

An Age of Wars? Article Two. What Is to Be Done

Sergei A. Karaganov

Sergei A. Karaganov, Professor Emeritus
National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs
Academic Supervisor;
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
Honorary Chairman of the Presidium

DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-96-111

“Our path has pierced our breast like an arrow
Of ancient Tatar will...
...And the battle is eternal! We can only dream of peace
Through blood and dust...
The mare of the steppe flies on and on
And tramples the steppe grass...”

Alexander Blok
“*On the Field of Kulikovo*”

My previous article discussed the unprecedentedly dangerous situation in which we now find ourselves (Karaganov, 2024). In this article, I outline the new policies and priorities that Russia, as I believe, should adopt, building upon Russia’s National Security Strategy (2021) and especially its Foreign Policy Concept (2023).

FOREIGN POLICY

The extremely dangerous world of the next two decades requires that Russia adjust its foreign and defense policy. I have already written that this policy should be based on the “Fortress Russia” concept:

maximum possible sovereignty, independence, autonomy, and security, with a focus on intensive internal development (Karaganov, 2022). (But certainly not autarky, which is deadly.) Russia must be intelligently open to beneficial economic, scientific, cultural, and informational cooperation with friendly countries of the World Majority. However, openness is not an end in itself, but rather a means to ensure internal material and spiritual development. As we have already seen, liberal-globalist openness is also deadly. It would be stupid to try to integrate into “international value chains” now that the creators of the former system of globalization are destroying it and militarizing economic ties. Interdependence, previously overestimated as a source of peace, is now largely dangerous. We must try to create “value chains” on our own territory in order to increase its connectedness. This especially applies to the connections of Russia’s core to Siberia and—more carefully—to friendly states, most prominently Belarus, most of Central Asia, China, Mongolia, and the rest of the SCO and BRICS.

The “Fortress Russia” policy demands that Russia minimize its entanglement in the conflicts that will flare up during the ongoing “geostrategic earthquake.” Under the new conditions, direct involvement is not an asset, but a liability, as the former colonial powers are beginning to experience. The U.S., especially, faces an upsurge of anti-Americanism and attacks on its bases. These and other overseas holdings will become increasingly vulnerable, which we should indirectly facilitate, thus raising the cost for the American empire and helping the American foreign policy class to recover from its globalist hegemonic disease of the postwar period, and especially of the last 30 years. We were wise enough not to get entangled in the newest Armenian-Azerbaijani and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. But we should not by any means repeat the Ukrainian failure, permitting anti-Russian elites to take power in neighboring countries or allowing those countries to be destabilized from outside. Kazakhstan is of greatest concern in this regard. We need to work proactively, together with other, friendly countries.

To continue its only partially successful Turn to the East via the Far East, Russia needs a new comprehensive national Siberian strategy,

which would call for going forward, but also “back” to the romantic period of the Trans-Urals’ development. Russia must be “Siberianized,” shifting its center of spiritual, political, and economic development to the Urals and all of Siberia (not just the Pacific part). The Northern Sea Route, the Northern Silk Road, and major North-South land routes must be rapidly developed. The labor-rich but water-poor Central Asian countries should be incorporated into this strategy.

Conscious integration into the new world also requires the discovery of our Asian roots. The great Russian ruler, Prince Saint Alexander Nevsky, not only received a *yarlyk* authorizing his rule from Batu Khan at Sarai, but also traveled across modern Central Asia and Southern Siberia, in 1248-1249, to have the *yarlyk* endorsed at the Mongol capital of Karakorum. There, a few years later, Kublai Khan began his rise to power, which would culminate in his becoming the emperor and the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty over China, Mongolia, Korea, and a number of adjacent countries. Kublai, whom we know of through Marco Polo, almost certainly met Alexander. Kublai’s mother was a Christian, and his forces included Russian recruits from the Smolensk and Ryazan provinces. Likewise, Alexander’s army included Mongols, whose authority he sought to overthrow, but whom he used to protect his lands from enemies in the west—enemies who threatened, as we would now say, the identity of Russia. The history of Russia-China relations is much deeper than is commonly believed.

Russia would not have become a great empire—and most likely would not have survived on the European plain, attacked from the south, east, and west—if it had not been for the conquest and development of Siberia with its infinite resources. It was largely on their basis that Peter the Great built an empire: fees from caravans, carrying silk and tea from China to Europe along Russia’s Northern Silk Road, were used to equip the regiments of the new Russian army.

