While only recently the West’s dominance looked absolute, now the roles of the teacher and the student, the leader and the straggler are no longer definitely assigned. Сompetition in interpreting reality, defining meanings, and translating values will increasingly grow.
We will live in a highly competitive and increasingly unpredictable world. Russia should start economic growth and development in order not to fall behind the new technological revolution again. Economic weakness provokes external pressure.
The economic heritage of Eurasianists includes opinions, still quite important today, on the role of the state and the private sector in the economy, models of economic development and planning during economic modernization.
The article discusses the results of Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union against the background of major new global and regional international trends and the policy of other major world powers.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is by far the most ambitious project in the field of contractual formats of regional economic cooperation, combining traditional measures to liberalize mutual trade with regulatory rules of economic activity on the territories of member states. If successful, this project will influence on the development of both the world economy and its regulatory mechanisms.
The scope of China’s containment is broadening, while the scope of U.S.-China cooperation is gradually narrowing. Of course, it is easy not to see this if one cites high volumes of U.S.-Chinese trade or the great enthusiasm for American popular culture among the Chinese.
In view of the accelerated development of new technologies and potentially low energy prices, the struggle for energy markets will intensify. No matter in what areas energy cooperation may develop in the future, its main task will be attracting investment, technologies and human capital into the Russian fuel/energy sector.
It seems Washington wants to provoke China into muscle-flexing. If Beijing shows restraint and cold calculation in response, this may have a restrictive, if not sobering, effect on Washington. Russia is interested in preventing the South China Sea from becoming a proving ground for testing the strength of one’s nerves.
The G20 meeting in China was a milestone in international relations. Until only recently, world leaders were certain that the global economy and increased connectivity had helped stabilize and define the new world order. Now, however, the pendulum has turned back towards a classic game between the great powers, and Russia is again feeling right in its element.
How has decay of the American Empire affected globalization? Does the apparent fragmentation of older, Bretton Woods era, more universal forms of global governance into more regional forms imply US relative decline?
The North Korean issue has become an irritant not only in relations between “continental” and “oceanic” powers, but also within each of the camps and specifically between the United States and South Korea, and Russia and China.
A careful management of diverging interests and lingering conflicts of Russia and China in Central Asia, and expanding economic links as a gradual approach to economic integration could amount to something the EU can learn—and benefit—from.
Russia might have a unique chance to take a qualitative leap as part of a new industrial revolution rather than catch up with the outgoing technological mode. Preparing human resources for such a leap may be the quintessence of Russia’s current countercyclical policy.
The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
The “One Belt, One Road” strategic initiative is a focus and priority for China’s foreign strategy in the new century. What is particularly interesting is that this inter-regional cooperation initiative driven by concrete projects aims to link the Eurasian Economic Union with systemic policies and institutional designs.
Beijing is trying to bring the understanding of China’s role in World War II inside the country and abroad in line with its present status in global politics and economics. But these efforts bring some controversial facts to the surface.
National historical narratives describing the grandeur of “our” nation and its struggle for good against evil are the intrinsic ailment of history. But there are also historians who take such narratives with a grain of salt. If society prosecutes historians who lay the groundwork for critical public dialogue about the past, it will lose the only effective remedy for national narcissism.
With the formation of the TPP, regionalism is advancing to a new, transcontinental level and turning into mega-regionalism, which undermines the basis for multilateral liberalization of world trade. It brings to the fore the right of the strongest and most prosperous countries to identify the vectors of economic integration.
Several significant changes have taken place with regard to China’s foreign strategies in the last 50 odd years.
This paper presents the basics of a strategy for re-industrialization and economic rebalancing that starts from the highest available technology at the world level.
A nineteenth-century imperial policy is an anachronism in the modern world. Objectively speaking, post-Soviet Russia has returned to the nineteenth century, and it thinks that Western powers conduct the same policy. It is not able to understand why it may not do what others do.
In the fifteen years since the 1998 crisis, the so-called Emerging and Developing Asia has become a new engine of global economic growth.
Power politics is not “back” after having been away on some vacation. It has always been here. What is different today is that power plays are more visible because other countries are pushing back harder.
For the first time in history, Russia, previously only as a military power, now has a chance to enter the Asia-Pacific region as a factor of peace. And this may make it a unique player, so much needed to balance Asia.
There is clear recognition in both Moscow and Tokyo that a Sino-centric continent is not in their interests. Russia and Japan are obliged to recalculate their strategies in order to adapt for a future geopolitical realignment in Asia. Both sides recognize the stakes and that the rules of the game are no longer static.
As in Soviet Russia, a reunification can be achieved by changing the incentives for all North Koreans, and by offering its leaders a safe, honorable and beneficial way out of the deteriorating situation. The Moscow model for Korean unification is a detailed proposal to secure this result.
The Asia-Pacific Region’s growing global economic and political importance was a clear priority for all those attending APEC 2012 in Vladivostok.
When Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kuril Islands, first as president and then as prime minister, international commentators denounced Russia for its tactless conduct and imperial ambitions, as Japan considers these islands its Northern Territories.
Dmitry Medvedev has visited the Kuril Islands again, this time as prime minister.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The world economy enters a new phase of prolonged recession without any breakthrough in sight. International community seems no longer capable of creating new global initiatives
The article reveals causes of the social protest and the emergence of qualitatively new components in relationship between the elite and society.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.