Russia in Global Affairs

For citation, please use:
Savinykh, M.A., 2025. Experts and the Government in Russian Foreign Policy. Russia in Global Affairs, 23(3), pp. 126–140. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2025-23-3-126-140

In recent decades, the word ‘expert’ has increasingly been used in global public and political discourse. Many socially important decisions are accompanied by assurances that they are based on independent and highly qualified expertise.

As Christina Boswell postulates, expert knowledge shapes policymaking in three distinct ways. First, it serves an instrumental function when “governments and civil servants recognize that expert knowledge is crucial for improving the quality of their output” (Boswell, 2009, p. 30), directly refining policy decisions. Secondly, it has a substantiating function when used “to lend credibility to particular policy positions or decisions” (Ibid, p. 73). Thirdly, it has a legitimizing function as “draw[ing] on expert knowledge” (p. 47) enhances an organization’s authority, facilitating the implementation of its deisions. However, little is known about what experts (including in IR) think of their interactions with “practitioners” (officials and politicians) and how this affects their (un)willingness to participate in the foreign policy process.

What we know about foreign policy experts

There is a large body of work on experts’ interaction with the authorities in various countries—of the so-called West (Jasanoff, 1990, 2004, 2019; Collins and Evans, 2008; McGann, Viden and Rafferty, 2014) and of the equally abstract East and South (Stone, Denham and Garnett, 1998; Jones, 2019). Russia is no exception (Malinova, 2013; Sungurov, 2020; Balayan and Sungurov, 2022). These studies mainly deal with domestic policy issues, such as the role of experts in major reforms of the state (Ladi, 2005), education (Burns, 1981), urban policy (Kitchin et al., 2017; Davidson, 2022), etc.

Foreign policy and international relations are discussed far more rarely, for various reasons. Firstly, any political process is largely a black box (Allison, 1969). Researchers trying to understand it can rely only on outward appearances (Easton, 1965; Wellstead, Rayner, and Howlett, 2013). Secondly, the inner structure of that black box is so large and sophisticated that those who do occasionally get inside cannot grasp its entire essence, especially given the high degree of confidentiality in the foreign policy sphere, where outsiders are treated with caution and distrust. (For example, one respondent, with whom I had already had several contacts, told me that during the first interview many of my questions “embarrassed” him. At that moment there was no trust between us, and it took time to build it).

Nevertheless, attempts have been made to gain insight. For example, there is a debate about whether expert knowledge can be neutral (Ingold and Gschwend, 2014; Rietig, 2014), with recent studies increasingly suggesting that it is often caught up in bureaucratic-political conflicts (McQuade, 2016) or social factors (Stampnitzky, 2013). For instance, the EU’s External Action Service, a liberal, elitist, and bureaucratic establishment, often turns to those researchers and think tanks which share the EU’s institutional culture, values, and goals (Korneev and Kluczewska, 2022, p. 662). This inhibits critical analysis of the EU’s past, present, and future actions, and makes the relation between knowledge producer and consumer symbolic rather than real (Boswell and Smith, 2017). Hence Brussels often seeks expert support for decisions that have already been taken (Korneev and Kluczewska, 2022). (As some of my respondents point out, the EU is by no means unique in this respect.)

Another philosophical question of practical importance is raised in Federica Bicchi’s work, in which she differentiates between information (factual, descriptive material) and knowledge (analysis, interpretation) (Bicchi, 2013). Per this dichotomy, the EU External Action Service seeks information more than analysis (Korneev and Kluczewska, 2022).

An equally important question is the degree of experts’ engagement efficiency in the foreign policy process, with scholars setting a lower (Byman and Kroenig, 2016) or higher (Jentleson and Ratner, 2011) bar for the degree of influence necessary to warrant experts’ participation. Some scholars regard involvement in the formation of government decisions efficient if their expert knowledge has had a clear priority in taking decisions by the government (Jentleson and Ratner, 2011). Others suggest that it is sufficient for expert ideas to be taken into consideration during discussions by the officials, even if they are ultimately rejected (Byman and Kroenig, 2016).