It would have been better to finish our Western, European odyssey a century earlier. There now remains little of use to be borrowed from the West, though plenty of rubbish seeps in from it. But, as we belatedly complete the journey, we will retain the great European culture that is now rejected by post-European fashion. Without it, we would not have

created the greatest literature in the world. And without Dostoevsky, Pushkin, Tolstoy, Gogol, and Blok, we would not have become a great country and nation.

In the new international situation, unconditional priority should be given to society's development of a defensive consciousness, readiness to defend the Fatherland, including with arms. The "snowflakes" in our society should melt, and its warriors should multiply. This will mean the development of our competitive advantage, which will be needed in the future: the ability and willingness to fight, inherited from the hard-won struggle for survival on a giant plain, open on all sides.

Today's foreign policy should be geared towards the comprehensive development of relations with the countries of the World Majority. Another obvious, but not yet formulated, goal is to work together with the World Majority countries to ensure the maximally-peaceful exit of the West from its nearly five-century-old position of dominance. And the maximally-peaceful exit of the U.S. from the hegemony that it enjoyed since the late 1980s (though uncontested for only about the first 15 years). The West should be relocated to a more modest, but worthy, place in the world system. There is no need to kick it out: given the vector of Western development, it will leave by itself. But it is necessary to firmly deter any rearguard actions of the West's still-powerful organism. Normal relations may be partly restored in a couple of decades or so. But they are not an end in itself.

In a new diverse, multi-religious and multicultural world, we must develop one more competitive advantage: internationalism, and cultural and religious openness. In education, special emphasis should be placed on the study of the languages, culture, and life of the rising powers and civilizations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Foreign policy thinking should be not just encouraged, but forced, to turn to the other world from outdated and now simply wretched Westernism.

I have written much about the need for a radical reform of the foreign policy apparatus. It is underway but hindered by bureaucratic and mental inertia, and by secret hopes for an impossible return to the bygone *status quo ante*. I would also risk calling for administrative measures: diplomats posted in the West should be paid less than

those stationed in the World Majority countries. It is important to work with the World Majority to create new institutions that would help to build a new world and to prevent or at least slow our slide into a series of crises.

The United Nations is going to extinct, saddled with Western bureaucrats and therefore unreformable. There is no need to tear it down, but it is necessary to build parallel bodies based on BRICS+, and an expanded SCO, and their integration with the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, ASEAN, and Mercosur. In the interim, it may be possible to create a permanent conference of these institutions within the UN. If Russia is a civilization of civilizations, then why not start building an organization of organizations with our friends and partners—a prototype of the future UN?

China is the main external resource for our internal development, an ally and partner for the foreseeable future. Russia should help develop China's naval and strategic nuclear capabilities in order to help oust the United States as an aggressive hegemon, facilitating its withdrawal into relatively constructive neo-isolationism similar to that of the 1920s-1930s, but adjusted to the new reality.

China and Russia are complementary powers. Their coalition, if it can be preserved—and it must be preserved—may eventually become a determining factor in the construction of the new world system. It is gratifying that China's modern foreign policy philosophy is very close to ours.

At the same time, Russia's strategy should focus on avoiding one-sided economic dependence, and also on facilitating China's "friendly balancing" by cooperating with Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, the ASEAN countries, the Arab world, the two Koreas, and prospectively even Japan. Preventing an inter-Korean conflict, provoked by the U.S., is the foremost task. The primary element of "friendly balancing" should be the new development of Siberia. This balancing will be useful to Beijing, too, as it will help alleviate China's neighbors' fear of its growing power. Finally, friendly, almost allied relations with China, friendly relations with India, and the development of the SCO should serve as the basis for building a security, development and cooperation

system of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. I hope that its creation is becoming an official goal of Russian foreign policy.

Such a strategy will provide a safety net if historical, expansionist, i.e. Mongolian genes suddenly wake up in a China that has been living in peace for several centuries. These genes, however, unite us. Both countries are essentially heirs to the great empire of Genghis Khan. Identifying these common roots is a fascinating task for historians in both countries. If Russia stays strong (for which we will have to fight), China remains a peace-loving giant, and their leaders and peoples deepen their friendship, this pair of countries will become the bulwark of international peace and stability.

