Russia consistently advocates minimizing the role of military force in addressing international problems and reducing the function of the armed forces to deterring wars and armed conflicts. However, recent developments in the world have motivated Russia’s military-political leadership to amend its vision concerning the role and place of its military policy and military assets. A sufficient military potential and, above all, modern and effective armed forces are becoming a prerequisite for Russia’s successful and smooth integration into the newly constructed system of international relations.

GLOBAL TENDENCIES IN THE WORLD

An analysis of new global tendencies in the world will help better understand Russia’s foreign-policy interests and the role and place of its armed forces.

First, within the global system of military-political relations the top priority is the necessity to counter the challenges aggravated by the processes of globalization. These challenges include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles; international terrorism; demographic problems and ethnic instability; the activities of radical religious communities and groups; illegal drug trafficking and organized crime. The nature of these challenges precludes the ability of individual states to effectively combat them on their own. This factor has sharply increased the importance of international cooperation between security organizations, including the secret services and armed forces.

Second, countries have now begun to implement military force within the framework of international operations beyond the realm of traditional military-political organizations and institutions. Increasingly, military force is being used by the temporary coalition of states. This practice is likely to be used on a broader scale in the future. Russia continues to insist on the strict observance of international law in forming such coalitions and will join them only when it is necessary to meet its national interests.

Third, countries now give more priority to their economic interests, as opposed to political or military-political interests. Moreover, the economic interests of individual states often form an increasingly intricate relationship with the interests of large transnational companies. Formerly, military force was used to counter a direct threat to security, while now it is increasingly employed to defend economic interests. This factor objectively broadens the sphere for employing military force.     

Fourth, terrorism in individual countries has merged with international terrorism, thus making attempts to divide terrorist activities into categories of national and international senseless. This refers both to the political assessment of terrorist threats and to the use of force to neutralize them. Therefore, the share of responsibility of the armed forces – in particular Russia’s military – in countering terrorism has markedly increased.

Fifth, non-state agents of international relations now play a greater role in determining the nature of foreign-policy priorities of various countries. Non-governmental organizations, international movements and communities, interstate organizations and informal “clubs” have a broad – and often conflicting – impact on the policy of individual states.

The above tendencies supplement, and sometimes modify, the processes in bilateral political relations and in traditional interstate organizations.

Another major aspect that determines the alternatives that Russia must choose for the development of its armed forces is the nature of Russia’s relations with the more important institutions within the present system of international relations.

Russia seeks an active role within the major international organizations in order to meet various aspects of its foreign-policy interests.

Russia views the United Nations and the UN Security Council as major factors for ensuring global stability. Reducing their role – for example, through the new practice of using armed forces by the decision of individual states – is a very dangerous trend which may pose a serious threat to Russia’s political and military-political interests in the future.

The development of relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States is a foreign-policy priority for Russia. Our nation seeks to continue strengthening the potential for coordinating military-political activities of the CIS countries within the frameworks of existing structures and institutions, above all, the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia will continue working for the CSTO to become an effective interstate organization that will have a stabilizing impact on the general military-political situation in the CIS and adjacent regions.

Russia’s relations with NATO are regulated by the 2002 Rome Declaration. Russia keeps a close watch on NATO’s ongoing transformation and hopes for complete removal of direct and indirect anti-Russian elements from the military plans and political declarations of its member states. However, if NATO remains a military alliance with an offensive military doctrine, Russia will have to adequately revise its military planning and principles regarding the development of its armed forces, including its nuclear forces.

Russia is prepared for the continued development of constructive and mutually advantageous cooperation with the European Union, provided it unconditionally recognize Russia’s territorial integrity and respect its right to combat all manifestations of international terrorism.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization plays an important role in ensuring stability in Central Asia and the Far East. The further strengthening of this organization’s political and military-political potential will help form a zone of peace and stability in southeast and in the Far East directions. This will, in turn, rule out (or make unlikely) the emergence of a large-scale military threat there.

