

# Between Patriotism and Internationalism: The Difficulties of Chinese Foreign Policy Ideology

*Vladimir A. Skosyrev*

**Vladimir A. Skosyrev**, PhD in History

Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Russia

Center for World Politics and Strategic Analysis

Research Fellow

SPIN-RSCI: 3671-3326

ORCID: 0000-0001-6787-1773

Researcher ID: HKE-8375-2023

E-mail: [skosyrev@iccaras.ru](mailto:skosyrev@iccaras.ru)

Address: 32 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Moscow 117997, Russia

DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2025-23-2-129-144

## **Abstract**

In recent years, Beijing has intensified its foreign policy efforts and taken significant steps to improve China's international image by proposing a number of foreign policy concepts. However, these remain largely obscure and unpopular, as they lack internationalist content. Beijing's development of an internationalist foreign policy ideology is blocked by the national-patriotic nature of its domestic ideology, which was formulated in answer to an array of internal ideological-political challenges.

**Keywords:** China, foreign policy, ideology, Global Community of Shared Future, nationalism, internationalism.

China's foreign policy ideology is transforming as its international position keeps strengthening. In recent years, Beijing has introduced new foreign policy concepts<sup>1</sup> to explain its foreign policy to the global audience. In addition to the *Global Community of Shared Future* (人类命运共同体) concept that emerged in the early 2010s, Beijing proposed another three “global initiatives” (*quanqiu changyi* 全球倡议): the *Global Development Initiative* (*quanqiu fazhan changyi*, 全球发展倡议), the *Global Security Initiative* (*quanqiu anquan changyi* 全球安全倡议) and the *Global Civilization Initiative* (*quanqiu wenming changyi* 全球文明倡议). Their essence, and the factors driving China to a more active foreign policy, have been thoroughly examined by Russian researchers (Zuenko, 2024; Denisov, 2020; Denisov and Zuenko, 2022; Leksyutina, 2023, 2024; Perminova, 2023; Goncharov, 2024).

Yet, as Ivan Zuenko (2024, p. 147) rightly points out, there is a paradox: despite China's efforts to improve its international image, its foreign policy concepts remain largely obscure to foreign audiences. Moreover, the ambiguity of China's ideological framework generates suspicion and skepticism. Some countries, particularly China's neighbors (Seah et al., 2024), view its concepts as deeply pragmatic (Nathan and Zhang, 2022). Yet many U.S. experts interpret the slogans like “Global Community of Shared Future” as evidence of Beijing's intentions to fundamentally reshape the international order (USCC, 2020).

The ambiguous perception of Beijing's foreign policy initiatives can be attributed to several factors.

**Firstly**, not all foreign IR experts (let alone amateur political observers) have enough competence in Chinese culture and political thinking. Proper analysis of Chinese ideologemes, many of which refer to traditional texts, requires serious Sinological training. Incompetence is often compounded by ideological bias.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Foreign policy ideology is viewed herein as a set of concepts that China uses to rationalize its international activity. Domestic (party-state) ideology is what underlies the country's political system and shapes social perceptions of China's history and future.

<sup>2</sup> As a result, some experts perceive China's initiatives as a bid for global dominance. For a discussion on the ideological framing of Chinese foreign policy in the United States, see Zuenko, 2023.

*Secondly*, China's foreign policy concepts are sometimes ambiguous enough to permit varying interpretations even by genuine China scholars—foreign (e.g., IOS RAS, 2024) and domestic (Sun, 2022).

*Thirdly*, China has a complex international identity. Yana Leksyutina (2024) notes that historically, China positioned itself as a socialist state, then as a Third World country, and more recently as a “responsible great power.” Thus, Beijing's current foreign policy ideology embraces “several competing perceptions of itself” (Ibid, p. 66). This compound identity enters China's international image and confuses perception of its global initiatives.

*Fourthly*, Beijing's foreign policy concepts may not yet be fully developed. Alexander Lomanov (IMEMO RAS, 2023) believes that they will evolve over time to become more internationally appealing, much like Chinese goods have done.

