Russia in Global Affairs

For citation, please use:
Yefremenko, D.V., Karaganov, S.A., and Kozylov, I.S., 2026. Corridors of Opportunities and Risks. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(1), pp. 114–127. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-114-127

There are periods in world history when nations and their leaders need to strategize for many decades ahead, but immediate events place them before a crossroads that threatens to send them backward. It seems that Russia (and other leading international actors) is facing such a challenge right now. Russia’s direction will be determined by exactly how the Special Military Operation (SMO)—or at least active fighting—ends. The Ukraine war—let us call the SMO by its proper name—seemingly will not end in an unconditional victory for Russia. More precisely, Russia’s success will not be great enough to nullify the threat from the West. After the fighting, non-military confrontation will be long and intense, but its conditions will be less favorable for the West.

Already, the restoration of Euro-Atlantic political unity has become uncertain, and its possible failure would open a window of opportunity for us—recognizing Donald Trump’s peacemaking aspirations, but eschewing any illusions—to strike a “great deal” with Trump before the end of his term in 2029. This may offer us a respite on the American front, but a determined struggle with Europe’s current elites will remain necessary to “deactivate” Europe, saving it from itself. As for the remains of Ukraine, which Brussels will continue to turn into a “steel porcupine” armed to the teeth, we will likely have to deal with it in the way that India and Pakistan deal with each other. There will be nuances of course, but their discussion would be premature.

However, another scenario is equally likely. The European axis of escalation, stretching from Kiev to London, may block or emasculate Trump’s efforts to escape “someone else’s” war. The global situation might also be massively changed by the combination of Trump’s tariffs, intensified U.S.-Chinese confrontation, and a resumed Iran-Israel war. The U.S. may itself face increased socio-political polarization.

There are other potential risks; a “black swan” might emerge from any direction. But this does not make long-term planning senseless.

When Emperor Alexander III, after weighing all the pros and cons, backed the plan of Sergei Witte and others to horizontally connect Russia with a railway of unprecedented length, he certainly could not have foreseen the empire’s impending collapse and Russia’s approaching tribulations. However, even more than a hundred years later, Alexander III’s plan, which he called a “great national undertaking,” remains Russia’s main horizontal axis. Only the Soviet atomic and space programs match the Trans-Siberian Railway in the exertion of control over space. It has held Russia together in places where the near-unlimited expanses work against state integrity.

And yet the map of our country, crossed by the Trans-Siberian Railway and the parallel Baikal-Amur Mainline, inspires a sense of vulnerability along with pride. The horizontal axis is important, but we also need a more stable network that connects Russian territories to one another and to the outside world, and that will provide strategic advantages even into the 22nd century. Although long-term planning will be difficult during the upcoming peace (or peaceful interlude), Russia should make decisions comparable to the construction of the Great Siberian Route. The timeframe of planning should extend far beyond the middle of this century, despite socio-economic, ethno-demographic, geopolitical, technological, and climatic uncertainty.

The North-South International Transport Corridor Within Eurasia’s Network

This work does not start from scratch. Some groundwork has already been laid; plans for building north-south logistics corridors are already being implemented. If successful, they will provide Russia and its partners with the most important vertical route in Eurasia’s transport network. But they require the support of experts in geodesy, ecology, political science, and international relations. We hope that this article and its successors will provide contributions in the latter two spheres.

There are various ideas for vertical corridors in Russia’s European territory. These include:

• Under-discussion and partly-in-use routes through/around the Caspian Sea to Iran and the Persian Gulf, although these have many problems.
• A proposed trans-Afghan corridor.
• A proposed Istanbul Canal, parallel to the Bosporus (Boldyrev, 2020, pp. 164-178).
• Possible routes through Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey.

There is also an obvious need for a vertical logistics network connecting Siberia to rising Asia—the markets of the future.

But maximizing the INSTC’s effect requires its integration into a broader strategy, one that goes beyond transport and logistics. This ‘geostrategy’ is not a branch of geopolitics, but a long-term vision for the multi-stage socio-economic and political restructuring of the world’s largest continent. But the basis should be Russia’s internal development: spatial, political, industrial, scientific, and cultural.

Russia cannot impose its vision on the entire continent, but it can launch internal processes that will change the whole of Eurasia.

One of the authors recently proposed some principles for the development of a Greater Eurasian logistics network (Karaganov, 2025):

First. Economic calculation is necessary, but the network should be designed primarily based on concerns of security and long-term development. Private businesses can and should be engaged in specific projects, but major logistics programs should be the prerogative and responsibility of the state. The free-market approach is becoming obsolete, although economists are needed to soberly assess risks.

