Russia in Global Affairs

The events of 2022 drew a line under Vladimir Putin’s attempts to preserve or assert by means of political and historical polemics a narrative about the European past that would suit Russia. Putin’s extensive speech made on February 21, 2022, which became a foreword to the special military operation in Ukraine, heralded a transition from disputes about history to practical action to change its course.

For thirty years, staunch supporters of the confrontational approach worked to strengthen the image of the Other as an enemy to be faced sooner or later on the battlefield. Now the advocates of this point of view are triumphant as they see the current events as proof that they were right from the very beginning.

Millions of people with Ukrainian surnames, Ukrainian roots and even Ukrainian identity live in Russia. So the events of recent years and months can have a significant impact on identity-building processes not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia.

On November 23 at 18:00 a.m. MSK (GMT+3) will be an online session, titled: “International relation and memory of WWII today.” featuring Fyodor Lukyanov, Alexei Miller and prominent diplomats. The session will be within the framework of the International Conference “Memory of the Second World War – Glorification, Condemnation, Accusation, Justification, Explanation”, organized by EU SPb and Foreign and Defence Policy Council.

There’s a common joke that Russia is a country with an unpredictable past because it rewrites history to fit the present. Paradoxically, this joke is now becoming relevant for much of the world as well. What does the battle for history mean for the present and future? And where will memory wars lead us?

It is obvious that the Kremlin is trying to diversify the range of means by which it can defend its position in memory wars.

The task is to create a design of the future in which its authors will be able to take an unbiased look at the legacy of empires, free from the inherited intellectual restrictions and hackneyed stereotypes.

History, the end of which Fukuyama predicted some time ago with a big commercial success, has simply been negated by suggesting that interaction mechanisms concerning “identity” do not change over centuries.

If we count the Napoleonic Wars, then the First World War was actually the Second. For a century after Napoleon, it was assumed that war is always limited and fighting is followed by negotiations. War was not an existential threat for the states.