If the development of the military-political situation in those regions takes an unfavorable turn, Russia will have to regard them as a potential source of military-political instability.

Russia attaches special importance to its relations with the United States. We hope for broader and diversified cooperation with the U.S., which includes ensuring global and regional stability, as well as strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. Russia will consider compromise decisions on any international problems on the basis of the strict observance of international law and the mutual respect for national interests.

 So, an analysis of the global political trends shows that the fast-changing and controversial international situation, marked by the evolution of some key international institutions, causes Russia to reassess the threats to its security and to set new priorities for its military program, which would meet Russia’s international status and resources.

THREATS TO RUSSIA’S SECURITY

Presently, there are three types of threats – external, domestic and transnational – which the Russian armed forces are assigned to neutralize. Meanwhile, even traditional external threats are acquiring new aspects. These include interference in Russia’s internal affairs by foreign states or organizations supported by them, instability in neighboring countries caused by the weakness of their governments, and several other aspects which are relatively new for Russia’s military planning. The Russian armed forces now play an increasingly significant role in countering the threat of WMD development by individual states, coalitions of states and political movements, as well as their access to the most dangerous types of weapons.

External threats require that the Russian armed forces perform various kinds of tasks in various regions of the world. One should not absolutely rule out the preventive use of force, if this is required by Russia’s interests or its allied commitments.

The more important domestic threats, which the armed forces are assigned to neutralize, include:

• attempts to change the constitutional system by force and the violation of Russia’s territorial integrity;
• the formation, arming, training and functioning of illegal armed groups;
• illegal arms, munitions and explosives trafficking on the territory of the Russian Federation;
• large-scale activities of organized crime, threatening political stability on the scale of individual entities of the Russian Federation;
• the activities of separatist and radical religious or nationalist movements.

Special mention should be made of transnational threats which, although appearing domestic, are actually external.

These include:

• activities of organizations on the territory of Russia that are connected with the international terrorist community;
• the training of armed groups on the territory of other states for actions on the territory of Russia or its allies;
• transnational crime, including smuggling and other illegal activities.

The need to counter transnational threats to Russia’s security will be a growing factor in military planning. The armed forces will participate in neutralizing domestic and transnational threats jointly with other security forces on the basis of the Constitution and legislation of the Russian Federation. In this difficult period for Russia, it would be irresponsible to limit the activities of the armed forces only to the external aspect. The Chechen experience has taught us a lot. It is in Chechnya where Russia, countering a threat in the form of an internal insurgency, confronted aggression by international terrorist organizations.

It is necessary to take special account of a possible re-emergence of nuclear weapons as a real military instrument. This is an extremely dangerous tendency that is undermining global and regional stability. Even a modest lowering of the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons would still demand that Russia rebuild its troop control system, as well as the principles for the combat employment of its troops.

At present, none of the existing conflicts beyond Russia is posing a direct military threat to its security. However, it is necessary to foresee any situation that may arise in the future.

In the foreseeable future, Russia’s military planning will be determined by several uncertainty factors, i.e. conflicts or processes, which may develop into factors that would essentially change the geopolitical situation in regions of priority for Russia’s interests, or create a direct threat to its security. These factors include the situation in some CIS countries and adjacent regions. Modern military planning must also take account of the experience gained in the armed conflicts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This experience requires giving up habitual stereotypes.

Recent years have not been marked by the domination of any one particular type of armed conflict. This means that combat training, operational planning, and defense procurement must be as flexible as possible. It is also obvious that the former concept of conventional wars, both limited and large-scale, is undergoing dramatic changes. Therefore, one must be prepared for classical combat actions, as well as for combating terrorism. Most of the recent conflicts developed on a limited territory, within one theater of operations, yet they involved large-scale use of force located beyond. This factor requires an ability not just to defend against outside aggression, but also to transfer military operations to the enemy’s territory.

