FROM PARTNERS TO STRATEGIC ALLIES
The Pakistan-Saudi relationship is long-standing. Pakistani forces have long been involved in training, advising, and occasionally protecting Saudi facilities, particularly during regional tensions. But those actions were ad hoc and informal. The SMDA, even if publicly incomplete, elevates the relationship to a formal strategic level.
The timing is significant. The Gulf countries are reassessing their reliance on U.S. security guarantees. The West’s inaction per Israel’s transgressions against neighboring countries, such as missile strikes on Houthis facilities in Yemen and attack on the Hamas negotiating delegation in Doha, Qatar, forces the Gulf countries to diversify their defense partners.
Pakistan gains from the institutionalization of this alliance. Economically strained but militarily capable, Islamabad enhances its strategic profile and secures stronger political and possibly financial backing from a powerful Gulf actor.
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY AS A TOOL OF DETERRENCE
As only a single SMDA clause has been made clear―an attack on one will be treated as an attack on both―speculations grow. Some analysts suggest that the pact might include contingency plans for joint operations, Saudi’s access to Pakistani military expertise, Pakistan’s access to Saudi military equipment or even nuclear coordination. Yet there is no evidence or official indication that the agreement involves nuclear guarantees, basing rights, or force projection arrangements.
This lack of transparency may be deliberate. Strategic ambiguity has long been used by states to maximize deterrence while minimizing rigid obligations.
The SMDA may signal that Saidi Arabia is no longer willing to rely solely on distant superpowers for deterrence. The uncertainty about how Pakistan might act in a crisis complicates the calculations of any potential aggressor. The agreement may enhance Pakistan’s relevance in a strategically vital region without binding itself to specific conflicts.
This ambiguity is especially potent vis-à-vis India and Israel, as both will now have to factor it into their policies, however undefined the possibility of Saudi Arabia’s political or military backing by Pakistan is in future crises.
NUCLEAR CONCERNS
The most charged question is whether the agreement includes a nuclear dimension. Western media and some regional outlets have revived long-standing rumours that Pakistan could offer Saudi Arabia a nuclear umbrella or even transfer nuclear technology or weapons in the event of a crisis.
Such propositions are unsubstantiated. Pakistan’s nuclear program and doctrine are consistently designed for national security and not against any specific country. Its command-and-control structures are tightly centralized under the National Command Authority. There is no public evidence of any operational sharing or dual-key arrangements with foreign states. Pakistan’s officials have repeatedly denied allegations that its nuclear deterrence is available for export.
The SMDA does not confirm or deny any such provisions. In the absence of specific statements in this vein, the only responsible position is to treat nuclear speculations as politically charged theories.
Another concern that the agreement has raised is that it may serve as a backdoor to involve Pakistani forces in regional conflicts, above all in the ongoing conflict in Yemen where Saudi Arabia has long sought external military support.
The risk seems to be overstated. Pakistan’s 2015 parliamentary decision to remain neutral in the Yemen conflict still serves as a strong precedent. So far, despite Saudi requests, the Pakistani government has refrained from direct military involvement, choosing instead to balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Pakistani military presence in Saudi Arabia remains limited to training and advising.
Unless evidence emerges to the contrary, assumptions that Pakistani forces are now committed to offensive operations under Saudi command are speculative as they ignore the political constraints of Pakistan’s civil-military system.
STRATEGIC RIPPLES ACROSS THE REGION
India
In response to the SMDA, India’s MEA has offered a measured reaction. Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal emphasized that India “expects that [Saudi Arabia] will keep in mind mutual interests and sensitivities,” and that that it is studying the implications of the pact for its national security and regional stability. Given such statements, India is likely to view the agreement with concern, but not as an immediate existential threat. Indeed, the SMDA formalizes the Saudi-Pakistan- relationship in effect, and India seems aware that such moves could follow. But the MEA’s focus on “sensitivities” suggests that New Delhi is especially concerned about how the agreement might affect such as issues as Kashmir and regional diplomatic alignments.