*Finally*, China's domestic ideology has undergone significant changes. The objective of this article is to analyze the compatibility of China's domestic and foreign policy ideologies and, on that basis, evaluate the latter's potential.

## **TELLING CHINESE STORIES**

Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP), has repeatedly ordered China's propaganda agencies to communicate about China to foreign audiences in a language understandable to them. The Chinese leadership acknowledges significant shortfalls in this area. People in many countries do not understand China and view it through prisms imposed by the Western mainstream. This interferes with the maintenance of a favorable external environment for China's development (Xi, 2021b). In recent decades, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has significantly enhanced its power; however, its voice on the international stage remains quiet (Lin, 2023). According to Xi, China is no longer “beaten” and no longer suffers from starvation, yet it continues to be “scolded” (Communist Party Members Network, 2021).

Chinese experts see a solution in enhancing the international influence of Chinese media. To achieve this, government-run

media, private periodicals, and blogs should operate as a well-tuned propaganda mechanism (Wang, 2022). However, Chinese researchers acknowledge that the key lies in the content of the “stories” (*gushi*, 故事) that the country tells the world about itself.

Official guidelines require that external audiences be briefed on the CCP’s remarkable achievements in strengthening the country and alleviating poverty (Zhou, 2023). It is crucial to promote the traditional culture and historical accomplishments of Chinese civilization, promote the “spirit of multiculturalism” (*duo wenhua fengge*, 多元文化风格) (Lin and Li, 2023), and argue for the multiplicity of paths to development as illustrated by China’s modernization (Zhang, 2023). It is also necessary to convince the international community of Beijing’s commitment to peaceful coexistence (Zou, 2024).

Nevertheless, the most critical factor in effective international propaganda lies in conveying the “correct” interpretation of the CCP’s history (Xi, 2021b; Wang, 2022). This makes sense, as it is the CCP, not China’s traditional culture, that has become the primary target of Western journalists and politicians in recent years.<sup>3</sup> It is essential for China to combat the spread of negative, Western-inspired perceptions of the CCP, both domestically and in the Global South. The ultimate goal is to persuade the West, particularly the U.S., of China’s right to pursue its own development path and of the necessity of equitable relations. Contrary to the general belief that China-U.S. relations have reached the point of no return, Chinese official sources argue that the policy of China’s containment comes from “anti-China forces” within the U.S. establishment (A Brief History, 2021), and that only part of the U.S. ruling class is interested in “disengagement” from China. The Chinese largely believe in the possibility of reestablishing dialogue with the U.S. and continue their efforts to influence Western audiences.

The historiography of the CCP remains a crucial link in China’s modern domestic ideology. Facing the decline of public faith in Communism, which had begun by the 1978 launch of reform and

---

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., speeches by Mike Pompeo and Robert O’Brien during Donald Trump’s presidency, which helped shape the ideological framework of the U.S.-China confrontation (U.S. Department of State, 2019; The White House, 2020).

the Open Door Policy, the CCP has had to redefine its role in the country's recent history, recognizing this as the only way to legitimize its continued monopoly on power.

### **THE CCP'S SEARCH FOR MEANING**

The CCP's primary response to the crisis of Communist ideology—stemming from the abandonment of class struggle's primacy and from the transition to pragmatic market reform—was fixed in the 1981 *Decision on Certain Issues in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the PRC* (Resolutions, 2010). The document acknowledged Mao's significant miscalculations during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and especially the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) but emphasized that his merits outweighed his mistakes. Such arguments helped the CCP leadership to preserve the country's ideological unity.

The Chinese leadership was then challenged by the need to explain its continued rule despite giving up the plans for radical social transformation. This was addressed at the 13th CCP Congress in 1987, which stated that the CCP had not relinquished its commitment to achieving communism,<sup>4</sup> but that the country was simply at the initial stages of socialism (Vinogradov, 2008, pp. 223-225), which would take a long time and demand the implementation of market mechanisms.

