27.03.2025
Reflections on the Future World Order
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Mehdi Sanaei

Associate Professor at the World Studies Faculty of the University of Tehran; Director of the Institute for Iran and Eurasia Studies (IRAS)

AUTHOR IDs

Academic IDs: UT26610

Contacts

Tel.: +982188630931
E-mail: msanaei@ut.ac.ir
Address: University of Tehran, Enghelab Str., Tehran 14395-515, Iran

Since the middle of the 2000s, after the failure of the U.S.’s attempts to form a unipolar world order under its leadership, “the age of transition” has become the dominant discourse of research centers and academia. Speculating about the future world order, political analysts are trying to find signs of probable scenarios in the current international events to prove their predictions. COVID-19, the Ukraine crisis and the clash between Israel and Hamas are generally considered major factors that have accelerated the transition to a new world order. However, different IR schools and politicians offer various views on how these developments may impact the world’s future. The opinions of realists and liberals about these events differ considerably. Many politicians see Israel’s extensive bombing of Gaza in response to Hamas’s October 2023 attack, the widespread public support of the Palestinian people, and the simultaneous support of the U.S. and major European powers (Germany, UK, and France) of Israel as an important factor determining the future order. All these events show that the current geopolitical situation allows for most surprising things to happen.

Political scientists speak about four main possible scenarios for the future world order: a revival of a unipolar world order in a new form; a multipolar order or a new balance of power; new bipolarity; and a post-polar world (an age of non-polarity).

According to the first scenario, the U.S. may regain its position as the world’s dominant superpower while the potency of the emerging powers will decline. This view relies on the idea that, despite the relative decline of American hegemony, the U.S. remains a dominant power, with other countries being unable to challenge it in the main components of power. Among these components are the Anglo-Saxon countries’ ramified communication system as the world’s largest financial, informational and cultural network; the U.S.’s leading role in technology and innovations, and the dominant role of the dollar in the global financial system.

The theorists of the multipolar order emphasize the overall decline of American hegemony and the increasing role of new players. Various versions of multipolar order are envisioned, including the tripolarity of the U.S., Russia, and China; a multipolar concert of great powers; and a polycentric order with subordinate blocs. Among the reasons for the emergence of a multipolar order analysts name rising new powers such as South Africa, Brazil, India, Mexico, and Indonesia; China’s increasing role in the global economy and presence in various regions of the world; the strengthening of regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia; and the balancing of the foreign policies of the U.S. allies’—Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The multipolar order scenario is popular among non-Western countries and is explicitly stated in Russian and Chinese foreign policy doctrines.

The bipolar world order scenario highlights China’s preponderant position as an economic power and its strong position in the political, military, technological, and cultural fields. The current decline in the non-Western countries’ relations with the U.S. and its allies and simultaneous convergence of most non-Western countries’ interests with those of China and Russia are seen as a prelude to a possible emergence of a U.S.-China bipolarity. The toughening of the U.S.’s policy towards non-Western actors such as Iran, Russia, and China forces these countries to strengthen their economic ties with each other, which seriously endangers the West’s global power. The U.S.’s friendshoring policy[1] in the economic field is another sign of the formation of a bipolar world order. In addition to the bipolar U.S.- China scenario, other bipolar options are also being considered: the U.S., the EU, and their regional allies on the one side against China and Russia and their regional allies on the other; and the U.S. and the EU against China, Russia, and Iran.

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‘The age of non-polarity’ scenario stems from the idea that the decline of the U.S. as a superpower and guarantor of the international order has weakened the existing world order, while more new powers are coming into the scene. In this situation, disorder and confusion in international relations will increase, forcing countries to look for new relations outside the framework of international bodies to protect their interests and enjoy peace and security. This will boost the creation of regional alliances in various military, political, and economic formats, thus signifying the decline of global poles and the formation of a post-polar world.

These scenarios describe the transition trends from the perspective of the balance of power and geopolitical paradigms. This article considers the age of transition from the perspective of changes in the foundations and main components of the international order and suggests looking at these changes in terms of their scale: micro (humans as components of larger systems); medium (countries and their social, economic and political systems); and macro (developments in the international system). In the current age of transition, we are witnessing fundamental changes of all three scales.

The developments of the last few decades, some of civilizational nature, have affected every human being as a constituent of social systems. The borders of the traditional concepts of identity are fading. Many believe that in the age of artificial intelligence, the concept of identity is changing as a result of the rethinking of human nature.