India is another natural ally in creating the new world system and arresting our slide towards the Third World War. It is a source of critical technologies, labor for the new development of Siberia, and an almost limitless market. The most important task is to engage India in building the Greater Eurasian Partnership, from which it is still somewhat aloof; prevent it from becoming an unfriendly balancer of China, which the United States is pushing it to be; and ease the natural competition between India and China. The Primakov Triangle of Russia, China, and India is a guarantor of Greater Eurasia's relatively peaceful development. Separate efforts will be needed to smooth out Indo-Pakistani tensions, which remain on the periphery of Russian diplomacy's attention, but which are one of the most dangerous possible sources of a thermonuclear conflict. In the meantime, we need hundreds of Indologists, dozens of experts on Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian and Africa countries, and, of course, thousands more Sinologists.

More attention must be paid to ASEAN as part of the Greater Eurasia strategy. ASEAN is more than just markets and pleasant vacation destinations. It is a region where serious conflicts may erupt within a decade, especially since the retreating U.S. is still interested in their incitement.

The state of our ties with the Arab world is deeply satisfying. We maintain functionally friendly relations with many of its leading states—Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. Russia's external

balancing helps to bring order to the turbulent region, which the United States is actively destabilizing. China, which has contributed to the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has also joined the policy of external balancing and is doing its job brilliantly.

On the North American track, Russia should facilitate the U.S.'s ongoing long-term withdrawal into neo-isolationism, quite natural for it, at a new global level. Clearly, there is no returning to the pre-WWII policy paradigm, and that would probably even be undesirable. The U.S.'s dependence on the outside world provides tools for pressuring it. If its current liberal-globalist elites leave power, the U.S. may even turn back into the relatively constructive global balancer that it was before the second half of the 20th century. A comprehensive strategy for the U.S.'s containment is unnecessary, as it would only waste the resources that we need for internal rejuvenation. There are no intractable contradictions between us and the U.S. The contradictions that currently exist were caused by the U.S.'s expansion, facilitated by our weakness and stupidity in the 1990s, which contributed to the dramatic upsurge of hegemonic sentiment in the U.S. The internal crisis in the U.S., and its present elites' commitment to post-human values, will further sap Washington's "soft power," i.e. ideological influence. In the meantime, a harsh deterrence policy (more on it below) should create conditions for the U.S.'s evolution into a normal great power.

Europe—once a beacon of modernization for us and many other nations—is rapidly moving towards geopolitical nothingness and, hopefully I am wrong, towards moral and political decay. Its still-wealthy market is worth exploiting, but our main effort in relation to the old subcontinent should be morally and politically fencing ourselves off from it. Having first lost its soul—Christianity—it is now losing the fruit of the Enlightenment—rationalism. Besides, on orders from outside, the Eurobureaucracy is itself isolating Russia from Europe. We are grateful.

A break with Europe is an ordeal for many Russians. But we must go through it as quickly as possible. Naturally, fencing-off should not become a principle or be total. But any talk of recreating a European security system is a dangerous chimera. Systems of cooperation and

security should be built within the framework of the continent of the future—Greater Eurasia—by inviting European countries that are interested and are of interest to us.

An important element of the new foreign policy strategy should be an offensive (not defensive, as often in the past) ideological strategy. Attempts to “please” and negotiate with the West are not only immoral, but also counterproductive according to *Realpolitik*. It is time to openly raise the banner of the defense of normal human values from the post- and even anti-human ones coming from the West.

One of the main principles of Russian policy should be the active struggle for peace—long ago proposed, and then repudiated, by the Russian foreign policy community which was tired of Soviet slogans. And not a struggle just against nuclear war. The slogan of half a century ago—“Nuclear war should never be unleashed, as it can have no winners”—is beautiful, but also starry-eyed. As the conflict in Ukraine has shown, it opens the door to major conventional wars. And such wars can and will become ever more frequent, and deadly, and yet also within reach unless they are opposed by an active policy of peace.

Our only reasonable goal regarding Ukraine’s lands is quite obvious to me—the liberation, and reunification with Russia, of the entire South, East, and (probably) Dnieper Basin. Ukraine’s western regions will be the subject of future bargaining. The best solution would be creating a demilitarized buffer-state there with a formal neutral status (with Russian bases to guarantee neutrality)—a place to live for those residents of present-day Ukraine who do not want be citizens of Russia and live by Russian laws. And to avoid provocations and uncontrolled migration, Russia should build a fence along its border with the buffer-state, like the one that Trump started on the border with Mexico.