It is perfectly clear that the course and outcome of armed actions will be determined mainly by air and sea operations, while the ground forces will consolidate the successes and ensure the achievement of the desirable political goals. Those who still believe that attacks by tank spearheads can be decisive in modern warfare are entertaining outdated ideas.

It is also clear that victory will belong to the side that will be able to integrate all information flows functionally, while being able to amend combat employment plans in real time depending on the changing situation. Therefore, the operational structure of the military forces must include the following components: a reconnaissance center; an automated, highly protected troop and weapon control system; and most importantly, an aerospace force performing both reconnaissance and strike functions.

The characteristic features of modern wars and armed conflicts necessitate the formulation of new tasks for the Russian armed forces. These tasks must take into consideration recent changes in the military-political situation in the zones of Russia’s interests, as well as possible trends in the development of the principles of warfare.

TASKS OF RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES

The Russian Armed Forces are assigned the following four major tasks:

1. Containment of military and military-political threats to security, including the assurance of strategic stability and territorial defense of the country.

2. The furthering of economic and political interests. These may include operations involving the armed forces by decision of the Russian president.

3. Peacetime military operations, including the fulfilment of allied commitments, as well as peacekeeping operations under a UN or CIS mandate. Russia is now considering the establishment in 2004 of a permanent independent peacekeeping brigade within the Ground Forces.

4. The employment of military force to neutralize military threats, including in conditions when weapons of mass destruction are used.

The above tasks require the following capabilities for the Russian armed forces:

• being able to successfully fulfill tasks in two armed conflicts of any type simultaneously, as well as conducting peacekeeping operations independently or as part of a multinational force (this would be applicable in peacetime and in emergencies, with the armed forces retaining the strategic deterrence potential and performing their missions by means of permanent readiness units without additional mobilization measures);
• in the event of an aggravated situation, the ability to ensure strategic deployment and check its escalation by means of strategic forces and maneuvers of permanent readiness units;
• in wartime, being able to rebuff an aerospace enemy attack by means of the forces available, and, upon full-scale strategic deployment, to perform tasks in two local wars simultaneously.

So, the geopolitical requirements for Russia’s development, together with the nature of national security tasks set to its armed forces, make it possible to formulate the main priorities for developing the Russian army and navy, considering their present state.

RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES: THE MAIN RESULTS OF THE REFORM

Since the time when the Russian Federation became a sovereign state, its armed forces have traveled down a long and difficult road. As it is with the nation, the military has been radically reformed to meet geopolitical changes, as well as those changes associated with Russia’s new statehood. Even before the reform of the country’s socio-economic structure was completed, its political leadership launched sweeping quantitative and qualitative changes in the armed forces. Since then, serious results have been achieved, despite numerous problems.

First, there has been formed a legislative basis for the armed forces’ development, together with the basic elements of a system for political and public control over their activities. Additionally, there has been formed a system for the army’s and the navy’s interaction with other security organizations in the country.

Structural changes have been made to increase the effectiveness of military command. The Russian Armed Forces now have a new structure which better meets the present-day requirements.

The strength of the Russian Armed Forces has been undergoing reductions, and this process is mainly over. Admittedly, the reduction process has been rather painful as it was large-scale: in 1993, the strength of the Russian Armed Forces was 2,750,000 troops.

The economic crisis of the last decade hit the armed forces as well, yet they successfully survived it.

No more major reductions are planned for the armed forces. Their strength has been reduced to a defense sufficiency level which corresponds to about one million troops.

The recruitment system has been drastically changed in favor of contract-based recruitment of soldiers and sergeants, now being introduced on an ever-increasing scale.

Prerequisites have been created for introducing a modern social security system for servicemen, although some acute problems, such as housing, have yet to be resolved.

On the whole, the dramatic changes in the Russian Armed Forces brought about by their restructuring within the framework of the military reform were carried out. They helped solve the problem of the armed forces’ survival and enabled the military leadership to focus entirely on military construction issues.

