On Wednesday, October 11, a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council takes place in Sochi with the participation of the presidents of Eurasian Economic Union countries.
October 30 to November 3, 2015, was marked by the first large-scale visit made by the U.S. Secretary of State to Central Asia, covering all five countries of the region.
The Central Asian states have endeavored over the past two decades to maintain the appropriate amount of distance from the regional hegemon, Russia.
The fashion for Central Asia in international political and expert circles is notably weaker than what it was 10 or 15 years ago. This is due to the logic of international developments and the emergence of permanent sources of instability and tensions in other parts of the world, primarily in the Middle East.
In 2011, four Central Asian states signed a Joint Plan of Action in Ashgabat pledging to work together to counter radicalization and terrorism in the region.
Despite its geographical remoteness from conflicts involving radical Islamists, the Russian Far East is not completely isolated from them. Preventing the growth of extremist threats in the Russian Far East and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole requires joint efforts of all states concerned.
Central Asian countries will have to adjust their old stakes, which have failed, and make new ones. They will largely depend on the positions external partners will take. But countries in the region want economic cooperation without a geopolitical “burden.”
A hypothetical alliance between Russia and China is based on the assumption that it should serve as a counterweight to the U.S. hegemony. That thinking, however, overlooks the possibility that Moscow and Beijing might build closer relations for dealing with the important challenges they both face.
The migration corridor that has formed between the countries of Central Asia and Russia is one of the largest and most stable in Eurasia and the world.
The SCO summit in Tashkent and Russian President's visit to China which took place in June have provided a good occasion to discuss the need for strengthening multilateral cooperation and ensuring regional security.
The only strategic response to the global water challenge and international competition for water would be to improve water use efficiency by redistributing water intakes and introducing new water use technologies. Importantly, these measures do not require redistributing water flows among countries.
U.S. policymakers confront a paradox in Eurasian politics: more pluralistic Central Asian states are more prone than the region’s solidly authoritarian states to ethno-nationalist violence.
In the early 1990s, scholars, journalists, and political observers predicted that the new Central Asian states would descend into chaos and break apart. More than 20 years later, Central Asia’s states seem relatively stable, both at their political centers and outlying territories, including states like Tajikistan that were once embroiled in civil war.
Not so long ago Russia was the only country to advocate the adoption of a code of responsible conduct in cyberspace. Today the expert community is already actively discussing the need for such a code with regard to the global Internet infrastructure.
At the summit in Ufa, Russia should give the green light to the establishment of an SCO Development Bank where China takes dominant positions in the authorized capital and management bodies. In exchange, Moscow could coordinate investment principles on terms that would be most favorable to itself and its partners.
Russia proposes an integration project that envisages the strengthening of external economic borders to stimulate re-industrialization. Central Asian states are interested in the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, but they do not want to impose tighter control on their external economic borders.
Russia can be deservedly proud that it achieved its main goals in 1992-1994. The methods employed were almost exclusively peaceful, despite attempts by both parties to drag Russia into the confrontation. By all standards, national reconciliation in Tajikistan remains a landmark event in the modern history of Russian diplomacy.
The CSTO has not shown any signs of activity during its two decades of existence. The mechanism to realize its potential remains unclear; i.e., it is unlikely that a Belarus or an Armenian soldier will guard the Tajik-Afghan border, or that a Tajik or a Kyrgyz will intervene between Armenia and Azerbaijan in case of an armed clash.
Analysts have long observed that Central Asian countries are not seriously tackling the growing backlog of problems plaguing the region, and recent events give cause for a gloomy outlook.
The next six-year cycle of Russia’s foreign policy does not promise any easy victories. The previous six years could be likened to a breakneck cavalry charge against a complacent enemy.
The resignation of Armenia’s Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan after more than a week of mass protests in Russia’s backyard begs the question: Why has Moscow not intervened so far?
The Russian-Chinese relations can be called excellent. However, this is what makes one think very seriously about the future of these relations. It is the main problem of any success: having achieved something, one always has to stop and think what to do next.
The history of sanctions against Iran deserves close analysis in light of the growing sanctions pressure on Russia. Although Iran and Russia are different countries facing different sanctions paradigms, Iran’s experience is meaningful if only because both countries have to contend with US sanction law.
The emerging trend towards de-dollarization in the EAEU can make domestic monetary policy more efficient as well as facilitate economic integration in the Eurasian space.