DEFENSE POLICY

When preemptively (although belatedly) starting a military operation against the West, we, acting on old assumptions, did not expect the enemy to unleash a full war. So we did not use active nuclear deterrence/intimidation tactics from the very outset. And we are still dragging our feet. By so doing we not only doom hundreds of

thousands of people in Ukraine (including losses from a plunging quality of life) and tens of thousands of our men to death, but we also do a disservice to the whole world. The aggressor, which is de facto the West, remains unpunished. This clears the way for further aggression.

We have forgotten the basics of deterrence. Reduced significance of nuclear deterrence benefits an actor with greater conventional military potential and human and economic resources, and vice versa. When the USSR had conventional superiority, the U.S./NATO did not hesitate to rely heavily on the first-strike concept. The U.S. bluffed, though, and if it did make such plans, they were directed solely against Soviet troops advancing into NATO's territory. No strikes on Soviet territory were planned, since there was no doubt that the retaliation would target American cities.

Greater reliance on nuclear deterrence, and accelerated movement up the escalation ladder are designed to convince the West that it has three options regarding the conflict in Ukraine. First, to retreat with dignity, for example, on the conditions proposed above. Second, to be defeated, to flee as it did from Afghanistan, and to face a wave of armed and sometimes thuggish refugees. Or, third, the exact same, plus nuclear strikes on its territory and the accompanying societal disintegration.

It is Russian tradition to deliver a crushing defeat to European invaders and then agree on a new order. This is what Alexander I, Kutuzov, and de Tolly did in 1812-1814, after which followed the Congress of Vienna. Then Stalin, Zhukov, Konev, and Rokossovsky defeated Hitler's pan-European army, leading to the Potsdam Agreements. But for such an agreement to be concluded now, we would have to clear the way for the Russian troops with nuclear weapons. And we would still suffer huge losses, including moral ones. After all, it would be an offensive war. A viable nuclear deterrent and a security buffer in Western Ukraine should guarantee the end of the aggression. The Special Military Operation must be continued until victory. Our enemies must know that if they do not retreat, the legendary Russian patience will run dry, and the death of each Russian soldier will be paid for with thousands of lives on the other side.

It will be impossible to prevent the world from sliding into a series of conflicts and subsequent global thermonuclear war, to ensure our country's continued peaceful revival and its transformation into one of the architects and builders of the new world system, unless our nuclear deterrence policy is drastically energized and updated. I have written about many aspects of this policy in my previous articles and other documents. In fact, Russian doctrine already provides for the use of nuclear weapons to counter a wide range of threats, but real policy in its current form goes further than the doctrine. We should clarify and strengthen the wording and take the corresponding military-technical measures. The main thing is that we demonstrate our readiness and ability to use nuclear weapons in case of extreme necessity.

I have no doubt that the doctrine is already being updated, to which many concrete steps testify. The most obvious one is the deployment of long-range missile systems in fraternal Belarus. These missiles are clearly intended for use not only when the "very existence of the state" is threatened, but much earlier. And yet, the doctrine's provisions specifying the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons have certain gaps that need to be filled, especially in the conditions of an obviously short-of-war situation.

By intensifying nuclear deterrence, we will not only sober up the aggressors, but also perform an invaluable service to all humanity. There is currently no other protection from a series of wars and a major thermonuclear conflict. Nuclear deterrence needs to be activated. At the Institute of World Military Economics and Strategy, recently created at the Higher School of Economics and headed by Admiral Sergei Avakyan and Professor Dmitry Trenin, we will provide academic support. I will present here only some of my views, which require the fastest working-out and implementation.

Russia's policy should be based on the assumption that NATO is a hostile bloc that has proven its aggressiveness with its previous policy and which is *de facto* waging a war against Russia. Therefore, any nuclear strikes on NATO, including preemptive ones, are morally and politically justified. This applies primarily to countries that provide the most active support to the Kiev junta. The old and especially

new members of the alliance must understand that their security has cardinally weakened since joining the bloc, and that their ruling comprador elites have put them on the edge of life and death. I have repeatedly written that if Russia delivers a preemptive retribution strike on any NATO country, the U.S. will not respond unless the White House and Pentagon are populated by madmen who hate their country and are ready to destroy Washington, Houston, Chicago, or Los Angeles for the sake of Poznan, Frankfurt, Bucharest, or Helsinki.

