The ongoing military conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a stark reminder that shifts in political tone and military tactics do not necessarily correlate with each other or represent substantive shifts in a state’s foreign policy goals.
It could well be that the once stable, cooperative multilateral framework of the IMF, like many international institutions inspired and led by the advanced economies, has become afflicted by a democratic and growing call for voice and representation of other states and non-state actors.
A scenario similar to the Euromaidan protests may again take place and threaten to turn into an international crisis. It is in our common interest to stop making Ukraine a battlefield between Russia and the West, and encourage it to become a bridge between them.
The year 2014 has gone down in history as a time of the collapse of the previous model of relations between Russia and the rest of the world. The year 2015 will most likely show that the changes are irreversible and have gone beyond the point of return. We can draw a line under the bygone era, but we still cannot say what the new one will be like.
But sooner or later all crises come to an end, and life goes on. As such, the time is ripe to think of how Russia will build a relationship with the outside world “after Ukraine.”
Why are Russian-Ukrainian relations, which had always been characterized as fraternal, now in this state?
The global system will not reach any major milestones of development in 2015. However, judging from events in the opening weeks of this year, the general global trends that were already evident will become more clearly defined in the coming months.
Although many difficulties still lie ahead, from now on the conflict will be resolved through political, rather than military means
The Ukrainian crisis has two closely intertwined dimensions: a domestic one and an external one, both testifying to the failure to manage the process correctly.
The political crisis that erupted in Ukraine in early 2014 has ended the period in Russian-Western relations that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
Putin's departure from his usual realistic approach thrust Russia into a serious international crisis. The civil war in eastern Ukraine brought Moscow back from the global level to the local.
Is the Russian leader in the Great Game as a strategic player or trying to be a Russian nationalist?
The Ukrainian crisis has been raging for four months. What has Russia gained and lost in that time?
The crisis in Russian-American relations is not only a result of conflicting interests in Ukraine, but also of a misunderstanding of the logic and intentions of the other side.
The Russian leadership has been more accommodating to the new president of Ukraine than many anticipated. What will it take for Kiev and Moscow to mend their relationship?
Ukraine’s main chance of entering Europe not as a source of labor force, but as a moderately developed industrialized country will be to go ahead with exports to Russia and other countries where Ukrainian manufactures are in demand.
The participation of Donetsk representatives in the government corresponds to the “horizontal principle,” but domination does not. There will be neither real reform nor a modern and efficient state in Ukraine unless regions feel that they are equal.
Kiev’s attempt to build an all-Ukrainian identity solely on the basis of the Ukrainian ethnos through political centralization, cultural unification, and forceful assimilation was a complete failure. Now, as part of the Russian Federation, which pursues an entirely different regional policy, Crimea has an opportunity to form its own regional identity.
While nobody wants to go back to the Cold War, those of us who are old enough to remember it know that while tensions between Moscow and Washington ran high, they never exploded into outright conflict.
Though many of the presidential candidates in the upcoming elections in Ukraine are taking care to position themselves firmly as anti-Russian, the truth of the matter is that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian politicians are in one way or another tied to Russia – and the fragile state would do well to keep this in mind when planning for the future.
When he decided to postpone the signing of an association agreement with the EU, Viktor Yanukovich could not have fathomed the problems he was releasing into the world.
Russia, Kennan argued, would seek to bring about the collapse of capitalism not by an armed attack, but by a mixture of bullying and subversion.
Many observers were left wrong-footed by the comments made by the Russian president on May 7, in which he asked the southeast of Ukraine not to hold a referendum, expressed his support for presidential elections in the country on May 25, and announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from the border. What lies behind Putin’s unexpected move?
All the signs are that a military invasion of Ukraine’s restive eastern provinces by Russian forces is not on the cards. The likeliest scenario is that Moscow will allow Kiev to gradually claw back control of the east, though a prolonged crisis in relations with the West remains unavoidable.
Unfortunately, today Ukraine cannot be regarded as a full-fledged state. To ignore this reality and to focus exclusively on the "Crimean problem" would be disingenuous and hypocritical.
Russia has started a very big game. The risks are great, but the possible gains are enormous as well.
Everything will now depend on future developments and on Russia’s strategy. In my opinion, the Kremlin should plan its strategy very thoroughly and with due regard for the strategic nature of the ongoing confrontation.
“It is Putin the conservative and not Putin the realist who decided to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty.”
Russia had to move its troops into Crimea. If we confine ourselves to addressing the initial tasks and do not rush ‘to take Vienna’, to borrow Bismarck’s words, the West is unlikely to impose tough sanctions against Russia.
The nation’s largest neighbouring partners need to pool their efforts
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.