Russia’s military-political leadership and Defense Ministry face a new major task, which is, working out a concept for the further development of the national armed forces.

The new concept was introduced at an October 2, 2003 meeting of Russia’s military-political leadership and the top command of the armed forces. It was presented in a doctrinal document entitled The Vital Tasks of the Development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Now we have all grounds to say that the Russian Defense Ministry has a clear vision of its priorities in developing the army and the navy. These priorities stem from Russia’s place and role in the present system of international relations and from the new approach to military planning which now must be built on real national security requirements.

PRIORITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES

Preserving the potential of the strategic deterrence forces. The main objective of Russia’s strategic deterrence policy is preventing any kind of pressure or aggression against this country or its allies. Deterrence will be based on Russia’s ability to retaliate and inflict damage that would counterbalance potential aggressors’ objectives. In any case, no one should doubt that Russia will employ its entire potential to guarantee the protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests of itself or its allies.

Increasing the number of permanent readiness units and integrating them into groups of forces. The formation of groups of forces with unified control, capable of fulfilling combat missions in their peacetime composition, is a long-term objective of military construction. These groups of forces should be formed on the basis of experience gained in the combat employment of troops. The core of such groups of forces must be permanent readiness units.

Permanent readiness units include those that are capable of fulfilling combat missions in peacetime and wartime without additional mobilization. Permanent readiness forces are formed in all of the strategic sectors. Their composition is different yet adequate to the degree of threats to Russia’s national security. Increasing the number of permanent readiness units and forces and enhancing their long-distance airlift capability are major priorities in developing Russia’s armed forces over the next few years.

Increasing contract-based recruitment for the armed forces. The introduction of contract-based service in the armed forces is not an end in itself but a means for increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces. This objective is set in the federal program Transition to Contract-Based Recruitment in Some Military Units and Forces, adopted for 2004-2007. At the same time, the implementation of this program for the partial transition of the military to contract-based service does not rule out the preservation of the already prepared mobilization reserve.

Improving the operational and combat training of troops. The operational and combat training of the Russian Armed Forces must make the latter capable of countering military and other threats to Russia, ensuring the defense of the country, while adjusting them to new trends in the nature of warfare and warfare methods. It must be flexible enough to accommodate itself to all operational missions, as well as to the specific theaters of operations and peculiarities of the potential enemy.

Recent years have ushered in major advances in the improvement of combat training quality. In 2003, the number of exercises and other combat training events in all branches of the armed forces was almost double the 2002 figure.

The Defense Ministry’s draft budget for 2004 earmarks almost 16 percent of all funds for the improvement of the combat training system. Exercises to be held next year will focus on enhancing the mobility of heterogeneous forces and checking the possibility of inter-theater regrouping. Russia must proceed from the assumption that in a majority of potential armed conflicts its armed forces will face an enemy force composed of different types of units, including those using guerrilla tactics, acts of sabotage and even terrorism.

Another important aspect of military reform is the integration of the various supporting units and other troops of Russia’s armed forces through a transition to an interdepartmental system of technical and logistical support. The main goal of this transition will be enhancing the effectiveness of technical and logistical support for all military units on the basis of their integration into the respective bodies of Russia’s security ministries and agencies, as well as the rational employment of facilities and infrastructure.

The timely armament of the troops with modern weapons and military equipment will be impossible without optimizing the defense procurement system to bring it into line with modern requirements. Twenty general customers of armaments and military equipment have now been established for the Russian Armed Forces (compared to 57 in 1997, and 29 in 1999). To reduce the number of ordering organizations, it has been decided that there will exist only one in each branch and arm of the armed forces.

To centralize the orders and supplies of armaments and military equipment for the Defense Ministry and other agencies possessing military units, the Russian president issued Decree 311 on March 11, 2003, to establish the State Defense Order Committee at the Defense Ministry.

