The presidential election is still two weeks away and the inauguration of the next president more than two months off, but we can already analyze the results of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency.
Much has been written about the Arab Spring of 2011 and rightly so: no other event in world politics had such wide-ranging effects both in the region and far beyond.
The West and the rising rest are poised to compete over principles, status, and geopolitical interests as the shift in global power quickens. The challenge for the West and the rest alike is to forge a new and pluralistic order – one that preserves stability and a rules-based international system amid the multiple versions of modernity that will populate the next world.
Bush remembers the tragedy of Charles V of Habsburg and Philip II of Spain who strove to keep one world under one sensible hegemony and, despite defeating major adversaries, failed over the stubborn resistance of rebels and heretics then in Holland and yesterday in Iraq – debt and imperial overstretching as predicted by Paul Kennedy.
In the post-nuclear age, or rather beginning with NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia, military campaigns have actually turned into international political campaigns. The new strategic logic aims not to destroy an enemy state but to overpower it with a view to subordinating it to the victor’s interests politically and economically.
The bottom strategic line could not be clearer: Russia is no longer a superpower, even if some in the Kremlin hanker after such standing. Consequently, Russia must recognize the nature of its decline (just like Britain) and better prepare for today’s challenges rather than re-fighting the old ones.
This week’s meeting of the NATO-Russia Council draws a line under an interesting and revealing discussion on joint missile defense.
The vote in the UN Security Council that sanctioned military intervention in Libya may have serious consequences for European politics.
There can be no “national” solution to the Caucasus in that a number of ethnic disputes and irredentist claims overlap presently demarcated territorial state borders. Moreover, the membership of these states in either NATO or in the CSTO is not panacea either, in that membership in these separate military camps and command structures, even if these camps can be aligned, would not work to better integrate the entire Caucasus region.
The discussions about Russia’s possible membership in NATO, although not followed up on, once again have created an opportunity to probe positions and see certain changes in the opinions of a growing number of politicians, above all in Europe. These discussions have also prompted people to look at this issue from a more specific point of view: “If Russia cannot join NATO, then why?”
Global politics seems to have been going slightly mad for quite a while now, but the past few months have seen this outbreak rise to critical levels.
NATO can survive for a fairly long time in its present condition because it is to the benefit of its participants, especially the Europeans.
Containment, especially when based on nuclear deterrence, was the main link in the vicious circle that emerged in Russian-U.S. relations after World War II. The situation has changed dramatically since then, but people’s mindsets have not – you can’t trust the one you seek to deter. The lack of mutual trust makes it highly difficult to resolve conflicts.
This past year saw a lot of speculation about whether Russia will ultimately join NATO.
News about Russia’s alleged intention to contribute forces to the Western coalition in Afghanistan has made headlines on both sides of the Atlantic in the past few days.
Greater Europe is at a crossroads. Twenty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, it remains divided, unable to unify into a global force.
The ongoing changes in the international arena are becoming ever faster and bigger.
The anti-nuclear movement is harmful. Firstly, it may result in the reduction of nuclear armaments to a dangerous minimum, as it opens the Pandora’s Box of negotiations over the reduction of non-strategic nuclear armaments. Secondly, it distracts from the search for new ways of setting peace and stability in the new world.
The teamwork philosophy underlies Russia’s foreign policy. Its top priority is creating favorable external conditions for comprehensive modernization of the country, diversification of the economy and its transition to an innovation development model. We do not need confrontation and we will never opt for it.
At a roundtable event in Moscow, top experts debated the “hypocritical” and “insincere” foreign policies of both Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era.
Vladimir Putin has mentioned several times that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical mistake. Although these words were often interpreted as his desire to constitute that country, there is little reason to believe this.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
If the larger picture defies prediction, the immediate future is scarcely more transparent. In the U.S. case, the known unknowns are numerous. They begin with the question of how much deck furniture Trump is willing to overturn in order to pursue an “America First” strategy.
In the wake of the For Fair Elections protest movement in Russia in 2011-2012, the Kremlin initiated a new strategy of state-society relations that was aimed at diminishing the propensity for protest in the next election cycle.
Belarus’ traditional structural dependence on Russia is increasing, and Minsk’s freedom of maneuver continues to shrink.