Russia in Global Affairs

With participation of: Bogdan A. Barabash, Evgeniia S. Komarova, Khusravkhon Kh. Nabiev, Dylan P. Royce

 

Presenting IHES

 

Since 2021, a research team comprising faculty members and graduate students from MGIMO and HSE has been conducting an annual international expert survey on hierarchy in international relations (IR): the International Hierarchy Expert Survey (IHES). The survey was first conceived and conducted at the end of 2021 as part of a study on the relationship between states’ status and their roles in key global agendas.[1] However, it was clear that the value of the results would increase as more data was accumulated. Hence, the survey has been conducted annually since then.

A state’s status in international relations is not an inherent characteristic like economic or military power. In Niklas Luhmann’s new systems theory, status is defined through actors’ collective observation of the international system. In other words, status is a product of how a state is perceived within the international relations system. Thus, status can be most directly measured by surveying the epistemic community of IR experts.

The IHES is conducted in English, online, anonymously and confidentially. Invitations are sent primarily by email, using snowball sampling.[2] As with other types of social surveys, the number of respondents is smaller than the total population. To minimize potential systematic biases and enhance the validity of observations, the survey responses undergo post-stratification weighting (see Appendix 1: «Methodological Notes»).

Each survey wave spans several months around a new year. The first wave, at the end of 2021, had 76 respondents from 23 countries. The second wave, covering 2022, had 86 respondents from 31 countries, and led to a technical report.[3]

The third wave, conducted from December 2023 to March 2024, had 158 respondents from 49 countries. Respondents range in age from 20 to 90. 54% are IR scholars, 27% are specialists in related fields (economics and the social sciences), 11% are IR practitioners, and 8% are graduate students and upper-level undergraduates specializing in IR and related disciplines.

The IHES consistently considers states that are members of the G20, are held by experts to aspire to regional leadership, and/or have nuclear weapons. These criteria yield a core group of 26 countries: the US, China, Russia, Germany, France, India, the UK, Japan, Turkey, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, Italy, Israel, South Korea, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Mexico, Egypt, Pakistan, Nigeria, Argentina, North Korea, and Poland.

There is also a rotating group of additional states, selected each year based on recent developments and regional quotas. This is based on the fluidity of the boundary between «middle powers» and «small states», which necessitates testing states outside the core group in order to identify those that are approaching the status of «middle power». In the second wave of the survey, the rotating group included Chile, Ukraine, and Vietnam. In the third wave, it included Hungary, Ukraine again, the UAE, and Ethiopia.

The survey includes a set of core questions each year, focusing on states’ status and roles and on the importance of functional subsystems (spheres) of IR. Other questions rotate, repeating every two to three years. This allows for the accumulation of data on a broader range of topics while maintaining acceptable quality. Collecting data on rotating questions every two to three years should adequately reflect trends due to the stable nature of the measured phenomena.

The survey has gradually expanded in sample size, geographic coverage, and the range of its questions. Efforts have been undertaken to ensure results’ cross-year comparability. The collected data is used to calculate several indices developed by the research team.

This report presents IHES, its key data, and derived indices for 2023 (Wave III) compared to those of previous waves.

 

Power Status Index

 

 

The Power Status Index is determined by respondents’ assignment of states to the categories of small power, middle power, great power, and superpower (for details, see Appendix 1, «Methodological Notes»).

 

Three years of observations reveal significant dynamism in status hierarchy, with most countries shifting in their positions.

Russia is the only great power that did not change positions, remaining the leading great power even though its average score declined in both 2022 and 2023. Over the three years, the UK advanced from fifth to second place among the great powers, while Germany fell from second to fifth. India rose from third to second place in 2022 but returned to third in 2023. France, after falling from fourth to fifth place in 2022, regained fourth place in 2023.

Significant shifts in the hierarchy were also observed among middle powers. Nearly all of them (Turkey and Brazil being the only exceptions) changed their positions at least once over the three waves of observations.

Japan is notable since, for two waves, it was the leading middle power by a significant margin, actually closer to the lowest-ranked great power than to the next-highest middle power. And in 2023, Japan moved into the category of great power.