While regional expertise is particularly important for political decision-making, area experts have often found themselves disregarded. In the U.S., area studies enjoyed a golden age in the 1950s-1960s, when they were generously funded by the government and universities in the context of the Cold War. In the 1970s, the U.S. government came to prioritize statistical methods over expert knowledge, which was seen at best as raw material for hypothesis testing (Panel Discussion, 2019). Although the situation changed somewhat in the 1980s-1990s, statistical methods continue to prevail today. Many academic journals prefer research papers based on quantitative methods and generalizable findings, which often ignore local contexts. Marginalization of specialists on the Middle East and Islam arguably permitted the 9/11 attacks (Fukuyama, 2005) and led to U.S. failures in post-Saddam Iraq (Long et al., 2015). However, area expertise has been always in demand in U.S. foreign policy towards major geopilitical rivals: during the Cold War, Sovietologists enjoyed considerable influence, just as Sinologists do today (Sil, 2020; McCourt, 2022).

Soviet/Russian area specialists have had their own failures and achievements, including invaluable research works (Kuznetsov, 2023, 2024). Experts from IR and area studies institutions—the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of Africa, and MGIMO—wrote reports for the Ministry of Forein Affairs and the Central Committee of the CPSU, but also participated in official negotiations (e.g., on disarmament) and confidential missions (e.g., to establish contacts with the Kurdish movement in Iraq or the Israeli government) (Arbatov, 2008; Primakov, 2012, 2015; Cherkasov, 2016).

There have also been cases of the government’s complete defiance of expert opinion, such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Primakov, 2012). In general, the 1990s were difficult for political decision-making, as ideological liberalization triggered the creation of many new expert organizations, while lack of funding led to brain drain (Lebedeva, 2004, 2013; Kaczmarska, 2020).

As for the present day, foreign policy experts mostly have no wish or opportunity to interact with the government (Kaczmarska, 2019, 2020; Graef, 2019; Okunev and Graef, 2019; Varfolomeev et al., 2020, 2021).

Several questions pertaining to the topic remain outside of specialists’ attention: When are experts allowed to participate in the foreign-policy process? How do they view this experience, and how does it subsequently influence their attitude towards the analytical support of foreign-policymaking? This paper attempts to serve as a starting point for broader academic discussion of these issues.

Data and research methodology

This article is based on 22 interviews with representatives of various organizations operating under the Russian Academy of Sciences, MGIMO, and Higher School of Economics, as well as with former and current members of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP).

Judging by their KPIs, these organizations are not officially tasked with analytically supporting the government, and do not operate with the expectation of funding for such support. This also applies to RIAC, where a significant portion of funds is spent on educational, outreach, and research activities. According to one respondent, the Institute of International Studies (IIS) at MGIMO may be an exception, as it is subordinate to the MFA and its KPIs include analytical support for the MFA. However, other respondents working at the IIS said that it is not actually involved in this.

Almost all foreign policy analytical centers in Russia are state-funded.

But many “independent” foreign-policy experts affiliate with educational or research institutions. For example, scholars affiliated with RIAC identify themselves as “independent RIAC experts”, as they are not officially on the payroll and are not engaged in academic training or research work within this institution.

Most of my respondents are experts on specific countries or regions, or specialists in specific fields, such as disarmament. In selecting interviewees, I relied on recommendations from scholars or on the person’s general professional reputation. If a person is often invited for comment by RIAC or SVOP, he/she is regarded as an expert. All of my respondents are recognized as experts in their fields by the academic community.

The initial idea behind the study was to see whether there was any interaction between experts and the state. Some respondents have had episodic and brief interactions with government agencies, others advise government bodies on a systemic basis. While the relevance to this work of the latter is clear, the former group is also of interest, as their experience, even if negatively-perceived, helps to draw a more comprehensive picture of expert-government cooperation.

All respondents’ answers and summaries are anonymous, coded R1-20. Respondents were reached through email, direct messages to personal Telegram channels, and (most successfully) referrals from previous respondents.

Nearly half of interview requests went nowhere, being ignored or rejected (mostly on the grounds of unavailability or Russia’s complex political situation).

Most respondents described formal interactions, through analytical notes or meetings of experts. A significant number of respondents met privately and informally with officials.