The next challenge for the CCP leaders was the May-June 1989 Tiananmen events and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Updating the theory of Socialist construction proved insufficient for strengthening the legitimacy of the party's rule. Nor could the CCP's leaders account for it by referring to China's economic growth, as this had the side effects of rampant corruption and social inequality. *The CCP needed a new legitimating ideology.*

Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the term “national revival” appeared increasingly often in Chinese leaders' speeches. The topic of China's “historical humiliation” by foreign powers became increasingly prominent (Mao et al., 2021). And academic circles began reconsidering Marxism's rejection of tradition (Guo, 2019).

---

<sup>4</sup> The Constitution of the Communist Party still states: “The highest ideal and ultimate goal of the party is the achievement of communism” (see Constitution).

During the leadership of Hu Jintao (General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee in 2002-2012), the national-patriotic theme came to the forefront of the CCP's historiography. Its foundation in 1921 was framed within China's struggle to reclaim its sovereignty following the Opium Wars and subsequent humiliations. The narrative emphasized that only the CCP, armed with Marxist ideology, was able to lead this struggle to victory. Neither the reformers of the Qing Empire, nor the peasant masses of the Taiping (1850-1864) and Boxer (1899-1901) uprisings, nor the "bourgeois" ideologists, nor the warlords, nor the Kuomintang could resolve China's key societal contradictions or defend its interests from foreign threats. The CCP organized a common front against Japan, restored national unity, and ensured the country's subsequent strengthening and prosperity (History of the Communist Party of China, 2011, pp. 3-4, 5-7, 10. pp. 407-408, 418-419).

Different periods in the PRC's history are placed within a unified narrative of the nation's rise after the "century of humiliation" (*bainian chiru*, 百年耻辱). According to Xi, under Mao Zedong (1949-1976) China found its feet (*zhanqilai*, 站起来), during the reform and Open Door Policy (1978-2012) it grew rich (*fuqilai*, 富起来), and in the "New Era" (2012 to the present) it has grown strong (*qiangqilai*, 强起来) (Resolution, 2021). While the CCP has responded to varying challenges in various ways, it has always sought the renaissance of Chinese nationhood. Notably, new textbooks pay less attention to the shortcomings of party policies than earlier editions did. Miscalculations during the revolutionary struggle (1921-1949) and Maoist era (1949-1976) are mentioned less frequently. Also, less space is given to dry descriptions of the socio-economic environment and the balance of power between classes. Instead, historians emphasize the heroic deeds and sacrifices of Chinese revolutionaries, following Xi's call for historical narratives to resonate with the populace (Xi, 2021a; Skosyrev, 2024).

In a country with thousands of years of continuous history, the CCP's appeal to civilizational greatness appears sensible. Reliance on patriotic themes has thus far enabled the CCP to avoid serious ideological crises amid growing uncertainty in foreign policy and the domestic economy. However, nationalism in China is not only imposed

from above. As American historian Wang Zheng notes, the “century of humiliation” actually happened and has left a lasting imprint on the collective memory of the Chinese people (Wang, 2012).

The Chinese leadership’s “national revival” agenda responded to internal ideological and political crises at a time when a coherent foreign policy ideology was not so important. Thus, the domestic and foreign policy ideologies have become desynchronized. China long adhered to Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of “keeping a low profile” and then to Hu Jintao’s concept of “peaceful rise/development.” However, as China’s economic advantages grew and the U.S.-China standoff intensified, Beijing was compelled to search for a more attractive foreign policy ideology.

### **CHINESE WISDOM**

China’s new foreign policy ideology is a work in progress. Beijing’s “global initiatives” are continually being updated and refined. Nevertheless, their intermediate results, and compatibility with China’s domestic ideology, can be assessed here mainly on the basis of the White Paper “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions” released by the State Council of China in September 2023.

The document states that humanity stands at a crossroads between openness and isolation, cooperation and confrontation, unity and division, and its choice will determine its future survival. The global community can overcome its challenges only through joint efforts. Countries have long ceased to exist in isolation from one another. “The world is becoming increasingly flat,” a reference to Thomas Friedman’s (2005) book, popular in China.