Despite this significant dynamism, most trajectories were inconstant. Only three countries (Russia, Germany, and Brazil) consistently declined, while only five (the UK, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and North Korea) consistently rose.

Additionally, countries tend to move within a given category. Transitions between categories are rare and, in two out of the three cases, were reversed the next year. The third case (Japan) occurred in the survey’s third wave and has yet to confirm its stability. Categories’ memberships, then, are relatively stable.

It is also worth noting that nuclear weapons do not guarantee high status. Israel is in the middle of the middle power category, Pakistan is near its bottom, and North Korea is considered a small power (albeit at the top of that category). On the other hand, of the seven-to-eight countries identified as superpowers and great powers, the top six have consistently had nuclear weapons. In other words, while there are nuclear-armed countries that are not great powers, nearly all super- and great powers possess nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons thus seem to be almost necessary, but not sufficient, for high status.

 

 

International Role Index

 

The International Role Index reflects a state’s overall significance across four functional domains identified as core to contemporary international relations: security, economy, climate, and the humanitarian agenda (for details, see Appendix 1, «Methodological Notes»).

 

The International Role Index correlates with the Power Status Index. We conducted a separate study on this topic using data from the first wave of IHES.[4] Data from the second and third waves confirm this correlation. Over the entire observation period, no middle power has ever surpassed even the lowest-ranked great power in its perceived overall significance in the four considered spheres of IR.

However, the 2022 and 2023 waves do display an intermingling of middle and small powers. For instance, Argentina consistently ranks at the bottom of the middle-power list, and falls behind five small powers on the International Role Index. Combined with the two instances of shift between the middle- and small-power categories (see the previous section), this suggests (apropos of the scholarly debate regarding middle-power criteria) that the middle-power category’s (especially lower) boundaries remain unclear.

Additionally, the order of great and middle powers is not identical in the Status and International Role indices, and countries frequently rise or decline on one index while moving in the opposite direction on the other. One explanation of such discrepancies is that some countries are valued more for their inherent attributes than for their contributions to global affairs, while others are valued less than their contributions would suggest. Another possibility is that some countries’ roles are systematically underestimated, while others are overestimated. It may also be that the two indices are highly correlated but not synchronous, with one serving as a leading indicator for the other. Testing these hypotheses will require the accumulation of additional data in future IHES waves.

More concretely, the International Role Index, like the Status Index, displays the significant but inconsistent movement of states in recent years. Only six countries have consistently risen in their scores. Notably, only one of these six states represents the G7, and four represent BRICS. Also notable is that four of these six are middle powers, potentially indicating that category’s growing significance.

The 2023 wave featured rising International Role Index scores for only two superpowers and great powers: the US (very slightly) and India (more significantly). All other superpowers and great powers saw their scores decline. Meanwhile, the index rose for several middle powers, perhaps further indicating their increasing role in global affairs.

The application of the indicators we developed— great-power-level role and near-great-power-level roles[5]—reveals that the gap between great and middle powers, in terms of global roles, remains substantial. The assertion of an increasing role for middle powers is fully accurate only for a few countries.

In the first and second waves of IHES, all great powers had great-power-level roles, and two middle powers could manage near-great-power-level roles.[6] In the third wave of IHES, most great powers’ International Role Index scores declined. For Russia and France, this decline has reduced them to near-great-power-levels. Japan, a newcomer among the great powers, also fits this category. Yet there are now no middle powers with near-great-power-level roles, suggesting that, at least for the moment, the gap between great and middle powers has actually widened.

Middle powers with the most International Role Index growth — Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Indonesia — could, if this trend continues, reach near-great-power-level-role in three to five years. These few states largely account for the growing role of middle powers. Therefore, we are observing not so much a growing significance of middle powers as a whole, but rather the rise of a few specific non-Western middle powers.

 

International Security Role Index

 

The International Security Role Index is based on respondents’ selection of «key states» for international security (for details, see Appendix 1, «Methodological Notes»).          

 

The hierarchy of countries based on the International Security Role Index does not closely align with the hierarchy based on Power Status Index. States representing the four status categories are intermingled. For instance, Israel (a middle power) is ascribed greater significance in security than are four of the six great powers. North Korea, a small power, surpasses two great powers and all middle powers except Israel.

