Power politics is not “back” after having been away on some vacation. It has always been here. What is different today is that power plays are more visible because other countries are pushing back harder.
BRICS offers Russia a chance to steer clear of the whirlpool of economic and political problems with self-respect intact and international weight increased thanks to the solution of global challenges. BRICS’ field of activity is enormous.
The year 2014 has gone down in history as a time of the collapse of the previous model of relations between Russia and the rest of the world. The year 2015 will most likely show that the changes are irreversible and have gone beyond the point of return. We can draw a line under the bygone era, but we still cannot say what the new one will be like.
BRICS is an important instrument in Russia's foreign policy. The presidency gives Russia a chance to expand the economic, political and strategic scope of the five-nation grouping.
The combined BRICS market is enough to develop any defense or civilian technology and keep it competitive. The BRICS’ Technological Alliance can ensure the “scale effect” – the main condition for developing technologies.
The BRICS can serve as a locomotive for Russia’s geopolitical rise in the 21st century. This development will not necessarily imply a deterioration of relations with the West, which would be almost inevitable if Moscow were to face it alone.
At the summit in Ufa, Russia should give the green light to the establishment of an SCO Development Bank where China takes dominant positions in the authorized capital and management bodies. In exchange, Moscow could coordinate investment principles on terms that would be most favorable to itself and its partners.
Seoul believes that South Korea, with its advanced port infrastructure, is a natural gateway to the Pacific, opening access to the entire continent of Eurasia all the way to the Atlantic.
The possibilities of club monetary interaction mechanisms are very modest as they do not replace but supplement global mechanisms. Nevertheless, they deserve attention and support. Equally important is the fact that such mechanisms may have side effects, namely, general shifts in the structure of global economic governance.
The Russian-U.S. confrontation is amplifying an even larger trend in global development – the danger of the world’s division into the “Greater West” and the “Eurasian non-West.” There is the impression that the geography of the division resembles the dividing line between “continental” and “island” countries in classical geopolitics.
Today Russia is confronted by the West which is largely demoralized by its own blunders and no longer a source of moral supremacy and appeal for most people in the world. Sided with Moscow is the rising “non-West” that comprises the majority of countries and most dynamic economies.
As far as I know, this year’s Assembly will focus on prospects for accelerating domestic growth in Russia
As long as the fundamental restructuring of the global system is not reflected in people’s outlook (and this will take decades), the vacuum in the inner sanctum of Russian national consciousness will continue to be filled by the West.
There’s something about Russia’s attempts to establish a strong national identity in the post-Cold War era that clashes with America’s perceptions of its unique role in the world.
Until Russia can come up with an idea that is attractive to some, if not all, countries, we will have to keep telling ourselves that we’re better off alone.
When Goldman Sachs’ economist James O'Neill invented the abbreviation BRIC(S) in 2002, he referred to promising investment markets. BRICS today can’t be treated narrowly as a set of emerging economies, the global economy’s "semi-periphery"?— those views are from the last decade.
The Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated once again that the global Chinese business empire is growing much faster than Beijing’s military-political capabilities. There has again emerged a need for a more active Chinese policy to protect national interests.
All said, we are living in a global and rapidly changing world, and these changes will only gather momentum. How will the world change, and what can we do so as not to be left on the periphery of the new world order?
The European bureaucracy, a new political force with interests and leverage of its own, is behind the emerging EU trend to politicize the ongoing integration. A constructive way out of the growing contradictions between the alternative integration processes in Eurasia would be to de-politicize them into mutually beneficial economic cooperation.
Russia will remain a crucial interlocutor on nuclear policy, space, and various regional matters. As in the past, it will be able to block and delay global action with its Security Council veto. If its leaders want more than that, the changes this will require are relatively clear.
The interaction within BRICS has drawn a variety of comments – from sarcasm to the expectation of miracles. But the aggravation of problems with the sustainability of global development in 2008-2013 has brought the role of those states into the limelight to show that global decisions will not be necessarily found inside Bretton-Woods institutions or the OECD.
Accessing the top tier would be possible apparently on the condition the BRICS countries try to create their own spaces of global importance. These are to include a portfolio of global law ideas and a region of neo-capitalism, protected from the effects of the crisis of the current practices.
BRICS is held together and pushed forward not so much by the requirements of its member-countries as by the general situation in the world.
A Contradiction Between the Globalization of the World and the Deglobalization of Governance Is Creating a Vacuum of Governability.
Sooner or later the international agenda will include the possibility for re-orienting Russian foreign policy from servicing the interests of the state to lobbying for the positions of specific economic and political players.
Each BRICS summit sets off a new round of debates on the essence and the future of this unusual international format.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.