Almost all respondents were laconic and evasive, choosing their words carefully, given informal or formal nondisclosure obligations and uncertainty about what topics are permissible to discuss. As a result, some interviews were fruitless, while others revealed only minor, albeit interesting, details. However, there were also respondents who were extremely candid, on the condition that their replies remain private or be quoted only vaguely.

While officials’ perspectives are lacking from this data, the opinion of one side (e.g., criticism of authorities’ nonresponsiveness) is still valuable in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of expert-government interactions.

Skeptics

Contemporary academic literature often asserts that think tanks and individual experts should strive to influence the government or society (Balayan and Sungurov, 2022). Yet interviews with several respondents show that disappointing interactions with the government have left many experts uninterested in advising it.

For instance, the main task of a center researching East Asia is the accumulation of knowledge about its countries’ politics, societies, economies, histories, and relations with Russia. Its employees position themselves as bearers of practice-oriented knowledge [R7, 8]. The center regularly publishes workshop materials on the Internet. Yet its researchers claim that affecting society or the goverment is unimportant to them [R7, 8]. Another regional center’s leader similarly said: “Power is not an end in itself; it is not an indicator that is important to me” [R16]. Thus, for some experts, building up expert knowledge is sufficient and valuable per se. What happens to this knowledge afterwards is of secondary importance. The presence or absence of cooperation with the government does not affect the experts’ professional or social status.

But the government’s reluctance to accept advice, and the even greater rarity with which advice is implemented, also leads to experts’ disenchantment. Some respondents also complained about a lack of responsiveness: “Formally, there is feedback: you may receive some kind of thank-you messages in response to various memos. But the extent to which these thank-you notes reflect the real perception of your document, and to what extent they do not, is always a big question” [R4].

There is a widespread view that it is pointless to try to interest politicians or officials in the research institutions [R2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17], one that is born out of extremely disappointing past experiences: “Giving advice is of no interest at all. […] Nowadays, no one listens and no one wants to. […] There are a large number of external consultants working there [in the government… These people come and say, for example, at briefings in the State Duma or elsewhere, the things that they [the authorities] already know […] and want to hear. … I say things that are actually happening. They are unpleasant to hear. They require major changes to political decisions. No one wants to do that. This is not my cup of tea. I will never go there. The train has left the station” [R11].

Notably, the respondent holds that: “This type of situation is found not only here. It’s the same in the U.S. and Europe. […] I’ve seen it everywhere. No one wants to listen to anything. Because the political class has its own agenda, and it tailors its views of the world around it to fit that agenda” [R11]. Such a position is unlikely to be reconsidered under any circumstances.

Pragmatists

The second position acknowledges that the authorities are often uninterested in external expertise, but seizes the moment when the door is open. These experts carefully choose the topics in which they engage with the government, in order to avoid merely legitimizing decisions that have already been made (Boswell, 2009). They eschew politicized topics, regarding which their opinion is unlikely to be heard and might even complicate future cooperation. They focus on fairly narrow, somewhat “technocratic” areas [R15, R16, 17].

“If there is a request for my expertise, I will not refuse. If there is no request, to some extent this is an indication that what you are doing is not in demand. That is something to think about, but is not something that could determine my academic trajectory” [R16].

Adherents to this approach view cooperation in terms of relationships with individual officials, and are thus familiar with cases of interest and disinterest alike: “There are people who are interested, and there are those who are not. In my experience, their percentage varies. Very few people in law enforcement are interested. They usually do the opposite: first they make a decision, and then they have to explain why it is a good decision. But if we take the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the State Duma, there are some who are genuinely interested in expertise; they order it themselves and initiate it. But here it depends on the specific person. Therefore, it is difficult to talk about the authorities as a whole. You need to look at certain people holding specific positions” [R17].

Cooperation with the same office may vary depending on who is currently in charge. For example, the head of an MFA department showed great interest in one respondent’s analysis, translating it into concrete action, but under the next department head, the cooperation continued in a purely formalistic manner [R16].

This reflects the difficulty of examining expert-government cooperation from an institutional point of view. Even if agencies are ordered to request expert advice and given the funds to pay for it, successful cooperation is also dependent on ‘soft’ institutionality similar to Chinese guanxi—informal horizontal and vertical links in society.

