ISSN 2618-9844 (Online version)
ISSN 1810-6374 (Print version)
Ivan V. Safranchuk - Senior Fellow, Institute of International Research, MGIMO University;
Associate professor, National Research University–Higher School of Economics.
SPIN RSCI: 9754-1094
ORCID: 0000-0003-2214-6628
ResearcherID: O-3257-2017
Scopus AuthorID: 57193867458
e-mail: latuk.info@gmail.com
Institute of International Research, MGIMO University
Office 319, 76 Vernadsky Prospect, Moscow, Russia
National Research University–Higher School of Economics
20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, Russia
Hypothetically, Russia and the U.S. may stop escalating their war of ideas if their material interests do not cross. This would be possible if they divide their zones of influence and respect them.
Relations between Russia and the United States are acquiring a new quality. Moscow and Washington can cooperate on certain individual issues, but strategically they are now on their own—certainly not in the same boat.
For all the importance of Trump’s victory, it is too early to say that the long-term liberal trend has been broken. A basis exists for a conservative correction, probably deep and long, but not for a complete turnaround.
Central Asian countries will have to adjust their old stakes, which have failed, and make new ones. They will largely depend on the positions external partners will take. But countries in the region want economic cooperation without a geopolitical “burden.”
In the American discourse concerning relations with Russia the realists’ calls for interaction with it run counter to the alarmists’ stubborn mantra that Russia’s attempts to question U.S. omnipotence should not be left without a harsh response.
Russia proposes an integration project that envisages the strengthening of external economic borders to stimulate re-industrialization. Central Asian states are interested in the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, but they do not want to impose tighter control on their external economic borders.
Although Moscow has no reasons to be proactive in Afghan affairs, it will probably need to step up its efforts. Ultimately, the Afghans should be given the opportunity to build up a steady balance of forces at home, and then use these forces as a basis for political compromise.
Russia by no means is interested in a defeat of the international forces in Afghanistan, as it would create new security problems. But Moscow does not see prospects for a military victory. And if these prospects appeared, they would give a green light to “Greater Central Asia” infrastructure projects that would be economically disadvantageous for Russia.
Relations between Russia and the United States are acquiring a new quality. Moscow and Washington can cooperate on certain individual issues, but strategically they are now on their own – certainly not in the same boat.
The talk about the SCO’s anti-American stance did not spring out of nothing. The organization openly pursues the goal of doing without the U.S. in resolving all challenges facing Central Asia. While it does not seek to oppose Washington either globally or regionally, the SCO does not want any links with Washington either. This means it wants to get along without the U.S., but not go against it.
A country seeking to return to the global stage as a major actor must find a well-planned solution to the problem of providing its foreign policy with sufficient resources. The volatility of foreign policy spending reveals the main problem: political decisions in Russia are poorly translated into budgetary categories and specific plans with a particular price tag.
Russia and China’s strategic military cooperation is becoming ever closer. President Putin has announced that Russia is helping China build an early warning system to spot intercontinental ballistic missile launches.
This year’s Annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington DC revealed a growing preoccupation with the mounting signs of a slowdown in the world economy.
Catherine the Great is credited with saying that the only way to secure the borders of the Russian Empire is to expand them continuously. This logic is to some degree applicable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which embarked on a path of geographical enlargement quite literally from the very first days of its existence.
Developing the Russian Far East and Siberia has been an important step in state-building for Russia. Although there have been debates about appropriate ideas and policies in the strategy, developing the vast frontier region and promoting relations with Asian countries has set a steadfast direction of development for Russia. Chinese-Russian cooperation in the border region during the early stages of imperial Russia’s policies in the Far East holds enlightening significance for today’s bilateral cooperation.
The main objective for the Shinzo Abe administration’s active engagement in supporting the involvement of Japanese companies in the development of the Russian Far East is to create favourable environment for resolution of the territorial issue and conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia. Japan–Russia cooperation in the Russian Far East is part of Abe’s 8-point cooperation plan with Moscow.