From my point of view, Russian nuclear policy and the threat of retaliation should also deter the West from the massive use of biological or cyber weapons against Russia or its allies. The arms race in this field, conducted by the U.S. and some of its allies, must be stopped.

It is time to end the quarrel, pushed by the West, about the possibility of using “tactical nuclear weapons.” Their use was theoretically envisaged during the previous Cold War. Judging from leaks, American strategists are working on the further miniaturization of nuclear weapons. This policy is foolish and short-sighted, as it further erodes strategic stability, thus increasing the likelihood of global nuclear war. As far as I understand, this approach is also extremely ineffective militarily.

I believe it appropriate to gradually raise the minimal yield of nuclear warheads to 30-40 kilotons, or 1.5-2 Hiroshima bombs, so that potential aggressors and their populations understand what awaits them. Lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and increasing their minimal yield, is also necessary to restore another lost function of nuclear deterrence: the prevention of large-scale conventional wars. Strategic planners in Washington and their European minions must realize that the downing of Russian planes over our territory, or the further bombardment of Russian cities, will entail punishment (after a non-nuclear warning strike) in the form of a nuclear strike. Then, perhaps, they will take it up upon themselves to do away with the Kiev junta.

It also appears necessary to alter (to some extent, publicly) the list of targets for nuclear retaliatory strikes. We need to think hard about who, exactly, we intend to deter. After the Americans, “in defense

of democracy” and for the sake of their imperial ambitions, have killed millions in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Iraq, committed monstrous acts of aggression against Yugoslavia and Libya, and against all warnings deliberately cast hundreds of thousands—maybe even millions—of Ukrainians into the fire of war, there is no guarantee that the threat of retaliation, even against cities, is a sufficient deterrent for the globalist oligarchy. Simply put, they do not care even about their own citizens, and will not be frightened by casualties among them. Maybe it would be worth designating this oligarchy’s gathering places as targets for the first wave, or even for preemptive retribution strikes?

God struck Sodom and Gomorrah—mired in abomination and debauchery—with a rain of fire. The modern equivalent: a limited nuclear strike on Europe. Another hint from The Old Testament: to cleanse the world, God unleashed the Great Flood. Our Poseidon nuclear torpedoes can trigger similar floods by tsunamis. Today, most brazenly aggressive states are coastal. The globalist oligarchy and the deep state should not hope to escape as Noah and his pious family did.

Allow me to repeat the above. Improving the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is necessary not only to end the war that the West unleashed in Ukraine, or to peacefully put the West in a much more modest but hopefully worthy place in the future world system. Above all else, nuclear deterrence is needed in order to stop the approaching wave of conflicts, to ward off an “age of wars,” and to prevent their escalation to the global thermonuclear level.

This is why we should go up the ladder of nuclear deterrence, regardless of the war in Ukraine. To develop upon the steps already planned and taken, I believe that it would be advisable, after consultation with friendly states but without shifting responsibility to them, to resume nuclear testing as soon as possible: first underground, and if this is not enough, then with the detonation of Tsar-Bomba-2 on Novaya Zemlya, while taking steps to minimize damage to the environment of our own country and of friendly World Majority states.

I would not even protest too much if such a demonstration were also conducted by the United States. This would only enhance the universal effect of nuclear deterrence. But Washington is not yet

interested in enhancing the role of the nuclear factor in international affairs, relying instead on its still-significant economic power and conventional forces.

Sooner or later, Russia will have to change its official nuclear non-proliferation policy. The old one had some utility, as it reduced the risks of unauthorized use and nuclear terrorism. But it was unfair to many non-Western states, and stopped working long ago. Adhering to it, we took our lead from the Americans, who wanted to minimize not only risks, but also counterbalances to their conventional (especially naval) superiority. Historically and philosophically, proliferation contributes to peace. It is frightening to even imagine what would have happened if the USSR and then China had not developed nuclear weapons. Having acquired nuclear weapons, Israel became more confident among its hostile neighbors. (However, it has abused this confidence by rejecting a fair solution to the Palestinian question, and now unleashing a war in Gaza with clearly genocidal characteristics. If its neighbors had nuclear weapons, Israel would have acted more modestly.) Having carried out nuclear tests, India has become more secure in relations with a more powerful China. The Indo-Pakistani conflict still smolders, but the clashes have diminished since both countries obtained nuclear status.

