of the state and the market – fostering groups, intermediary institutions, small-and medium-sized enterprise as well as regions, instead of relying exclusively on the sovereign will of the individual or the sovereign power of the collectivity.
The range of opportunities opening up before Russia in the process of the emergence of a post-American world should be used to create favorable conditions for internal development, and not for complicating them with involvement in strict alliances. The freedom of choice is a truly precious asset in the era of multipolarity.
The issue of one of the main roots of Russia's problems – our inability to overcome the legacy of the horrible-for-Russia 20th century.
Over the past year, Russian foreign policy has been more reactive than proactive. At the same time, Moscow understands that it needs to adopt new approaches.
Until only recently, the territory of the former Soviet Union appeared to be a vast geopolitical battlefield on which major world powers fought it out for the choicest "trophies".
Many Russians today, as they try to assess the role and place of their country in the international community, often proceed not from the global realities of the 21st century, but rather from nostalgia for that “once-mighty power, the Soviet Union,” a country “everyone feared and respected.”
The bottom strategic line could not be clearer: Russia is no longer a superpower, even if some in the Kremlin hanker after such standing. Consequently, Russia must recognize the nature of its decline (just like Britain) and better prepare for today’s challenges rather than re-fighting the old ones.
There is no greater joy for a Russian intellectual than to speculate about a decline of America. The problem is that the Russians still do not see any other worthy role for their country in the 21st century than the role of a superpower, as a state that realizes itself primarily through influence on global processes.
The new configuration of power after the 2011 and 2012 elections will not so much determine a radical change in Russian foreign policy (which is unlikely), but indicate whether or not Russia will become a new source of global turbulence. In the end it is the election, not the winner, that matters, i.e. its ability or inability to secure the legitimacy of the next president.
The fallout from the turbulent events of the winter and spring of 2011 is gradually subsiding.
The 2012 guessing game about the future of the so-called tandem of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin is beginning to dominate the political debate in Russia.
Questions of history prompt heated debate and stir powerful emotions in Russia, as in all post-Communist countries.
Despite all the weaknesses of its development model, this country is viewed as a rising economy, with a prospect of becoming an economic power in the future.
Many IT companies do not need Skolkovo’s Garden of Eden. Far more important to them are financial instruments (for example, lower taxes), mechanisms of interacting with other businesses, institutions and real investors and the selling of ideas. All this can be arranged in a long-distance mode.
The discussions about Russia’s possible membership in NATO, although not followed up on, once again have created an opportunity to probe positions and see certain changes in the opinions of a growing number of politicians, above all in Europe. These discussions have also prompted people to look at this issue from a more specific point of view: “If Russia cannot join NATO, then why?”
Among the respondents favoring Chechen secession only a very small number believe that Chechnya should be entitled to independence by virtue of its right to self-determination. Remarkably, these respondents have Russia’s interests in mind (“It would be better for Russia”), not Chechnya’s.
The deterioration of economic behavior will impact not only the population but also (and primarily) the elite, who today are connected with the rules of the “imposed consensus.” This means that the diffusion of the current political system could take place against the background of economic changes that, at first glance, do not look like a crisis.
It makes almost no sense to try to publish an analytical journal on international politics in today’s world that would not be removed from current events, but follow them.
The bombing of Libya has already had unexpected consequences: an unprecedented split between Russia’s ruling tandem.
NATO can survive for a fairly long time in its present condition because it is to the benefit of its participants, especially the Europeans.
In assessing Russia’s policy towards Russians living abroad, the respondents think that Russia is not doing enough. Such an opinion was voiced by every second individual polled in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A quarter of the Russian communities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan feel no support from Russia.
It goes without saying that the “game” being played in the post-Soviet space remains a priority for the Russian Federation in building up its international influence and foreign policy strategy in general. Creation of Russian soft power resources through consolidation and organization of the Russian diasporas is an indispensable condition for effective work on this foreign-policy track.
The backbone of the Soviet economy was built during the period of industrialization before 1940, and in the post-war period from 1945-1960.Then the system failed after reaching its peak of growth in the 1970s. The decline dragged on until 1998. Russians paid a high price in the 1940s and the 1950s for building the foundation of a national industry, and civil freedoms in the 1990s. It is only now that the new Russia has a truly excellent opportunity to develop into a strong and prosperous country.
The Soviet Union, contrary to many expectations, survived the year 1984 – one of the last years of the industrial age. But it proved helpless in the new conditions, when the development of post-industrial countries demanded greater flexibility and innovation from the rest of the world. As for Russia, over the years since the end of the Soviet era, it has grown, it looks, richer somewhat, but its basic features have remained Soviet all along.
Ten years ago, when the 1990s were coming to an end, many politicians were making plans for the future, trying to predict what the world would be like in 10 years.
Preserving the political union of the West is becoming the main function of NATO.
In 2010 Russia made a psychological break with its past and its former status as an empire.
Japanese Ambassador Masaharu Kono, recalled to Tokyo for consultations after President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to one of the disputed Kuril Islands, has returned to Moscow. Some people still wonder what really is behind this diplomatic spat.
Is Russia unpredictable? Perhaps, but one shouldn’t exaggerate – its randomness often follows a consistent pattern.
Russia should naturally specialize in the economic sectors that require big quantities of land and water. And if the production in these sectors is propped up by a dynamically growing global demand, they have every right to claim the priority status in the national strategy of economic development.
Medvedev has begun to chart a radical alternative path that outflanks both liberal and conservative ideology. His proposed “third way” gestures towards a pluralist, associational account of the state and the market – fostering groups, intermediary institutions, small-and medium-sized enterprise as well as regions, instead of relying exclusively on the sovereign will of the individual or the sovereign power of the collectivity.
The range of opportunities opening up before Russia in the process of the emergence of a post-American world should be used to create favorable conditions for internal development, and not for complicating them with involvement in strict alliances. The freedom of choice is a truly precious asset in the era of multipolarity.
The issue of one of the main roots of Russia's problems – our inability to overcome the legacy of the horrible-for-Russia 20th century.
Over the past year, Russian foreign policy has been more reactive than proactive. At the same time, Moscow understands that it needs to adopt new approaches.
Until only recently, the territory of the former Soviet Union appeared to be a vast geopolitical battlefield on which major world powers fought it out for the choicest "trophies".
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.