The White Paper identifies armed conflict as the primary global threat. It outlines the possible end of what has been a generally peaceful 70 years for humanity: “The fire of war has flared up again in Eurasia, tensions continue to escalate, problems are mounting, the shadow of the arms race lingers, and the nuclear Sword of Damocles still hangs over us.” No nation has the right to recklessly open Pandora’s box of war. “The world needs peace just as humanity needs air and life needs sunlight.”

Another significant threat is posed by “lack of development.” The global economy has yet to recover from the shocks of the pandemic. For the first time in 30 years, the Human Development Index is in decline, and the ranks of the impoverished and starving are growing. In this context, unilateral actions, protectionist measures, building “small yards with high walls,” and “breaking ties and bonds” are unacceptable.

Beijing is concerned by growing international competition, the erosion of international trust, the resurgence of a “Cold War mentality,” and ideological confrontations. This is further compounded by the rise of non-traditional threats such as terrorism, cyberattacks, transnational crime, and biological risks.

Finally, there is a frightening deficit of global governance. The world is struggling to address escalating energy, food, and debt crises. Insufficient efforts are being made to achieve a green and low-carbon economy, improve access to digital technologies, and integrate elements of artificial intelligence into governance.

The Chinese concept of a Global Community of Shared Future (人类命运共同体) offers potential solutions to these challenges. The existing world order, rooted in Western individualism and social Darwinism—where “the weak become food for the strong”—is contrasted with the Chinese vision for international relations, based on China’s “outstanding traditional culture” with its notions of harmony in diversity (*he er bu tong*, 和而不同) and the world as one family (*tianxia yi jia*, 天下为一家). “The China Plan” (*Zhongguo fang’an*, 中国方案) also reflects the CCP’s wish to share the PRC’s modernization experience with other developing countries.

Yet, the White Paper also seeks to establish the internationalist character of Chinese foreign policy. It argues that the idea of “Community of Humanity’s Destiny” can be found in the teachings of ancient Greek philosophers, the texts of ancient India, traditional African customs, and the proverbs and poetry of various cultures. Beijing positions itself as a promoter of “genuine multipolarity” and universal values: peace, development, honesty, justice, democracy, and freedom. It emphasizes that no country has the right to monopolize



these values or to force them into the molds of “democracies’ fight against authoritarianism” or the “rules-based order.”

This is the essence of contemporary Chinese foreign policy ideology. But it cardinally differs from domestic ideology in several respects.

### **CONTRADICTIONS**

A domestic ideology, focused on national revival, contradicts an internationalist foreign policy. A focus on the universality of human rights gives liberalism its energy for external propagation. Liberation of the global proletariat did the same for Marxism.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the ideology of the PRC, while formulated in Marxist terms, prioritizes the interests of the Chinese nation (Galenovich, 2020). Official sources explicitly state that foreign policy supports internal development (A Brief History, 2021). Though rational, such a stance implies pragmatism and breeds foreign suspicion about Beijing’s “global initiatives.”

The PRC’s civilizational paradigm seeks to address this, promoting mutual civilizational enrichment to foster each country’s development, and emphasizing China’s willingness to learn from others’ modernization experience while sharing its own (Zhang, 2024). Nevertheless, Beijing does not advocate for a universal model that other countries should adopt. Instead, the PRC’s ideology posits that each civilization has the right to freely interpret universal values and choose its own development path. It asserts universal forms without universally-applicable content.