At first glance, this might be interpreted to suggest that even middle and small powers can play a significant role in international security. However, more detailed analysis shows that the average International Security Role Index is notably higher for superpowers than for great powers, and for great powers than for middle powers. The two main exceptions possess nuclear weapons. 

In general, nuclear powers play a greater role in security matters than non-nuclear ones do. Of the nine de facto nuclear powers (including Israel), eight occupy the index’s top positions.

Across all survey waves, seven countries (the US, Russia, China, the UK, Israel, France, and Iran) consistently had great-power-level roles in security, and in each year they were joined by at least one of India, North Korea, and Turkey (whose roles shifted between great-power-level and near-great-power-level). Germany and Pakistan have consistently been ascribed a near-great-power-level role. This group of twelve includes all superpowers and great powers (except Japan), all nuclear powers, and two non-nuclear regional leaders (Iran and Turkey). Other countries lag significantly behind this group, and do not seem to be closing in.

 

International Economy Role Index

 

The International Economy Role Index is based on respondents’ selection of «key states» for the international economy (for details, see Appendix 1, «Methodological Notes»).

 

The economic hierarchy aligns with the power status hierarchy more closely than the security hierarchy does. However, some mismatches between economy and power status still exist. For example, South Korea, a middle power, ranks ahead of France, a great power. Saudi Arabia is ranked higher than Russia. The UAE, a small power, is ranked above about half of the middle powers, including active players like Turkey and South Africa.

More generally, the results of the International Economy Role Index are somewhat difficult to explain.

At the top are China, the US, and India, which aligns with their GDP(PPP) — but then Russia is missing from fourth place. Brazil and Indonesia are also ranked significantly below their GDP(PPP), behind South Korea and Saudi Arabia with significantly smaller GDPs (PPP). It may be that PPP is applied to only the very largest economies, but somehow this criterion becomes less significant when assessing the economic importance of other countries.

There is another oddity. Like other indices, the International Economy Role Index demonstrates significant dynamism, but only eight countries experience consistent improvement. Of these, only three of them (Nigeria, Iran, and Poland) have recently displayed GDP growth above the global average, while the rest (Germany, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Argentina) have seen far-below-average growth. Are stagnating economies growing in global significance?

Despite these oddities, some evaluations can still be made using the indicators great-power-level role and near-great-power-level role. Five countries consistently reach a great-power-level role in the international economy: China, the US, Germany, Japan, and the UK. Additionally, while India in 2021 had only a near-great-power-level role, it reached a great-power-level role in 2022, surpassing the UK in that year and Germany and Japan in the next. Aside from these six most economically-significant countries, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and France shift between levels at and near the level of a great power, while Russia and Brazil consistently display the latter. Together, these 11 countries are the main contributors to the global economic agenda. They include five G7 members and five BRICS members.

Aside from them, six countries — Italy, Turkey, Indonesia, the UAE, South Africa, and Mexico — have either temporarily reached near-great-power levels or consistently approached this threshold (notably, all besides Italy are non-Western). So, in the near future, the group of states believed to define the global economic agenda may expand from 11 to 17 (although this “maximum” scenario, in which all the «threshold» countries enter the leading group, is unlikely).

All other countries lag behind significantly and lack trajectories that could bring them into world’s leading economic group.

 

Climate Agenda Role Index

 

The Climate Agenda Role Index is based on respondents’ selection of «key states» for the international climate change agenda (for details, see Appendix 1, «Methodological Notes»).

 

Despite changes in the ordering of states on the Climate Agenda Role Index, the trajectories of their scores are more consistent than on other indices — and almost uniformly negative. Brazil’s rise from ninth to sixth to third place — which, if continued, will bring it above China in one year and above the US in three — is partly due to improvements in its actual score, but mainly due to most other states’ declining scores, which have generally fallen faster than those of the few rising states have increased. This imbalance likely reflects a loss of international interest in the climate agenda.

This is most notable among the great powers, which all declined in their scores over the observation period, as did China — but not the US. Most middle powers had also negative dynamics.

