Russia in Global Affairs

The new set of global and regional actors can be taken for the new, multipolar hardware of the global system; its software is shaped by new structural realities, within which actors operate. These are conceptualized as the mismatch between material globalization and the decline of ideational universalism: the latter determines conflict while the former limits escalation. The article outlines the mode of competition within these structural realities, i.e., indirect coercion.

Whether the United States, after four years of backsliding on democracy and continuing domestic political rancor, is itself fit to lead a global democratic alliance is a question many American allies and partners are asking. The Biden administration likes to announce that “America is back.” But it needs to demonstrate that American democracy and predictability are back for the long term before countries will be willing to bear significant risks to pursue joint endeavors with Washington.

I do not think that there is a serious risk for Russia to end up in strategic dependence on China. No dependence on any external center is acceptable for Russia with its sacred striving for sovereignty. It cannot be anyone’s “younger brother.”

Giving Iran a full-fledged membership in the Eurasian Economic Union is risky proposition that will reshape Russia’s regional integration strategy, the nature of post-Soviet institutions, and Moscow’s relations with other Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern states.