In this context, the concept of “Chinese-Style Modernization” (中国式现代化) is particularly noteworthy. This is the idea that China’s unique development model is rooted in the CCP’s century-long struggle for national independence and prosperity. The key features of this model include a large population, “Common Prosperity,” harmony

---

<sup>5</sup> Hence Maoism, in the 1960s-1970s, spread in the Third World (from the Philippines, India, Nepal, and Turkey to Peru and Mexico), and even the First World (France, the U.S., Germany, Italy, and Australia). Mao’s ideas were regarded by his foreign followers as the embodiment of a universal Marxist truth that was being realized in China. They were adopted—albeit with limited results—by political forces in agrarian countries with similar revolutionary conditions and colonial or semi-colonial pasts. Maoism was also seen by some intellectuals as a viable alternative to “revisionist” Soviet Marxism (for more detail, see Dirlik, 2014).

between material and spiritual “civilizations,” balanced coexistence between humans and nature, and peaceful development.

The idea of Chinese-Style Modernization is primarily aimed at external audiences, particularly developing countries. China’s experience is cited as proving that a historically agrarian society can achieve modernization without becoming dependent upon the West or adopting its social organization. However, Chinese publications do not specify the specific institutions needed for “Chinese-style modernization.” Instead, they offer general principles to the Global South: consider national specifics, unite around a political force that represents the people’s interests, and abandon the Western-style multiparty system that brings narrow groups to power and does not permit a long-term modernization strategy (Skosyrev, 2023).

China’s call to consider its development path is unlikely to promote ideas of national revival in the Global South. Accepting China’s message of nationally-oriented development would inherently mean rejecting all external influences, including China’s. It remains unclear what lessons developing nations can draw from China and what Chinese institutions are suitable for other countries. The Chinese themselves tend to sidestep this issue, maintaining that it is impossible to fully replicate China’s socio-political model.

China’s modern socialist system has emerged as a result of its Leninist party-state’s long evolution. Thus, it seems unrealistic to transfer even some of its elements to other countries, with the exception of states like Vietnam, which indeed carefully studies China’s path. Yet even there, strong national pride prohibits the acceptance of Chinese notions like the “Community of Common Destiny,” let alone “Chinese-Style Modernization.”<sup>6</sup>

Another paradox of China’s foreign policy ideology is that, while it calls for win-win cooperation and mutual trust, Beijing’s international actions prove the reality of weak states’ insignificance in global politics.

---

<sup>6</sup> This was not the case in the Maoist era. Maoism appeared early in Chinese socialism’s development. Its practical elements were transplanted to Third World countries struggling for independence, where national-oriented forces recognized their dependent position in the world capitalist system and adopted China’s peasantry-based anti-imperialist struggle.

Analysis of China's past humiliation yields the conclusion that "the backward are beaten" (History of the Communist Party of China, 2011, p. 4). While China denounces global Social Darwinism, that is the rationale for its modernization and uncompromising defense of vital interests.

The CCP's narrative of past humiliation underscores its decisive role in restoring China to its former greatness, and unites the Chinese nation against external threats. But the narrative is hardly attractive internationally. As under Mao, Beijing claims that China shares a common colonial or semi-colonial history with many others. But China is no longer an underdeveloped agrarian nation, and instead one of the world's two superpowers. Thus, besides the uniqueness of China's development model, there is also a significant gap in power between it and the Global South: the idea of fellowship with other misfortunates is nothing more than a rhetorical tool with which to extend China's sphere of influence over the Global South. Beijing no longer proposes non-capitalist independent development, and is perceived by developing countries as a pole of global capitalism. Moreover, China's reference to past humiliations to pressure others (Kazantsev, 2022) has raised fears of revanchism among China's neighbors.

\* \* \*

The acceptance and spread of China's foreign policy concepts will be limited for the foreseeable future by Beijing's lack of an internationalist agenda, an agenda that is contradicted by the CCP's national-patriotic domestic ideology.

One could say that China does not currently have a foreign policy ideology, if by that one means universally-applicable ideas that postulate humanity's movement to some ideal end of history (rather than pragmatic and propagandistic elements pursuing short-term goals). Instead, China has only a foreign policy practice that is being rapidly developed.

However, China's lack of an internationalist ideology limits its foreign policy tools, particularly in confrontation with the U.S. Beijing cannot compete with the global hegemon for spheres of influence

through coups, interventions, or proxy wars, as it has no ideological foundation for such actions. (For which reason it would be wrong to liken the current struggle between the U.S. and China to their rivalry during the Cold War, underpinned by universalistic ideologies.)