Four countries — China, the US, India, and Germany — are consistently at a great-power level (although the scores of all but the US have recently declined), and Brazil has now joined this group. Four others — Russia, France, Canada, and the UK — declined from great-power levels in 2021 to near-great-power levels by 2023.

Besides these nine main global climate players, Japan and Australia have displayed near-great-power level scores in two of the three survey waves, while Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are close to that threshold. However, these countries have inconsistent trajectories. 

More generally, the group of leaders could either expand or contract in the future, given many countries’ rapid loss of score on the index and interest in the subject.

 

Humanitarian Role Index

 

 

The Humanitarian Role Index is based on respondents’ selection of «key states» for the international humanitarian agenda (for details, see Appendix 1, «Methodological Notes»).

 

The trends visible in the Climate Role Index are even more pronounced in the Humanitarian Role Index.

All states — except for Saudi Arabia, which has risen from 28th to 15th to 13th place, mainly due to others’ decline — have displayed falling scores.

Only the US has a consistently great-power level, while the UK and Germany reached that threshold in two of three years, and France and Canada in 2021. Only these five countries — all the Western superpowers and great powers, plus the middle power of Canada — have reached near-great-power level or above in every year, forming the core group of players on the international humanitarian agenda. Below these are China (near-great-power level in 2021 and 2022), Japan, India, Russia, Turkey, and Italy (near-great-power level in 2021). All others (including Saudi Arabia) lag well behind these eleven. 

Interestingly, the index scores are quite similar for the non-Western superpowers and great powers of China, Russia, and India.

These results reflect a perception of Western powers’ dominance over the international humanitarian agenda (as it is currently understood). However, their roles are diminishing within their own agenda, without any comparable rise in that of others. Altogether, this indicates a deep crisis in the humanitarian agenda. Non-Western powers lack interest in the agenda, as it is shaped by the West, and non-Western conceptualizations of it are still relatively weak.

 

Prioritizing Agendas

 

In the second and third waves of IHES, respondents were asked: “What is more important for the international system in the long run?” rating objectives in the four functional spheres. The objectives are: maintaining international security, fostering global economic development, dealing with climate change and its consequences, and promoting human rights (humanitarian agenda). Based on this data, the diagram for this section was created.

Experts consistently prioritize international security. The climate agenda was ranked second and the economic agenda third in 2022, before switching places in 2023. But the gap between them is minimal and they are essentially tied for second place. Interestingly, the gap between each of them versus security has shrunk significantly, suggesting increased demand for economic and climatic quality of life (despite the difficulties, noted in previous sections, in determining which states contribute the most to it). Lastly, the humanitarian agenda has fallen further behind, reinforcing the observation (see the previous section) of its deep crisis.

 

Combining Hegemony, Revisionism, and Status Data

In the third wave of IHES, respondents categorized seven superpowers and great powers (at the global level) and all 30 countries (at the regional level) as «already a hegemon», «aspires to become a hegemon», or «has no hegemonic ambitions». A weighted share of the respondents’ answers was used to construct figures for this section.

 

Figure 1 depicts a direct positive relationship between status and global hegemony, aligning with all major theoretical paradigms. However, the relationship is remarkably asymptotic: only superpowers are ascribed significant global hegemony, and even China lags significantly behind the US, much more than it does in terms of status. Also note the size of the circles in Figure 1, which indicates states’ scores on the Revisionism Index (evaluating the degree of states’ revisionism, an effort to change the “rules of the game”, rather than maintaining the status quo[7]).  The US — the leader in both status and global hegemony — has a low Revisionism Index score, while many states with lower hegemony and status have more revisionism. However, this relationship is not constant, as China has a relatively high revisionism score, while three of the five great powers have a low one. In fact, all non-Western superpowers and great powers have high revisionism, while all Western ones have a low score.

Figure 2 depicts a cluster of Russia, China, and India, featuring both global hegemonic ambitions (x-axis) and revisionism (y-axis). All Western countries have little assessed revisionism, but France and Britain are seen as having relatively high hegemonic ambitions, close to those of non-Western powers. In short, the non-Western powers are willing/forced to revise the rules of the game in pursuit of greater power/influence, while Western powers pursue their ambitions within the existing rules. Notably, India forms a group with Russia and China in Figure 2, but its perceived revisionism is noticeably lower than theirs. In the future, India may either approach the ambitious Western great powers or, more likely, occupy an intermediate position between those who pursue their ambitions through revisionism and those who do not. However, as of 2023, India is perceived as closer to the former.