North Korea is more confident and is raising its international status, especially since Russia has finally stopped dragging itself after the West and *de facto* resumed cooperation with Pyongyang. Limited nuclear proliferation may also prove useful as a barrier to the creation and use of bioweapons. Raising the nuclear threat could deter the militarization of AI technologies. But most importantly, nuclear weapons, including their proliferation, are necessary to restore the aspects of nuclear deterrence that have ceased functioning—to prevent not only major conventional wars (as in Ukraine), but also a conventional arms race. A conventional war cannot be won if the potential enemy has nuclear weapons and, most importantly, is ready to use them.

Greater reliance on nuclear deterrence is necessary to cool the European “leaders” who have lost their mind, speak of an inevitable clash between Russia and NATO, and urge their armed forces to prepare for it. These babblers and their listeners need to be reminded

that, in the event of war between Russia and NATO in Europe, little will be left of many European alliance-members after even the first few days of the conflict.

Naturally, proliferation also carries risks. But given the current disorder and redivision of the world, these risks are much smaller than those that result from the weakening of nuclear deterrence. There will be no polycentric and sustainable future world order without nuclear multilateralism.

Needless to say, some countries should be permanently and firmly denied the right to possess nuclear weapons, or even come close to obtaining them. Germany, which started two world wars and committed genocide, must become a legitimate target for destruction by a preemptive strike if it ever tries to lay its hands on a nuclear bomb. However, having forgotten its gruesome history, it is already asking for such punishment by acting as a revanchist state and the main European sponsor of the war in Ukraine. In Europe, all countries that participated in Hitler's invasion of the USSR should fear a similar fate. I think that such a fate would also be shared, in the event of emergency, by the country that Churchill aptly named the "hyena of Europe," if it ever contemplated obtaining nuclear weapons. God forbid, of course, as I have said so many times before.

China, with the support of Russia and other World Majority countries, will have every right, and even moral obligation, to punish Japan—whose aggression claimed tens of millions of lives in China and other Asian countries, and which still dreams of revenge and claims Russian territory—if Tokyo moves toward acquisition of nuclear weapons.

A sustainable nuclear balance must be established in the Middle East between: Israel, if and when it overcomes its delegitimization by the atrocities that it has committed in Gaza; Iran, if it withdraws its officially announced pledge to destroy Israel; and one of the Gulf countries or their commonwealth. The most acceptable candidate to represent the entire Arab world is the UAE, and if not it, then Saudi Arabia and/or Egypt. Naturally, the World Majority countries should move towards nuclear status at a measured pace, while training relevant

personnel and elites. Russia can and should share its experience with them. Dialogue with the leading countries of the World Majority, on the substance and modernization of nuclear deterrence policy, must be intensively developed now. If the United States—while transitioning (hopefully as peacefully as possible) from the status of global hegemon (which it got by chance) to the role of a normal great power—decides to return to a classical interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and again become a hegemon in Latin America, we might consider helping Brazil or even Mexico obtain nuclear status (if they want it).

Many of the proposals outlined above will spark a wave of criticism, as did last year's articles on nuclear deterrence. But they turned out to be extremely useful for both the domestic and international strategic communities, by waking them from their lethargic dream of strategic parasitism. Americans quickly stopped talking about how Russia would never use nuclear weapons in response to the West's aggression in Ukraine. Then they started talking about the danger of nuclear escalation in Ukraine. And then about how they would lose a war against Russia and China. Europe, which has completely lost its strategically-thinking class, is still whining, but they are not that dangerous.

We will have to work and think together. I believe that we will do so, both publicly and behind closed doors, with experts from the leading countries of the World Majority, and in the future, with representatives of the sobered-up Western world. I will end my essay with lines of hope from Alexander Blok: "Before it is too late, put an old sword in the scabbard, / Comrades! We will become brothers!" If we survive the next two decades and avoid another age of wars like the 20th century, our children and grandchildren will live in a multicolored, multicultural, and much more just world.

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