Indeed, the SMDA’s ambiguity allows India room for adapting its strategic posture rather than assuming fixed outcomes. Without clarity on what obligations the agreement creates―defensive mobilization, logistical cooperation, nuclear coordination, or advisory support―Indian planners will likely hedge against worst‑case possible scenarios. The MEA’s position underscores that India’s strategy will emphasize protecting national interests across political, economic, and military domains, while maintaining its own bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Iran
Rather than viewing the SMDA with suspicion, Iran may interpret it positively, especially in light of the recent geopolitical shifts. The April 2025 Iran-Israel conflict has reshaped Tehran’s regional outlook. During that conflict, Pakistan publicly supported Iran’s right to self-defense, reinforcing mutual understanding between the two. The ongoing Iran-Saudi rapprochement, initiated by the 2023 Beijing-brokered normalization, has also held firm. Within this context, the SMDA may be seen by Tehran not as containment, but as a regional deterrent framework aimed at preventing unilateral Israeli actions and reinforcing Gulf stability.
Importantly, the agreement could also be viewed as a barrier to Saudi-Israeli normalization, which had gained momentum before the Iran-Israel escalation. By aligning more closely with Pakistan, a country firmly opposed to recognition and consistently supportive of the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia signals a shift in strategic priorities. In this light, Iran is likely to see the agreement as a stabilizing development that strengthens regional deterrence and reflects growing resistance to Israeli militarism.
China and Russia
For China, the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defense pact is consistent with its strategic interest in a stable Persian Gulf―a critical artery for global energy flows and a central node in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are key partners in China’s economic connectivity project: Pakistan is the linchpin of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and Saudi Arabia is a major energy supplier and infrastructure partner. Although the SMDA does not explicitly involve China, its long-term implications could reinforce the multipolar strategic framework that Beijing has consistently advocated for. As an intra-regional security agreement that reduces dependence on U.S security arrangements, the SMDA may indirectly serve China’s interests, particularly if it contributes to regional stability and discourages external actors’ aggressive behavior.
For Russia, the SMDA is likely to be viewed in the context of broader efforts to promote regional strategic autonomy. While Moscow maintains bilateral relationships with both Riyadh and Islamabad, primarily through arms sales, energy diplomacy, and multilateral engagement via the SCO and BRICS+, its involvement in their defense relationship is indirect and marginal. The agreement may create limited diplomatic space for enhanced consultations, particularly if either party decides to diversify its strategic dialogue beyond traditional partners. However, any prospective Russian engagement would remain circumscribed by the SMDA’s bilateral nature, the absence of formal security frameworks with either state, and Russia’s own prioritization of core theatres such as Ukraine, Central Asia, and Syria.
Its response will be shaped by evolving alignments in the Gulf and South Asia, as well as by the extent to which the agreement reshapes the power balance relevant to Russian interests.
OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS
Despite its symbolic and strategic significance, the SMDA leaves several key points obscure. Central is the definition of ‘aggression’―it remains unclear whether the pact applies solely to conventional state-on-state attacks or could extend to cyber operations, drone strikes, or actions by non-state actors. Similarly, the extent of operational coordination is unknown, there is no clarity on whether the agreement includes joint planning, force deployment protocols, intelligence-sharing, or defined rules of engagement. The presence of crisis-management mechanisms is another critical unknown factor that raises questions about how Islamabad and Riyadh would coordinate under high-pressure conflict conditions.
Additional uncertainties pertain to the agreement’s legal structure and scope.
Likewise, it remains unclear how the pact applies to third-party conflicts, such as in Yemen or potential escalations in South Asia, where the parties’ interests may not fully align. Finally, the agreement’s strategic signaling to powers such as Israel and the U.S. is open to interpretation. Whether the pact reflects a broader realignment or a tactical hedge remains unclear.
Until these uncertainties are clarified through official disclosure, the SMDA will continue to raise questions that shape regional threat perceptions.
A FLEXIBLE ALLIANCE IN AN INFLEXIBLE REGION
The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia agreement is notable not just for what it includes, but for what it leaves obscure. The deliberate opacity allows both states to send a strong deterrent signal without confining themselves to inflexible commitments. In a region where security threats are diffuse and alliances are often tested by shifting loyalties, this flexibility may be its greatest strength.
However, strategic ambiguity is not without risk. Misinterpretation, miscalculation, or overconfidence may turn uncertainty into escalation. But as long as both Riyadh and Islamabad remain clear-eyed about the limits of their obligations and the costs of the entanglement, the agreement could serve as a stabilizing force.
Ultimately, the SMDA reflects a world in which regional powers are preparing to take more responsibility for their own security, sometimes through clarity, and sometimes, just as powerfully, through ambiguity.