In its interactions with other nations, Beijing will likely continue to rely primarily on economic leverage, which (unlike the foreign policy concepts) has a robust internal foundation provided by rapid economic growth. If China compels others, it is more likely to do so for economic rather than ideological reasons.

While some of China's successes in mediation, such as the restoration of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, deserve tribute, its ability to resolve deeper contradictions is questionable. (Its February 2023 plan to settle the Ukraine crisis has proven ineffective (Babaev, 2023, p. 49).)

Beijing will continue to improve its international image while countering negative portrayals by Western media. Chinese scholars recognize the necessity of adapting "Chinese stories" for external audiences (Wang, 2022). But if Beijing is successful in fostering a favorable external environment for the Chinese economy's continued development, then it probably will not need a new internationalist ideology at all. If so, Beijing's foreign policy toolkit will remain limited, as will its influence in the emerging world order.

## References

A Global Community of Shared Future, 2023. 携手构建人类命运共同体：中国的倡议与行动 [A Global Community of Shared Future: China's Proposals and Actions]. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China], 26 September. Available at: [https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202309/content\\_6906335.htm](https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202309/content_6906335.htm) [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Constitution, n.d. 中国共产党章程 [Constitution of the Communist Party of China]. 共产党员网 [Communist Party Members Network], n.d. Available at: <https://www.12371.cn/special/zggcdzc/zggcdzcqw/> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Denisov, I.E., 2020. Концепция «дискурсивной силы» и трансформация китайской внешней политики при Си Цзиньпине [The Concept of "Discursive Power" and the Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping]. *Sravnitel'naya politika*, 11(4), pp. 42-52.

Between Patriotism and Internationalism:  
The Difficulties of Chinese Foreign Policy Ideology

Denisov, I.E. and Zuenko, I.Yu., 2022. *От мягкой силы к дискурсивной силе: новые идеологемы внешней политики КНР* [From Soft Power to Discursive Power: New Ideologemes of China's Foreign Policy]. Moscow: IMI MGIMO.

Dirlik, A., 2014. Mao Zedong Thought and the Third World/Global South. *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, 16(2), pp. 233–256.

A Brief History, 2021. *中国共产党简史 / 《中国共产党简史》编写组编著* [A Brief History of the Communist Party of China / Compiled by the Editorial Group of A Brief History of the Communist Party of China]. Beijing: People's Press.

Friedman, Th., 2005. *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Galenovich, Yu.M., 2020. *Кратко о “Кратком курсе истории КНР (1949–2019)”. Китайское государство на заключительном этапе построения “среднезажиточного общества”: материалы ежегодной научной конференции Центра политических исследований и прогнозов ИДВ РАН, Москва, 23–24 марта 2020 года* [Briefly about “A Brief History of the People's Republic of China (1949–2019.)” The Chinese State at the Final Stage of Building a “Moderately Prosperous Society”: Proceedings of the Annual Scientific Conference of the IFES RAS Center for Political Research and Forecasts, Moscow, 23–24 March 2020]. Moscow: IFES RAS.

Goncharov, S.N., 2024. “Судьба человечества” и украинский кризис [“The Fate of Humanity” and the Ukraine Crisis]. *Rossiya v globalnoi politike*, 22(3), pp. 128–145. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6439-2024-22-3-128-145

Guo, Yingjie, 2019. From Marxism to Nationalism: The Chinese Communist Party's Discursive Shift in the Post-Mao Era. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 52(4).

History of the Communist Party of China, 2011. *中国共产党历史.第1卷, 1921~1949* [History of the Communist Party of China. Volume 1, 1921–1949]. Beijing: Party History Research Office of the CCP Central Committee.