Second. The center of infrastructural development should be shifted from Russia’s European parts to Siberia. Although infrastructure west of the Urals is economically more efficient, strategic planning requires other considerations. The center of infrastructure construction, and of Russia’s spiritual, economic, and cultural development, should be beyond the Urals. And this is where new capital cities should be founded, through the relocation of some corporate headquarters, federal ministries, and perhaps an entire branch of government. The calls regarding corporate headquarters have been heard by President Vladimir Putin, who has ordered the relocation of almost 150 corporations’ headquarters to the regions where they mainly operate.

Third. Russia is a river power. In the past, it sought to rid itself of the continental curse, and rightly pursued sea access under Peter the Great and later. But it has so far not capitalized on its significant competitive advantage: large rivers and high-quality fresh water flowing into the Arctic Ocean. There can be no talk of reversing Siberian rivers, an idea that was rightfully criticized. But we should revive our river transport system and connect it to other logistics corridors. Other than the Lena, Siberia’s rivers have lost their icebreakers, which could provide transport in the autumnal period before winter roads become operational. We are encouraged by the 73rd Meridian Program (Tramplin, 2025), which aims to invigorate traffic along the Irtysh and Ob Rivers—to the Arctic Ocean and, via the Irtysh, to Kazakhstan and even neighboring China.

Fourth. The new logistics strategy should facilitate small towns’ preservation and development, and the entire country’s Siberization.

Fifth. Transport corridors should contribute to the revival of Eurasia’s civilizational unity in diversity.

Sixth. The new logistics matrix should not only complement the Trans-Siberian Railway and the BAM, but also become an analog to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, which expanded U.S. infrastructure and offered job opportunities to millions of people during the Great Depression, thereby relieving social tensions (Smith, 2005). The construction of new infrastructure east of the Urals will open up new prospects for many Russians, including veterans of the Ukraine war.

Seventh. Russia’s new elites—not captivated by obsolete Western-centric attitudes, but looking to build a new world—should be cultivated in its east. The new elites, and the whole country, should feel engaged in the project of building Greater Eurasia, with a Siberian Russia at its heart. Historically, great projects have been needed for Russia to make breakthroughs.

The construction of the transport network for a Siberian Russia, and for Greater Eurasia, should become such a project.

Eighth. Building a new network of north-south routes, we should engage our Asian neighbors from the initial design stage, drawing on their capabilities and expertise. Russia, in a “limitless partnership” with China, faces mixed effects from Sinocentric logistics and value chains. Some are already beneficial, while others may become beneficial when/if Russia regains access to westward transit. But the Belt and Road Initiative, binding Eurasia together with several horizontal corridors, relegates the Trans-Siberian Railway and the BAM to the role of northern peripheral branches. It does not facilitate the development of the vertical corridors—aside from those connecting Siberia and the Far East to China—that are strategically important to Russia.

This imbalance can be rectified only through the INSTC’s comprehensive implementation and through the construction of additional vertical transport routes. This does not mean sharp competition with China; on the contrary, synergy with certain segments of the BRI is necessary. The integration of horizontal and vertical transport corridors in Central Eurasia has already significantly increased the volumes and efficiency of shipments, especially by container (Vinokurov et al., 2024, pp. 5-15). However, most work will have to be done by the key stakeholders of the INSTC: Russia, India, and Iran. This means that Russia, apart from developing infrastructure, will have to provide political and diplomatic support, requiring long-term involvement in Middle Eastern political processes.

Ninth. New logistics projects are not only vital for national development, but are also necessary as a source of inspiration, like the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea Route, the BAM, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Bratsk, and many others have been in the past. They will transport us from an outdated and restricting Western-centric mindset to a sovereign and independent one.

Connectivity, Not Just Transit

The concept of a Eurasian transport network, suggested and theoretically substantiated at the Eurasian Development Bank (Vinokurov et al., 2021), emphasizes the interconnection and complementarity of existing and emerging corridors in Eurasia. Naturally, an international organization like the EADB issues reports that downplay states’ political and economic competition for these routes. Indeed, the concept presumes broad cooperation between key states and international organizations, unencumbered by deep disagreements over security and international order. We are not constrained by such factors and can consider the Eurasian transport network in the context of Russia’s geostrategy.

Again, international transit is important and valuable, but internal connectivity is even more important. Without it, no continental transport network can sustain itself. Currently, Central Asia is the zone of greatest intersection between the various transcontinental routes. Though it would be more appropriate to speak of Central Eurasia, roughly encompassing the Caspian Sea region, Southern Urals, Southern Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Mongolia, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and some other Chinese provinces.

In geostrategic terms, a network of transport routes alone is not enough. As demonstrated by Central (Eur)Asia, numerous transcontinental corridor intersections do not guarantee stable internal connectivity within a macroregion.