At the same time, in a paradoxical way, while industrial and social technologies have spurred a tremendous transformation in recent decades and have changed man in terms of expansion of knowledge, his behavioral, moral and psychological problems differ little from those in the era of Plato and Aristotle. Man has created a new world, but he has not achieved a higher level of moral and social virtues. The inconsistency between the changed environment and man’s mind is one of the reasons for the weakening of national and global governance and must be a starting point in our speculations about possible future global developments.

Changes in power relations within countries and the weakness of their political systems are another important factor that can also lead to changes in their behavior in the international arena. For quite a while, experts have noted the exhaustion of the democratic system and the emergence of autocratic leaders, with elections providing only domestic and international political legitimacy for the ruler. These processes can be traced in many states, including Western ones. Also, after 2010, Western countries have increasingly faced public protests caused by the enormous wealth gap, growing inequality, and the elites’ accelerating alienation from the masses.

The use of social media in politics is another important phenomenon of the current age, where the weight of public opinion has increased immensely. Social apps such as Twitter (X), Facebook, and Instagram[2] play a prominent role in political and economic affairs. In the current age of transition, the state has less authority than the state of modernity had, because it has lost monopoly both in hard (economy and military strength) and soft power (cultural issues and narrative creation).

The possession by the privileged few companies and individuals of financial power that exceeds the gross national product of some countries, the use of cryptocurrencies in international trade without the control of the countries’ central banks, and the incursion of private companies into the provision of basic infrastructure, which until recently has been the exclusive responsibility of governments, show that the role of the state in the economy has been seriously impacted by the changes in technology. One of the recent examples is Elon Musk’s offer to provide free Internet service to other countries via his Starlink system. Such phenomena undermine Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as the only social institution that can legitimately use coercive force.

Description and interpretation of events, which generally used to be done under the control of power structures (government institutions or religious centers) and the elites affiliated with them, is now done by social media. Thanks to technological advances, content production (written, audio, videos and photos) has become very easy, and anyone can create the desired content independently of the official authorities, which generates a diversity of narratives and interpretations. The events of recent years, including the Middle East crisis, the COVID-19 epidemic, and especially the Ukraine war and the Gaza war, have shown that now societies do not wait for the governments and even media giants to tell stories.

These changes have also had an impact on the international relation. The theme of American decline has now entered political economy, and the appearance of new economic and geopolitical powers in the last decade is now viewed as an important factor in changing global economic equations. BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are the two main symbols of the call for international multilateralism. The revision of the world order is not limited only to the sphere of world politicsvarious countries are seeking ways to do away with the dominance of the dollar. The U.S.’s use of the dollar for intercepting international economic exchanges and imposition of sanctions have made countries under sanctions (Iran, Venezuela and Russia and some economies that exchange with these countries) to look for new ways to carry out transactions avoiding the dollar and to expand the use of SWAP contracts in trade.

Today, the role of international institutions and organizations guarding the liberal world order has diminished. The UN Security Council’s resolutions and relevant institutions have failed to offer an effective response to the crisis in West Asia, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the mass slaughter of the Palestinian people in Gaza. Over the past years, the Western coalition has violated the principle of state sovereignty (by invading Iraq and Libya) and broke the rules of the liberal order by using protectionist policies. During Donald Trump’s first presidency, the weakening of international institutions became systematic as the U.S. withdrew from the Pacific Trade Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Agreement, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, UNESCO, and the United Nations Human Rights Council. These developments force countries to reconsider their security policies, focusing on their national interests rather than following international law. In the age of transition, non-Western countries feel less obliged than before to comply with the rules of international law if they consider them to be contrary to their cultural values.

Most predictions about the future world order stem from the assumption that relations between countries will take some form of order after all. Yet the history of international relations shows that international order is usually found when the world faces global threats, large-scale catastrophes, or big wars. However, the bipolar world order established after World War II has only been disrupted but not destroyed so as to build a new order from its ashes.

The factors of the current age of transition described above indicate that it will be accompanied by the growing number and power of centrifugal forces and the declining power of the centrist forces. Meanwhile, no scenario of the future suggests the advent of a force that could establish order and restrain the centripetal forces.

Thus, the age of transition is likely to be long and, unfortunately, we may see more chaos in world affairs. In today’s world, weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons, and numerous cyber capabilities of modern armies are much more destructive than 20th century weapons were. If current tensions are not managed, the transition can have disastrous consequences. Moreover, in the current interconnected world, micro-conflicts between political and international actors may easily end up in macro-conflicts. So, identifying pervasive threats and accepting the emergence of new powers can and should be a basis for global dialogue and a way for a gentle and less painful transition to a new world order.

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References

[1] Economic cooperation is primarily with friendly countries.

[2] They are owned by Meta, which has been designated as an extremist organization and is banned in the Russian Federation.

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