ISSN 2618-9844 (Online version)
ISSN 1810-6374 (Print version)
The U.S.-China relationship and the economic and security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific are riddled with contradictions that raise questions about both the Chinese and American policies. How this drama plays out will have no small impact on a global and regional system in transition looking out to 2025.
Putin has snubbed Abe as he boosts links with China amid growing US hostility to Beijing and Moscow.
Irredentism may cause all the risks stemming from the strong identity of a great power and its imperial heritage, which fuels the temptation to regard the modern borders as “casually drawn” and “unfair,” to get mixed with nationalism. This is a very dangerous cocktail.
The Palestinian response to Donald Trump’s move might take one of two shapes: to give him a chance to develop the “ultimate deal” and present it to the parties in the coming months or to transform the hit into an opportunity to get their right of self-determination in their independent state.
The Asian center of economic growth will move to the south, and the developed countries will try to adapt foreign labor migration to the needs of high-tech production.
Current discussions, including the recent annual session of the Valdai Club in Sochi and its aftermath, have drawn attention to international law and particularly to two crucial questions: can international law be effective in the absence of a balance of power, and what is the role of precedent in that domain? Here are some reflections on these matters.
Arctic remains one of the world’s last great, pristine and undeveloped areas. Equivalent to one-sixth of the world’s landmass, the region is home to just 4 million people. The region is rich in both renewable and non-renewable resources.
Central Asian attitudes to China are vastly different from how China is perceived in Europe, the rest of Asia and other parts of the world. Politicians, businessmen and ordinary people in Central Asia are either baffled or inspired by the geographical proximity of their huge neighbor.
The asymmetry of the views and interests of the two sides with respect to a dialogue at the highest level significantly limits both the opportunities and the visible effects of that dialogue. As we move deeper into the drawn-out Russia–Japan dialogue, expectations as to what can actually be achieved have inevitably dwindled.
The April 16 referendum will focus on power distribution rather than institution building. In other words, the organizers saw it as an opportunity to expand the President’s powers and allow him to rule longer. In their turn, Turks perceived it as an institutional choice to contribute to the development of the state.
After experiencing many ups and downs in their relationship, China and Russia have forged a strategic partnership since the advent of the 21st century. While Russia's relations with the United States and the European Union have hit a rough patch, its ties with China are on an upward trend.
Some form of power-sharing arrangement could pave the way to reconciling the conflict in the Ukraine and in relations between the EU and Russia is a valid one.
It seems Washington wants to provoke China into muscle-flexing. If Beijing shows restraint and cold calculation in response, this may have a restrictive, if not sobering, effect on Washington. Russia is interested in preventing the South China Sea from becoming a proving ground for testing the strength of one’s nerves.
The G20 meeting in China was a milestone in international relations. Until only recently, world leaders were certain that the global economy and increased connectivity had helped stabilize and define the new world order. Now, however, the pendulum has turned back towards a classic game between the great powers, and Russia is again feeling right in its element.
If there is a key lesson to be drawn from the history of international relations, it is that, in extremis, political and security considerations almost inevitably triumph over economic considerations. Nothing is less certain.
Yerevan would have shown greater interest in the problems of security in Central Asia if it were certain that its Central Asian allies would take symmetrical and proportionate actions in the Karabakh conflict.
Normalizing relations with Georgia is simple for Russia, which only has to ease entry and import restrictions and to show that it is open to cooperation.
Post-Soviet Russia largely emerged as a separatist project, although it had not used this kind of rhetoric for its legitimization. Separatism was, in fact, embedded in the foundation of the post-Soviet Russian statehood.
The Asia-Pacific Region’s growing global economic and political importance was a clear priority for all those attending APEC 2012 in Vladivostok.
When Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kuril Islands, first as president and then as prime minister, international commentators denounced Russia for its tactless conduct and imperial ambitions, as Japan considers these islands its Northern Territories.
Dmitry Medvedev has visited the Kuril Islands again, this time as prime minister.
If we look at the issue of the Russian-Japanese territorial disput through the prism of global processes, this conflict may also tell us something about the world at large.
Our relations are probably at their lowest point since the fall of the Soviet Union.
The treaty concerning maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, which Russia and Norway signed in September 2010, is regarded by the officialdom as a great diplomatic success. However, the document disregards a whole range of vital legal aspects, which may be detrimental to the operation of Russian state companies in the region, including possible weighty losses due to discrepancies in tax treatment.
Japanese Ambassador Masaharu Kono, recalled to Tokyo for consultations after President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to one of the disputed Kuril Islands, has returned to Moscow. Some people still wonder what really is behind this diplomatic spat.
Despite eight years of horrific conflict, and over 500,000 thousand deaths, a stable peace in Syria remains elusive.
The presidents of Russia, Turkey and Iran convened for their fourth summit on Syria in Russia’s southern resort city of Sochi on Feb. 14. Earlier leaders of the “guarantor countries” of the Astana process met in November 2017 in Sochi, in April 2018 in Ankara and in September 2018 in Tehran.
Anyone who has at least some idea about the theory of international relations should remember the oft-quoted formula put forward by the father of British geopolitics, Halford Mackinder: “Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.”
Relations between the US and Russia are at their worst since the end of the Cold War, China and the US have tense relations, India and China are trying to stabilize relations after a period of acrimony. The major powers appear today to be like the unhappy families in Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: ‘Each unhappy family (major power in this case) is unhappy in its own way.’
Freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of residence can be ranked among the category of freedoms which, as part of the Global Commons, have been restricted to varying degrees at the level of communities, states, and international associations.