Figure 3 depicts a clear direct positive relationship between regional hegemony (x-axis) and status (y-axis), one that is stronger and more linear (less asymptotic) than for global hegemony and status in Figure 1. But, as in Figure 1, revisionism (circle size) and status are not linearly related, as the most revisionist states are those with middling (not low) status and regional hegemony. 

Figure 4 indicates high regional hegemonic ambitions amongst non-Western middle powers, as well as India and France (the only Western power). It also replicates Figure 2’s division between revisionist and (more commonly) non-revisionist ambitious states. However, among the most ambitious countries listed above, revisionism is greater, particularly for Iran and India.

In conclusion, status and regional hegemony are more strongly correlated than are status and global hegemony. Great powers — and to some extent even China — have high status, but lesser global hegemony.

It also may be that the global political stage is so «distorted» by American hegemony that even great powers and superpowers cannot fully express themselves at that level. In any case, the varying gaps between status and hegemony are significant to the study of contemporary IR.

 

Expectation of Major But Gradual Changes in the International Order

 

In the third wave of IHES, respondents were asked to identify the decades that saw the greatest changes in international hierarchy. Based on their responses, Figure 1 was created (because of multiple choice the total of all answers exceeds 100%).

After World War II, the Cold War’s end, and World War I—major confrontations ending in the victory of one side and the defeat of the other — the 2020s were placed fourth, named almost as often as the 1990s and 1910s.

 

Figure 1. Which decades saw the biggest shifts in international hierarchy?

 

But respondents were also asked: “In the contemporary world, how much time does it usually take for a state to transition from one status category to another?”. Figure 2 was created based on the responses to this question.

Significant improvements in status are expected to take 10-30 years—or even longer—while no possibility is seen of them occurring in less than a year. Yet loss of status is seen as potentially happening faster. The majority of responses were spread 20 54,8% 79,3% across four intervals: 1-5 years, 5-10 options fell within the range of 20-35%. years, 10-30 years, and 30-80 years, with no clear favorite, as all of these options fell within the range of 20-35%. This implies a more cautious outlook and practical policy.

 

Figure 2. In the contemporary world, how much time does it usually take for a state to transition from one status category to another?

 

Country Profiles: Super and Great Powers

 

 

Country Profiles: Middle Power

 

Country Profiles: Small Powers

 

Conclusion

 

This report presents the key indices based on IHES data. Its observations and limited interpretations are the authors’ own. The data can be variously analyzed and utilized, offering opportunities for research within and beyond the indices. IHES data can be employed for country- specific or regional analyses, as well as in combination with various objective (e.g. economic, military, etc.) parameters to explore the relationship between objective reality and the epistemic community’s aggregated perceptions.

In the field of IR, it is customary to use material indicators such as GDP, population, or military expenditure as indicators of state power. However, some IR paradigms, particularly neoclassical realism and constructivism, argue that a state’s perceived characteristics are at least as important as its objective resources in determining political outcomes. The IHES, through its rigorous methodological approach, quantifies such abstract perceptions, expanding possibilities for their application in research.

The IHES dataset also itself forms a distinct research agenda. Potential lines of inquiry include the relationship between an actor’s status, roles, regional/ global ambitions, and revisionism, as well as the temporal asymmetry between upward and downward status trends. These opportunities will expand along with future data.

Of particular interest is the differentiated impact of roles in certain functional spheres upon a state’s status. Changes in the significance of the four main functional spheres —international security, economic development, humanitarian issues, and climate agendas—affect not only various international processes, but also the status of states with differing capacities and roles in these spheres.

The dynamics of status and role also merit attention. What contributes to the stability of a state’s status and position within the international system? Under what conditions can states alter their role specialization? These questions underscore the importance of a comprehensive approach to studying international relations, in which survey- based status measurement serves as a valuable research tool.