Improving the military training system. The modernization of the armed forces requires the constant upgrading of the officers’ professional knowledge and skills. The military training system must be reformed. One of the reasons is the partial transition to contract-based service for sergeants and rank and file. Officers must be able to effectively command their subordinates who may have a broad background and a high educational level.

To solve the difficult problems pertaining to military training, on May 27, 2002, the Russian government adopted a federal program named The Reform of the Military Training System in Russia in the Period Until 2010. This program provides for the establishment of an interdepartmental system for training military specialists for the Russian armed forces and other military units and agencies of the country.

The training of future officers at the military departments of civilian colleges and universities, with their subsequent mandatory recruitment for service in the armed forces, will be continued as a promising practice.

The training of reserve officers at military departments of civilian educational establishments is an issue requiring special consideration. The number of reserve officers trained at the military departments exceeds the actually required number by ten times. Also, the number of military departments training military specialists in numbers exceeding the Defense Ministry’s actual demand has increased unfoundedly. Obviously, it is necessary to raise the issue of payment for work inside of the military departments, proceeding from the actual fulfilment of their plan targets. This approach must either stimulate the preservation of military departments or necessitate their reduction due to their inexpedience.

Improving the social security system. Apart from increasing money allowances for servicemen, the Defense Ministry’s social policy focuses also on the housing problem.

Naturally, this problem cannot be solved within a year or two. The present system of providing servicemen with housing needs to be radically changed. The state must not only increase allocations for housing construction, but also immediately introduce an Accumulation Housing Program for servicemen.

The Defense Ministry’s fund for providing living quarters to its servicemen now comprises only 98,000 apartments, while the amount of living quarters required for each officer to have a guaranteed place to reside while he serves in the army is approximately 450,000 apartments.

According to estimates, the problem of providing servicemen with living quarters will be fully solved by 2012-2015. The solution of this problem will require the construction of new apartments and the rebuilding of barracks and other premises; however, this number will be reduced due to the planned reduction of the armed forces.

This situation, which now seems to be at a dead-end, can be resolved only through the early formation of a quarters fund, the continuation of the State Housing Certificates program adopted for 2002-2010, and the implementation of the Accumulation Housing Program for servicemen. This program, now being prepared by the Defense Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade, provides for the accumulation of budget funds on each serviceman’s bank account in an amount that will enable him to buy housing of his own in any region of Russia after 20 years of service. To encourage him to continue serving in the army beyond that term he will be paid bonus payments.  

The Russian government has approved a plan for drafting regulations and taking measures for the transition to the accumulation system. The transition to the accumulation system will ensure social justice and confirm in practice that servicemen are citizens with a special state status.

Improving the system of lifting morale in the military and cultivating patriotic feelings in Russian citizens. Success in battle is always achieved not by materiel but people, and the fulfillment of combat missions depends on their morale. Therefore, the morale of personnel and the maintenance of high military discipline have always been, and will continue to be, major tasks of Russian military commanders of all levels.

High morale does not appear at once. It is the result of a deliberate and purposeful impact on the views, intellect, moral state and psyche of the servicemen.

Despite the massive influence of all negative factors in the armed forces, their personnel remain one of the most law-abiding groups inside Russian society. The crime rate among servicemen is half the average rate of the Russian Federation.

*  *  *

Russia’s leadership and the Defense Ministry have a well-conceived program for developing and enhancing the armed forces’ effectiveness, based on a realistic understanding of the state’s capabilities and tasks facing the country while it is integrating into the modern system of international relations.

We view the use of military force only as a forced measure and a last resort, which should be used only when all the other opportunities have been exhausted. Russia’s interaction with various international institutions considerably facilitates the implementation of its foreign-policy objectives, but it does not fully guarantee its security. Only highly effective armed forces can give such guarantees.

Today we can say with confidence that the period of crisis development of the Russian military is over. Problems that arose in the past should be viewed as inevitable developmental difficulties. The main objective now is modernizing the military organization within the framework of the above development priorities.

 In the 21st century, Russia’s armed forces must correspond to the status of this great power.