The creation and development of a transport network should be part of a comprehensive strategy that develops the involved territories’ infrastructure, human capital, and scientific, technological, industrial, and commercial capabilities.

The 21st century has seen not only the end of the West’s 500-year hegemony, but also, as Peter Frankopan notes in the afterword to his book on the Silk Road, the return of global gravity’s center to its place a millennium ago (Frankopan, 2017, p. 494). Central Eurasia lies astride the axis of this shift, and its countries and peoples will naturally take advantage of this return to a more stable intercivilizational balance. Almost all states in the region recognize the moment’s importance, and are trying to tap the new opportunities.

But what about Russia, which controls the northern part of Central Eurasia? The concept of Greater Eurasia, and the initiatives for a Turn to the East and Siberization, seize Russia’s Eurasian chance so that it might endure and prosper. Simply put, the country’s spiritual, cultural, and economic center should be shifted to the east (Vukovich et al., 2025, p. 5) and localized in the northern part of Central Eurasia.

Spatial Policy and the Northeastern Vector

There is no need to list all the arguments for Siberization in this article. It seems that political and intellectual elites have already come to a common understanding of why Russia needs a turn to the East.

But something else has yet to be fully understood. Historically, power and property in Russia are closely intertwined. This phenomenon, which is not unique to our country, is noted within Weber-based concepts of neopatrimonialism (see Weber, 1972; Eisenstadt, 1973; Erdmann and Engel, 2006). This de facto fusion of power and property is a matter of social order that requires its own in-depth study. But, realistically, Russia’s internal geopolitics will limit any Turn to the East unless state power is spatially tethered to Siberia. Programs for territorial development, and even large-scale megaprojects, will not shift the focus of national development to the East as long as Russia’s primary resource magnet remains in its European part.

Once the headquarters of some state corporations are moved beyond the Urals, several key federal ministries and agencies should follow suit.

In the future, a Siberian city could host a residence of the head of state. This will give a powerful impetus to the establishment of a third Russian capital in Siberia.

A third (Siberian) capital should be discussed in the context of decentralizing government functions—the transfer from Moscow to other cities of official residences, agencies, and certain branches of government. This process is already underway. For example, the presidential residence near Sochi makes that city a partial capital. The digitalization of interdepartmental cooperation and paperwork also reduces the authorities’ need for territorial concentration.

There are other arguments for delegating some government functions to one or more Siberian cities. The SMO has revealed that Moscow is effectively protected by existing air defense systems, but it also emphasized the danger of concentrating all decision-making centers and communication hubs in one city. So, it is reasonable to consider relocating some federal agencies to Siberia and the Far East and building a compact additional capital in a historically significant place with a rich cultural heritage.

It would be senseless to provoke competition between major Siberian cities like Novosibirsk, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk. The new capital should be free of the social and environmental problems typical of megacities. It will not need to be inundated with the industrial infrastructure that characterized regional industrialization from the late 1800s to mid-1900s. The creation of a new capital in Siberia should draw on the (positive and negative) experience of new capitals in Brazil, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Myanmar, as well as of distribution of capital functions among several cities, like in South Africa.

It could also be possible to transfer individual government functions to several Siberian cities. However, the most feasible option would be renovating a small Siberian town that is relatively close to a megacity and its infrastructure.

The selection of location will depend on factors like the following:

• Geopolitical impact. The aim is not just to strengthen Russia in its middle part, but to restructure all of Central Eurasia, taking into account potential changes in migration, capital flows, value chains, and the development of innovative industries.
• The cumulative effect for neighboring cities, which could take on various functions—scientific, educational, technological, energy-supplying, etc. Ideally, the Siberian capital would be surrounded by several urban settlements with good infrastructure, no more than 90 minutes apart from one another.
• Proximity and accessibility of transcontinental routes. A modern airport with an international runway, plus access to vertical and horizontal highways and railways. A large river, navigable in summer, is also desirable.
• Climate. A microclimate close to that of European Russia would be preferable: a sufficient number of sunny days, limited seasonal variations in temperature, and a comfortable living environment.
• Culture and civilizational narrative. The historical narratives of Northeastern Russia and Central Eurasia/Siberia should be organically combined. Nearby fortresses, wooden architecture, and sites of various religions are desirable, as is the potential for large museums and exhibitions (a ‘Hermitage on the Yenisei’ like the ‘Louvre Abu Dhabi’.)

Ultimately, Russia’s Siberian capital should serve as a new pillar of statehood in the center of Eurasia. Central Asia will then regard Russia not as an alien power or a longtime guest to the region, but as a permanent and significant participant in regional development, contributing to the region’s stability, prosperity, and role across Eurasia.

One of the INSTC’s branches should be directly connected to the new capital city (or cities, if government functions are moved to multiple locations). At the same time, shifting national development’s focus to the East will require an updated logistics strategy for decades to come, one that may change significantly over time.