Communist Party Members Network, 2021. *如何讲好中国故事·解决好“失语就要挨骂”的问题?* [How to Tell the Chinese Story Well and Solve the Problem of “Being Scolded for Being Speechless”?]. 共产党员网 [Communist Party Members Network], 7 September. Available at: <https://www.12371.cn/2021/09/07/ARTI1630968762051491.shtml> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

IMEMO RAS, 2023. *Девятый выпуск подкаста “Лаборатория ИМЭМО”. Противостояние США и Китая: есть ли идейная составляющая?* [Episode 9 of the IMEMO Laboratory Podcast. The US-China Standoff: Is There an Ideological Component?]. IMEMO RAS. Available at: <https://www.imemo.ru/special-rubrics/podcasts/text/devyatiy-vipusk-podkasta-laboratoriya-imemo> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

IOS RAS, 2024. “Слон в комнате”, или Китай и изменение устройства мира [“The Elephant in the Room” or China and the Changing World Order]. IOS RAS, 27 February. Available at: <https://video.ivran.ru/novosti?artid=215305> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Kazantsev, A.E., 2022. Антияпонская война и историческая политика КНР [Anti-Japanese War and Chinese Historical Policy]. *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*, 2, pp. 162-173.

Leksyutina, Ya.V., 2023. Концепт международной дискурсивной силы в идеологии внешней политики Китая [The Concept of International Discursive Power in China's Foreign Policy Ideology]. *Rossiysko-kitaiskie issledovaniya*, 7(4), pp. 367-380.

Leksyutina, Ya.V., 2024. О двойной международной идентичности современного Китая [On the Dual International Identity of Contemporary China]. *Mezhdunarodnaya analitika*, 15(1), pp. 63-76.

Lin, Shengdong and Li, Danyao, 2023. 林升栋 · 李丹瑶. 用世界元素讲好中国故事 [Tell Chinese Stories with World Elements]. 中国社会科学网 [China Social Sciences Network], 6 May. Available at: [https://www.cssn.cn/xwcbx/rdjj/202305/t20230506\\_5627136.shtml](https://www.cssn.cn/xwcbx/rdjj/202305/t20230506_5627136.shtml) [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Mao, Zedong, Deng, Xiaoping, Jiang, Zemin, and Hu, Jintao, 2021. 毛泽东邓小平江泽民胡锦涛关于中国共产党历史论述摘编 [Excerpts from Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao's Discourses on the History of the Communist Party of China]. Beijing: Party History and Literature Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee.

Nathan, A.J. and Zhang, Boshu, 2022. A Shared Future for Mankind: Rhetoric and Reality in Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 31(133), p. 14.

Babaev, K.V., 2023. Мирная инициатива по Украине в контексте внешней политики Китая [Peace Initiative on Ukraine in the Context of China's Foreign Policy]. *Puti k miru i bezopasnosti*, 1(64), pp. 48-57.

One Hundred Years of the Communist Party of China, 2022. 中国共产党的一百年：全四册 [One Hundred Years of the Communist Party of China: Four Volumes]. Beijing: Party History and Literature Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee.

Perminova, A.A., 2023. От частного к общему [From Particulars to Generals]. *Rossiya v globalnoi politike*, 21(5), pp. 82-94. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6439-2023-21-5-82-94

Resolution, 2021. 中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议（全文） [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Resolution on the Party's Major Achievements and Historical Experiences over the Past 100 Years (Full Text)]. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China], 16 November. Available at: [https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content\\_5651269.htm](https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content_5651269.htm) [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Resolutions, 2010. 关于若干历史问题的决议》和《关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》 [“Resolution on Certain Historical Issues” and “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China”]. Beijing: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Seah, S. et al., 2024. *The State of Southeast Asia: 2024 Survey Report*. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Between Patriotism and Internationalism:  
The Difficulties of Chinese Foreign Policy Ideology

Skosyrev, V.A., 2023. Идеология Коммунистической партии Китая о “модернизации китайского типа”: историческое и международное измерения [Chinese Communist Party’s Ideologeme of “Chinese-Style Modernization”: Historical and International Dimensions]. *Klio*, 6(198), pp. 44–51.