Enthusiasts

Finally, enthusiasts see advising the government as something just as important as research and teaching.

Interestingly, they often experience difficulties similar to those faced by the above groups. Every single respondent criticized the lack of feedback. For instance: “The [MFA] rarely writes detailed comments on the analytical information it receives. Although the Foreign Ministry did introduce a rule that a review must be written in response to each analytical memo received. A certain number of such reviews were written, but I get the impression that this practice has gradually faded out. We receive such reviews less and less often” [R6].

Another problem noted by enthusiasts is a substantial decline, compared to the 1990s and 2000s, in officials’ interest in expert assessments. This might be due to foreign policy shocks, during which it is quite difficult to examine the government’s decisions critically. (For instance, in the early 2000s, critics of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy were often ignored (Long et al., 2015)).

“At first, after these events [in 2014 and 2022], there was a growing wish to influence what was happening. There were active attempts to take the initiative …to send ideas and proposals to various organizations. Such attempts were made. But the further we moved away from these events, the clearer it became that there was a certain established line that was very difficult to influence. Gradually… many expert centers moved away from making these issues the focus of discussion. There was a noticeable return of all research centers to the topics they had been working on before…” [R6].

Notably, this expert remains committed to advising the government. A similar approach was outlined by other experts who initially sought to influence government decisions on Russian foreign policy in specific regions or spheres [R1, 3, 6, 10, 21]. Their stories mostly pertain to Asian and African countries, but are not limited to them.: “Some experts returned to discussing the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, without mentioning Ukraine at all, while others set their eyes back on interethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, also without comparing them to what was happening in Donbass” [R6].

Since 2022, experts have distanced themselves from the “hottest” topics and retreated into their disciplinary/geographical specializations: “These were interesting events that could be interpreted in various ways, including in terms of Russian foreign policy, and I wrote a number of articles about them, including in academic journals, and made some proposals. Since 2022, my focus has been mostly on China” [R3].

Some experts continued to do their job with due diligence. As one respondent put it, “simply out of inertia” [R3].

The enthusiasts’ commitment to advising Russian foreign policy agencies may have different explanations. Above all, this position was often voiced by those working for government-funded institutions. However, not all employees share this enthusiasm.

So, formal affiliation with government bodies does not mean that the expert will be enthusiastic about such work.

*  *  *

This research has identified three main groups of experts. Skeptics completely refuse to cooperate with the government, based on negative experiences that have led to a view of the government’s total disinterest in outside advice. Pragmatists do not see influencing the government as their main task, but take the opportunity to do so when it presents itself, usually as determined by the ‘human factor.’ Enthusiasts see the analytical support of foreign policy as one of their main professional motivations.

Varying experiences with the government could be responsible for dividing the experts into these groups. The skeptics did, in fact, experience total rejection by the government. However, the pragmatists and enthusiasts both encountered the same problems, such as poor feedback from the state. Thus, it is not only the experience that matters, but how it is interpreted. “Experience is not what happens to a man; it is what a man does with what happens to him” (Huxley, 1933, p. 5). And this is likely determined by the experts’ initial attitudes: those, for whom expert and analytical support of the state is important for professional identity, will strive to provide it regardless of the difficulties in doing so.

This is undoubtedly a pleasant conclusion for those in power, as there will always be people on whom they can rely for external expertise. However, as the experience of several respondents shows, the current relationship between experts and the state does not allow all talented and capable specialists to reveal their potential. In this article, I deliberately wrote little about the objective structure of this relationship; that is for a separate study. This article was concerned with the relationship’s perception by experts, which turns out to be negative or at least extremely reserved.

The government will be able to find many reasonable arguments that this perception is inaccurate. This clash of perceptions can be resolved through a “cultural rupture” (Kaplan, 1979) in which the experts and decisionmakers go their separate ways. But if the authorities want to attract experts, it is important to not only support their work, but also to engage in dialogue with them, to listen to them and hear them. More specifically, the state should show that it truly needs and values the knowledge and expertise of the expert community, a gesture that would be appreciated, and not only by the skeptics.