The American Vector

Roads and railways, currently under construction, should be extended to still-isolated locations. For example, the Amur-Yakutsk Mainline (which, after the construction of the Lena bridge, operates year-round and reaches Yakutsk) could be extended to Magadan.

A railroad to Magadan would provide a new route for exporting raw materials to poorly-accessible Pacific markets. This is only a possibility for the future. But let us recall the symbolic prelude to the Russian-U.S. summit in Alaska. On his way to Anchorage, President Putin made a stop in Magadan and laid flowers at the memorial to the heroes of ALSIB, the Alaska-Siberia route by which aircraft were provided during World War II. After talks with Trump, the Russian president visited Fort Richardson National Cemetery to lay flowers at the graves of Soviet aviators and sailors who operated the ALSIB and ship routes between the USSR and the U.S. in the North Pacific Ocean. In addition to the obvious symbolic reference to the USSR-U.S. alliance in WWII, this may project a future in which Russia and the U.S. connect Eurasia and America.

The idea of connecting the two continents via the Bering Strait was initially proposed by the Americans, and consideration of it began almost simultaneously to the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (Oliver, 2006). In the 21st century, it seemed that after more than a hundred years of discussing various options (a tunnel, a bridge, or a dam), practical work would begin at last to connect Chukotka with Alaska. So far, this has not happened. Politics is inextricably linked to economics, and both have stalled substantive discussion.

Nevertheless, drastic changes are possible, particularly in the context of a hypothetical Russo-American “great deal” based on some resolution to the SMO. The Russian and American Arctic, the Northern Sea Route, and the Bering Strait may become priority areas for reviving bilateral cooperation. Trump’s megalomania and penchant for symbolism tend towards undertakings of extraordinary ambition.

Connecting America and Eurasia may well become an alternative to landing on Mars, and the passage—likely to be named the Trump-Putin Route—would certainly do more honor to the 47th U.S. president than the Zangezur Corridor.

However, apart from political vanity and symbolism, there are more pragmatic motives that may accelerate northeastern Eurasia’s infrastructural development and connection to North America. One is the intensifying competition for the Northern Sea Route, especially given its possible prioritization for BRICS countries (Strelnikova, 2025, pp. 176-201).

The Northern Sea Route, one of the 21st century’s key transport routes, is increasingly host to political, economic, and military rivalry, but also to cooperation between states willing to use the route to boost trade and develop Arctic resources. Russia must accelerate infrastructural development along the entire NSR, and ensure its stable connection to Russia’s core.

Stalin’s megaproject, the Transpolar Mainline (formerly the Great Northern Railway), now consists of ruins whipped by cold and memories of the Gulag, but also some sections that are operational and economically feasible. Its revival should be considered. The ongoing construction of transport routes in the North, Siberia, and Far East cannot yet be considered such a revival, but it still offers broader investment possibilities: aside from government funding, public-private partnerships and even private railroads (like the recently commissioned Pacific Railway).

A firm link between Eurasia and America would allow new connections between the world’s largest markets, with a powerful cumulative effect.

If the political barriers—U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China confrontation—were removed, a branch line could also be built through Sakhalin to Japan.

Russia’s segment of the Eurasian transport network can be considered fully completed only with the revival of a multimodal Transpolar Mainline to the Pacific Ocean, and the construction of a firm connection to North America’s transport system. Work on the Transpolar Mainline gained impetus at the 10th Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, when President Putin instructed the government and the Maritime Board to assess proposals for a Transarctic Transport Corridor (TTC).

The TTC’s implementation and return on investment will benefit from (quite uncertain) improved relations with leading powers and depend upon the systematic development of extreme-weather infrastructure technology. Russia should consolidate its global leadership in Arctic shipbuilding, develop autonomous cargo transportation systems for extremely cold environments, create polar ‘smart cities’ with AI-monitored and -maintained infrastructure, and implement photocatalytic technologies for cleaning harmful emissions from transport routes. All these are technologies of today. Future technologies will have to be discussed with dedicated experts.

The INSTC should be considered in the context of the Eurasian transport framework. It will be sustainable only if Russia, having launched it and other vertical corridors in partnership with other states, completes the Arctic horizontal corridor, leading to the Pacific and binding the world’s largest markets together across the Bering Strait.

Strategic control over this network will be augmented if Russia’s Siberian capital is located close to its center. Ultimately, the country’s security, prosperity, and global influence can be consolidated—although not guaranteed—by shifting state power, human and material resources, new industries, and cultural initiatives to Siberia, to the northern part of Central Eurasia.

This paper is part of the research project supported by the Russian Science Foundation’s grant #25-68-00031, https://rscf.ru/en/project/25-68-00031/.