30.12.2025
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Sergei Poletaev

The Vatfor project;
Co-founder and Editor.

The outgoing year is the first time in the Special Military Operation (SMO) when we can speak in earnest about a Ukraine peace process. In the popular consciousness it is associated with Trump’s personality, but what seems obvious may not necessarily be true: the self-proclaimed great peacemaker is more like a great opportunist seeking to take center stage in all peaceful (and not very peaceful) agreements, which work out all by themselves, without his help.

However, Ukraine is a special case: the U.S. is involved in this conflict, albeit indirectly. Moreover, the previous administration largely bore the costs of war, which Trump keeps mentioning at every opportunity. So, by trying to negotiate peace, Washington emerges amid an investigation leading to its own wrong doings.

Anyway, Trump has initiated a fundamental (if not to say historic) shift in U.S. foreign policy: from values to interests. This means that for the first time in many decades, Russia and the U.S. seem to be speaking the same language. Needless to say, Moscow appreciates the new opportunity as a breath of fresh air.

Yet a common language is a necessary but insufficient condition for agreement, especially when it comes to such complex matters.

It quickly became clear that Trump’s idee fixe about achieving peace in Ukraine “in one day” was an empty shell. Whether Trump tried to get in a game of chicken with the Kremlin in one blow or whether he sincerely believed that all he had to do was to ask the sides to stop shooting, neither Moscow, nor Kiev, nor even European capitals played along with Trump.

He failed as a Deus ex machina.

 

Major Milestones

The West began talking about the peace process—first in undertones, but then louder—in 2023, when Ukraine’s abortive counteroffensive foreboded its defeat on the battlefield. Over time, the West consented to considering the Korean scenario, which essentially means freezing the conflict without mutual commitments. This option was discussed in Russia too: I, for one, assumed that the Kremlin might agree to it if faced with profound economic problems threatening to collapse the homefront. But freezing would not eliminate the root causes of the conflict and instead invite the prospect of a new SMO.

In fact, the U.S. started planning its withdrawal from the conflict even under Biden. The squabbling over Ukraine financial support led to an unspoken agreement that the $60 billion tranche approved in the spring of 2017 would be the last one, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election. Trump’s victory solved the issue in principle by shifting the costs entirely to Europe.

Thus, the unwillingness to pay for a hopeless war with money and lives was the main prerequisite for peace negotiations, stirring interest in peace both in the West and Ukraine. Trump simply put this long-overdue process in motion as the only one able to relaunch dialogue with Moscow.

The dialogue suddenly proved that everything that Putin had been saying for years and what the West had ignored was not the Kremlin’s bravado, bluff, or propaganda for the domestic audience. It became clear that the root cause of the conflict was the Kiev Russophobic regime that the West used as a battering ram against Russia.

It turned out that Moscow was ready to compromise on a variety of minor issues but would not back down on the key points: post-war Ukraine’s policies must basically exclude any hostility towards Russia, and the Kremlin must have a golden share in managing Ukraine’s transformation.

Notably, this came as a surprise not only to the West but also to many Russian experts.

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You Are Not in the Church, No One Will Cheat You Here

Moscow is essentially calling for a re-establishment of the Ukrainian state. But this is a matter of life and death for its incumbent regime, and not only in political terms. That is why not only Moscow but also Kiev refuse to compromise, despite all the pressure from Washington. Since the first day of the SMO, Zelensky has shown that he would sacrifice anything for preserving the current regime underpinned by Russophobic ideology, which Moscow seeks to dismantle.

This does not mean that Ukraine will hastily start preparations for revenge the day after the deal is struck. The breakdown may be serious enough for Ukraine to gradually transform after the war, just as Georgia did. In other words, it is possible that the regime is already doomed. However, these are merely prospects, but the reality is that the Kiev regime seeks to survive here and now. And it could present peace through its defeat not as surrender but as an achievement: look, we have persevered, we have ruined Vlad Putin’s dream.

This would be an achievement not only for Kiev but also for European globalists.

Unlike Trump, who has sort of stepped aside, Europe’s political mainstream stands its ground, denying Russia’s right to have its own interests. Europe still thinks in terms of light vs. darkness, the Order of the Phoenix vs. Voldemort.

If Moscow succeeds in changing the regime in Kiev, Europe will emerge as the main loser. There is no doubt that European liberal governments struggling to keep their grip on power will have to pay for this.

And yet, why does Brussels continue to pour tens of billions of euros into a hopeless project? Why doesn’t it, like Trump, lead a process which it cannot avert? Why isn’t it at least trying to reach some agreement with Putin before it is too late? Why does it keep making demands that are unacceptable not only to Moscow but also to Washington?

One reason, mentioned above, is the dogmas of religious teaching about ‘the right side of history.’ But there is also another reason: it seems that European capitals still believe that Moscow will abandon its maximalist plans before Ukraine’s front collapses. A few more sanctions, a little bit lower oil price, more long-range Ukrainian attacks deep into the Russian territory, and the Russian bear will crawl back to its den in disgrace to lick its wounds. The worse things are getting for Ukraine, the more fiercely European leaders are convincing each other of this outcome, ignoring any expert opinion suggesting otherwise.

In this sense, Zelensky is incredibly lucky to have such allies.

 

The Smoker’s Shuttle Diplomacy

Thus, the prerequisites for commencing a peace process do not at all guarantee its successful completion. The disagreements are too deep, and too much has been put at stake to just stop fighting while the sides are still able to fight.

Moscow remains confident that it can change the regime in Kiev using arms.

European leaders keep praying, waiting for signs from heaven and sacrificing at the altar of their own faith.

Kiev is simply unwilling to sign its own death warrant: after all, the front still holds, and there will always be time to surrender.

And in the middle of it all, there is Donald Trump, seemingly unhappy to have meddled in this mess. Trump’s subordinates are even more unhappy, as they have to flesh out his peace wishes and dreams and also pursue U.S. interests, which, as Rubio suggests, may not match Trump’s interests.

Unsurprisingly, the peace process is not so much moving forward as drifting with the current. U.S. officials meet with Russians and write down their demands. Then they meet with Ukrainians and write down their demands. At some point, Europe jumps into the process with its own ideas. Moscow then shrugs its shoulders to say that it would not agree to this, and the cycle repeats.

So, is it all useless? Not at all.

Russia’s main diplomatic achievement in the past year is that Trump has dropped his demand for a ceasefire.

Now the peace process is proceeding as it should, in parallel with the fighting. The conditions for the start of peace talks were secured on the battlefield, and this is where the prerequisites for their successful conclusion and for lasting peace must also be created.

The Kremlin is confident that peace must be concluded on Russia’s terms, of which the main one is changing the current regime in Ukraine to one that would be loyal to and controllable by Moscow. The Kremlin has tried to attain this through negotiations since spring 2022—to realize time and again that there is no way to peace but defeating Ukraine on the ground.

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