 

Appendix 1. Methodological Notes

 

Post-stratification weighting involves adjusting the collected survey responses based on the following respondent characteristics:

a) Country of origin. Weighting is applied to align the share of respondents from a given country with that country’s share of IR publications in 2022 according to Scimago.

b) Preferred paradigm of international relations theory. Weighting is applied to align the share of preferred paradigms in the sample with the paradigms’ popularity according to the TRIP Faculty Survey 2017.

c) Level of expertise: A weighting of 1 is assigned to IR researchers and practitioners, 0.75 to specialists in other social sciences, 0.5 to IR students, and 0.25 to students of other social sciences.

 

Survey-based indices. The responses collected during the survey are processed into indices that can be utilized for academic research and applied analytics.

The Power Status Index is derived from the weighted average (as outlined in the weighting procedure above) of respondents’ classification of countries into four status categories: «superpower,» «great power,» «middle power,» and «small power.» The initial responses are converted into numerical values: «small power» corresponds to 1, «middle power» to 2, «great power» to 3, and «superpower» to 4. As a result, the index values range from 1 to 4, with thresholds for determining a country’s status positioned midway between these «ideal» values. A «superpower» corresponds to an index above 3.5, a «great power» to an index between 2.5 and 3.5, a «middle power» to an index between 1.5 and 2.5, and a «small power» to an index below 1.5.

The International Role Index is calculated as the average of a country’s position on indices of its significance across four functional domains, and is measured on a scale from 0 to 4.

The significance indices for the four functional domains – security, economy, climate, and humanitarian[8] – are calculated as the weighted average of a state’s categorization as key (1) or not (0). Accordingly, four indices are calculated: International Security Role Index, International Economy Role Index, Climate Agenda Role Index, Humanitarian Role Index.

The Revisionism Index was calculated, in the second wave of IHES, based on a question about the extent to which each state exhibits revisionism (rather than maintaining the status quo) across the four main functional spheres. The index was measured on a scale from 0 to 4, based on the weighted average of all responses.

In the third wave of IHES, the question about revisionism was not included. Instead, experts were asked to assess states with respect to global and regional hegemony: «already a hegemon,» «aspires to become a hegemon,» and «has no hegemonic ambitions.»

The question about regional hegemony was asked regarding all countries, and the question about global hegemony was asked regarding the great powers and superpowers identified in IHES’s second wave.

Combining data on revisionism and hegemony (as it is done in the «Combining Hegemony, Revisionism, and Status Data» section of this report) expands analytical possibilities. Given the relative stability of these categories, it is permissible to merge data from different years for comparative analysis.

The experimental indicators great-power-level role and near- great-power-level role are calculated based on three specific considerations. 1) According to the chosen conceptual framework and related calculations, a great power cannot mathematically lag behind a superpower by more than 50% in the status index. Although no great power has reached this maximum lag during the observed period, it remains a theoretical possibility within the selected model. 2) Empirically, great powers have lagged behind superpowers by no more than one-third in the status index on average. 3) A strong correlation has been established between the status index and significance in functional spheres.[9]

These three factors allow for the definition of threshold values for the indicators: great-power-level role corresponds to a score exceeding two- thirds of the leading state’s value, while near-great-power-level role refers to a score below two-thirds but above half of the leading state’s value. Since these thresholds are determined not only through mathematical calculations but also based on empirical observations, future adjustments may be required as new data accumulates. Therefore, these indicators are appropriately classified as experimental.

 

Full IHES data is available at Harvard Dataverse

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PXVTEY

 

Academic article based on IHES Wave I results

Nesmashnyi A.D., Zhornist V.M., Safranchuk I.A. International Hierarchy and Functional Differentiation of States: Results of an Expert Survey // MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2022 ;15(3):7-38.

https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2022-olf2

 

Report based on IHES Wave II results

International Hierarchy Expert Survey Wave II. December 2023.

https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.23205.06882

 

Appendix 2. IHES Wave IV in progress

 

To participate access the Survey Form

https://forms.gle/ueprUWrqGmerSUNK8

(the survey is open till the end of March 2025)

 

IHES is conducted:

Anonymously (Leaving contact details is optional)

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Confidentially (contact details are not disclosed, results are published in anonymous version)

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To contact IHES team with questions or suggestions: [email protected]