The student radicals of Paris in 1968 used to chant: “Be realistic – demand the impossible.” It was a clever slogan for a moment of revolution. But what happens when revolution is not an option and reality can’t be wished away?
Wars end in many ways. Sometimes through the outright destruction of an opponent. Sometimes through negotiated exchanges of gains and losses. And sometimes they simply burn on until the conflict becomes pointless, only to reignite years later. History offers dozens of templates. Yet public consciousness tends to fixate on recent examples, especially those tied to national mythology or modern moral narratives. That habit has led many to mistake the 20th century for a historical norm.
It wasn’t. As the latest Valdai Club report notes, a defining feature of the last century’s strategic thinking was the expectation of total defeat. The idea that systemic contradictions could be resolved only by crushing the adversary. That logic shaped the world wars, reaching its apex in 1945 with the unconditional surrender of the Axis. It lingered in the Cold War as well: both blocs sought not only advantage but the transformation of the other’s political and social system. When the USSR dissolved, it wasn’t a battlefield defeat but an ideological one. However, in Western capitals the outcome was treated as a triumph of historical inevitability.
We are now leaving that era behind. International politics is reverting to earlier patterns: less ideological, less orderly, and more dependent on raw balances of power. Outcomes today are shaped by what armies can and cannot do, not by moral claims.
This context explains why Washington’s recent diplomatic push has been greeted with such attention. American officials insist their emerging 28-point peace plan is based on battlefield realities rather than wishful thinking. And the reality, as they see it, is blunt: Ukraine cannot win this war, but it could lose catastrophically. The goal of the plan is to prevent further losses and restore a more stable, if uncomfortable, equilibrium.
This is a standard approach to a conflict that is important for the participants but not existential for the external powers involved. For Ukraine and several European states, however, the framing remains moralistic: a struggle of principles in which only a complete defeat of Russia is acceptable. Because that outcome is unrealistic, they seek time in the hope that Russia changes internally, or America changes politically.
Another round in this political cycle seems likely. The situation on the front should, in theory, push Kiev toward realism. So far, the shift has been slower than circumstances would suggest.
For Russia, the real question is what outcomes are both acceptable and achievable. Historically, the conflict resembles not the ideological showdowns of the 20th century but the territorial contests of the 17th and 18th. Russia then was defining itself through its borders: administrative, cultural, and civilizational. It was a long process with setbacks and recoveries, not a quest for a single crushing, irreversible victory.
As long as fighting continues, that leverage exists. Once it stops, Russia will face coordinated diplomatic pressure from the same Western powers that defined victory in ideological terms for decades. No illusions about this are necessary.
If Russia defines clear, realistic goals aligned with its capabilities, diplomacy can then support the military component. Nevertheless, it can’t replace it, and the country’s leadership understands this dynamic well.
The 28-point plan may eventually serve as the basis for negotiations. But not yet. Ukraine and several Western European capitals remain attached to a vision of total moral victory. Washington is more sober, but not entirely unified. And the battlefield still speaks louder than conference tables.
This article was first published in the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and was translated and edited by the RT team.
