01.01.2026
Correcting Mistakes
No. 1 2026 January/March
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-5-6
Fyodor A. Lukyanov

Russia in Global Affairs
Editor-in-Chief;
National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs
Research Professor;
Valdai Discussion Club
Research Director

AUTHOR IDs

SPIN RSCI: 4139-3941
ORCID: 0000-0003-1364-4094
ResearcherID: N-3527-2016
Scopus AuthorID: 24481505000

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For citation, please use:
Lukyanov, F.A., 2026. Correcting Mistakes. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(1), pp. 5–6. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-5-6

 

A quarter-century ago, in January 2001, George W. Bush took the oath of office as President of the United States. “If our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led,” he proclaimed at his inauguration. “Civility is not a tactic or a sentiment. It is the determined choice of trust over cynicism, of community over chaos.”

Bush took the reins at probably the height of America’s global power. In the decade after his father had declared victory in the Cold War, no one dared challenge U.S. dominance. Soon that would fundamentally change. 9/11 revealed forces that even the mighty U.S. could not crush, and sparked a chain reaction that would sweep away the ‘unipolar moment’ in just over two decades. And the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008, triggered by the collapse of the American mortgage market at the end of Bush’s second term, rang the death knell for liberal globalization.

The U.S. National Security Strategy released in December 2025, by the administration of another Republican president, seems quite critical of the post-Cold-War period. American strategies “have not clearly defined what we want,” but instead “stated vague platitudes” and “often misjudged what we should want.”

The Trump administration’s new approach is not grounded in “traditional, political ideology,” but rather “is motivated above all by what works for America—or, in two words, ‘America First’.”

The irony of history. George W. Bush, who inaugurated the era of ‘endless wars’ that is now so condemned in Washington, was initially considered a moderate pragmatist, expected to follow in the footsteps of his realist father and to replace the leftist Clintonites with their democratizing fervor. But 9/11 turned everything upside down, fusing national security concerns and the neoconservative obsession with world revolution.

This is all quite natural. Faced with a threat from nowhere (or everywhere), a deeply ideological, monopolistic power activated every tool at its disposal. But, just as naturally, every tool was damaged in the process. The U.S.’s military was overstretched, its ideology was weaponized and thus discredited, its ends and means were confused.

Twenty-five years is long enough for serious changes even in calmer times—let alone now, when ten years are compressed into one. In a quarter-century, the ‘American empire’ of Bush’s early tenure (before the Iraq debacle) has given way to the ‘American republic’ invoked by Trumpists. True, critics will say that Bush’s “determined choice” has also been reversed, replacing trust with cynicism and community with chaos. But slogans exist to be turned inside-out whenever necessary. And cynicism is more palatable when frank than when veiled. Compare Trump to the recently deceased Dick Cheney.

American politics, in 2026, are a matter of trying to correct the mistakes that were made during the ‘end of history.’ Such mistakes are many; the U.S. set the global agenda and is principally responsible for the current situation. But unless another black swan throws everything into disarray, the Americans will take lessons from all this that are applicable to them. As for the rest of us, we should take a cue from the self-reflecting superpower, rethinking our goals and strategies in a world without hegemony. A more open, competitive, and anarchic environment offers various opportunities, but is also extremely unforgiving of mistakes, perhaps even more than the centralized ‘liberal world order’ was. Greater reward, greater risk.

No. 1
2026 January/March
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Contents
Correcting Mistakes
Fyodor A. Lukyanov
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-5-6
The Trodden Paths
Responsibility to Protect: Great Powers in a Polycentric World
Geoffrey Roberts
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-8-14
The U.S. Pursuit of NATO Expansion to Russia’s Borders: Motivation and Timing
Dylan Payne Royce
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-15-41
Whither Is the West Drifting?
Peter Slezkine
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-42-46
The Strike on Iran and the NPT Regime: Live Weapons and Political Tricks
Sergey B. Batsanov, Sofya S. Shestakova
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-47-58
The Signaling Function of Nuclear Deterrence and Some Non-Obvious Historical Parallels
Alexei A. Krivopalov
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-59-72
Digital War and Peace
The Digital War Is the New Reality
Yuri N. Baluyevsky, Ruslan N. Pukhov
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-74-80
Digital Securitization: How Online Platforms Change the Security Landscape
Yury Yu. Kolotaev
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-81-97
Deconstructing Propaganda: From Akkadian Kings to the Digital Age
Matthew Alford, Uliana Z. Artamonova
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-98-112
Eurasian Pojected Reality
Corridors of Opportunities and Risks
Dmitry V. Yefremenko, Sergei A. Karaganov, Ilya S. Kozylov
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-114-127
Eurasia’s Infrastructure— An Indian Perspective
Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-128-133
The International North–South Transport Corridor in Russian National Security Optics
Prokhor Yu. Tebin
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-134-148
Transport Corridors as a Geopolitical Instrument
Marina V. Beloglazova
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-149-152
Changing the Optics
The Role of Social Conservatism in the Postliberal Order
Dušan Proroković
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-154-167
Eurocentrism and Orientophobia: Have We Stopped Fearing ‘Asiaticism’?
Alexander А. Girinsky
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-168-178
Glocalization
The Middle East, Turkish-Style: How Ankara Exploits Post-Assad Syria
Yegor G. Chobanyan
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-180-199
Power and Market Commerce in the DPRK: From Prohibition to Recognition
Andrei N. Lankov
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-200-216