If Russia is to embark on the path of profound economic modernization in full seriousness, then there has to be a strategy of using WTO membership as the basis for modernization. It is crucial to determine the nature of our actions within the WTO for the long term.
The euro is a young currency that has all chances to make Europe a global player if the problems associated with its “premature birth” are solved in a decisive manner. The fiscal authorities should resort to extraordinary measures in order to accelerate economic growth, reduce unemployment, and boost the continent’s competitiveness.
All players expect explanation from China of its initiative to build a New Economic Silk Road. The faster it presents arguments and the clearer they are, the less room there will be for idle speculation and rumor. In any case, China is interested in a favorable response and support for its own foreign policy signals.
All said, we are living in a global and rapidly changing world, and these changes will only gather momentum. How will the world change, and what can we do so as not to be left on the periphery of the new world order?
Russia is in a precarious position: although formally enshrined in legislation, quite legal private property very often is not considered to be legitimate. The “unfair” procedures that brought about the emergence of mammoth private wealth during the privatization period breeds distrust in the authorities, the laws it adopts, and the measures it takes.
Economic history provides many examples that undermine Weber’s postulate that economies based on the Protestant ethic are more productive. And the lessons of the global financial crisis of 1997-1998 refute the view that economies based on Confucian values (above all, the moral need for a high degree of family and personal savings) are more successful and stable.
The interaction within BRICS has drawn a variety of comments – from sarcasm to the expectation of miracles. But the aggravation of problems with the sustainability of global development in 2008-2013 has brought the role of those states into the limelight to show that global decisions will not be necessarily found inside Bretton-Woods institutions or the OECD.
The general environment of U.S.-Russian relations up to 2020 will remain conflict-prone, especially as Russia and the United States lack a complex of stabilizing economic ties, like those in U.S.-Chinese relations. The nuclear missile parity remains the sole stabilizer.
It is the common wealth, or the accumulated and permanently growing public wealth that has real significance. A growing national economy as such is a factor of attraction. Broadening markets promise lucrative contracts to any economic partner.
BRICS is held together and pushed forward not so much by the requirements of its member-countries as by the general situation in the world.
The bankrupt Cypriot banks are worth nothing or less than nothing if they are not a part of the European financial system.
Following the disintegration of communism in the early 1990s, there occurred what was then referred to as an unblocking of many conflicts.
The Russian economy’s preparedness for the world economic growth slowdown cannot be rated on the basis of the reserves accumulated by the state. A reliable mechanism of generating savings and transforming them into investments and competitive projects in the national economy is a vital need.
Five years ago, when Europe was debating whether to recognize Kosovo’s independence, Russia warned against opening a Pandora’s Box.
The modern world is witnessing a shift of power in all spheres of public life towards supranational and transnational structures, and at the same time, growing aspirations of some regions of large states to gain autonomy or even independence.
The Russian parliament is discussing several drafts of a law which will oblige civil servants to transfer all their foreign-based assets and property back home to Russia.
Russia’s integration into the Western world would sharply enhance the latter’s positions in the face of the growing non-West.
The Chinese military calls for a transfer from the passive policy of deterring the U.S. to an active course and closest cooperation with Moscow. Russia’s foreign policy is regarded as a positive example of defending national interests and independent opinion.
Deng understood China much better than Gorbachev did the Soviet Union. Also, Deng was incomparably better positioned to manage the risky structural reform – even along just one (economic) dimension – than was Gorbachev.
Russia needs a Lee Kuan Yew style of state – with inevitable adjustments, because we are not Chinese. A strong, robust and honest state. A wise one. And tough, if need be.
Illusory hopes that new technological possibilities will help create unlimited wealth have never come true. No invention can ensure a life of ease for decades. Of course, the world has changed – but, as the developments of recent years have shown, not to an extent that the established economic patterns should be discarded as worthless. The 21st-century world is a renewed yet still industrial world.
Bush remembers the tragedy of Charles V of Habsburg and Philip II of Spain who strove to keep one world under one sensible hegemony and, despite defeating major adversaries, failed over the stubborn resistance of rebels and heretics then in Holland and yesterday in Iraq – debt and imperial overstretching as predicted by Paul Kennedy.
Since the time of Kievan Rus, Russia has been a key element of the world order through a multitude of circumstances. Therefore, in strengthening Russia we will strengthen the entire world order and render it more durable. In the overall scheme of things, this step will meet the real strategic interests of all responsible members of the international community, including the EU, the U.S., China and India.
Russia’s “gas wars” with Ukraine and Belarus and pointed objections to Europe’s “third energy package,” as well as heated competition to develop rival and commercially dubious “southern” energy transit routes, have re-ignited concerns about pipeline politics across Eurasia.
The economic and political crisis of 2008-2010 has had an unexpected impact by calling into question the success of the third wave of democratization in Europe.
The Russian authorities have succeeded in easing the consequences of the economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 for the population. At the same time, the crisis has exposed structural weaknesses of the Russian economy. The stabilization of economic growth and revenue in the first decade of the 21st cen- tury did not lay the groundwork for long-term development.
The summer of 2011 gave no break to global politics.
The Lisbon Treaty, which marked a new level of integration in the European Union, entered into force less than two years ago.
If Beijing decides to disengage from the global economy in deed, not in word as it did after the 2008-2009 crisis, this will result in a fundamental change in the world order.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.