Skosyrev, V.A. and Smirnov, D.A., 2024. О новых подходах Коммунистической партии Китая к описанию собственной истории [On the Chinese Communist Party’s New Approaches to Writing Its History]. *Klio*, 1(205), pp. 72-78.

Sun, Zhihao, 2022. От дискуссий о смысле “мирного подъёма” до ценностных ориентиров современной внешней политики: некоторые взгляды из Китая [On the Notion of “Peaceful Rise” and Its Value Orientations: Some Views from China]. *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*, 3, pp. 56-71.

The White House, 2020. The Chinese Communist Party’s Ideology and Global Ambitions. *The White House*, 26 June. Available at: <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/chinese-communist-partys-ideology-global-ambitions/> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

USCC, 2020. A “China Model?” Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards. *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC)*. Available at: [https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/March\\_13\\_Hearing\\_and\\_April\\_27\\_Roundtable\\_Transcript\\_0.pdf](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/March_13_Hearing_and_April_27_Roundtable_Transcript_0.pdf) [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Vinogradov, A.V., 2008. *Китайская модель модернизации. Поиски новой идентичности* [The Chinese Model of Modernization: The Search for a New Identity]. Moscow: NOFMO, pp. 223-225.

Wang, Lei, 2022. 王磊. 坚持讲好中国故事、传播好中国声音 [Persist in Telling China’s Stories Well and Spreading China’s Voice Well]. 中国共产党新闻网 [China Communist Party News Network], 2 October. Available at: <http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2022/1002/c40531-32538801.html> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Wang, Zheng, 2012. *Never Forget National Humiliation. Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Xi, Jinping, 2021a. 习近平. 论中国共产党历史 [On the History of the Communist Party of China]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, p. 30.

Xi, Jinping, 2021b. 习近平. 讲好中国故事 · 传播好中国声音 [Tell Chinese Stories Well and Spread Chinese Voice Well]. 求是 [Qiushi], 2 June. Available at: [http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanku/2021-06/02/c\\_1127522386.htm](http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanku/2021-06/02/c_1127522386.htm) [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Zhang, Shan, 2024. 张姗. 【读懂中华文明】中国式现代化增进中华文明与世界文明交流互鉴 [【Understanding Chinese Civilization】 Chinese-Style Modernization Promotes Exchanges and Mutual Learning between Chinese Civilization and World Civilization]. 中国社会科学网 [China Social Sciences Network], 11 July. Available at: [https://www.cssn.cn/skgz/bwyc/202407/t20240711\\_5764071.shtml](https://www.cssn.cn/skgz/bwyc/202407/t20240711_5764071.shtml) [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Zhang, Xili, 2023. 张西立. 讲好“中国式现代化”的故事 [Tell the Story of “Chinese-Style Modernization” Well]. 爱思想 [Love Thinking], 27 May. Available at: <https://www.aisixiang.com/data/143224.html> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Zhou, Jin, 2023. 周进. 对外传播中讲好新中国故事的理念与路径 [Concepts and Paths for Telling the Story of New China Well in External Communication]. 爱思想 [Love Thinking], 10 July. Available at: <https://www.aisixiang.com/data/144350.html> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Zou, Hongru, 2024. 邹宏如. 展现可信、可爱、可敬的中国形象 [Show a Credible, Lovable and Respectable Image of China]. 爱思想 [Love Thinking], 4 February. Available at: <https://www.aisixiang.com/data/149092.html> [Accessed 16 October 2024].

Zuenko, I.Yu., 2023. Проблемы восприятия внешней политики КНР как фактор китайско-американского противостояния [Misperception of Chinese Foreign Policy As a Factor of US-China Decoupling]. *SSHA & Kanada: ekonomika, politika, kultura*, 7, pp. 117–126.

Zuenko, I.Yu., 2024. Применима ли в России китайская модель внешней политики? [Is the Chinese Foreign Policy Model Applicable in Russia?]. *Rossiya v globalnoi politike*, 22(3), pp. 146-159. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6439-2024-22-3-146-159