Russia in Global Affairs

For citation, please use:
Fomin, M.Yu. and Kryuchkova, A.A., 2025. India’s Approach to Sanctions: The Origins, Current State and Significance for the Global South. Russia in Global Affairs, 23(2), pp. 165–179. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2025-23-2-165-179

The Global South’s stance regarding the Ukraine crisis and anti-Russian sanctions has emerged as a central issue in global politics over the past three years. Initially, the West was certain that it would be able to rally most of the world around Moscow’s diplomatic isolation. And indeed, after the UN General Assembly adopted several resolutions condemning Russia, it looked like the West would succeed. However, most countries of the Global South have tried to avoid joining sanctions and to instead continue cooperation with Russia, and the West has resorted to applying increasing pressure on the South to align with its position.

The Ukraine crisis, which attained global dimensions in 2022, has highlighted two critical issues: the efficacy of sanctions, and the dynamics of North-South relations. Questions have arisen regarding the legitimacy of unilateral sanctions—both primary and secondary—and regarding the Global South’s developmental needs. In this context, it is worth analyzing the perspectives of directly-affected countries of the Global South.

India, the demographically and economically second-largest non-Western nation, presents a particularly illustrative case. Unlike China, which has steadily ascended to the club of the world’s most developed nations and reclaimed its historical role at the center of the global economy, India is still striving to achieve that status.

India is widely regarded as the world’s largest democracy, and its economy is closely intertwined with the West through trade and corporate ties.

In this respect, India is potential proof that the liberal international community is not exclusively Western.

Yet New Delhi has avoided involvement in the efforts of the U.S. and its allies to isolate Russia, confining itself to declarations advocating for a cessation of hostilities. Indeed, it has significantly increased its engagement with Russia—especially in trade—while simultaneously maintaining its cooperation with the U.S. and other Western nations. In some spheres, such as arms purchases, cooperation with the West has even been enhanced.

Aware of the limitations of traditional (Western) IR theory in explaining the policies of non-Western countries, we examine India’s rich political thought and experience as determinants of its policies regarding sanctions. We then analyze the evolution and current state of India’s sanctions policy, before assessing its potential influence on the sanctions policies of other Global South countries.

The Place of Sanctions in Modern Indian Political Thought

The postcolonial paradigm is warranted in its skepticism of traditional Western IR schools’ claims to universality (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2021). Scholars advocating for the inclusion of non-Western experience in IR theory call for an eclectic approach to explaining global processes (Acharya and Buzan, 2009), one that rejects the projection of Western theories to the entire world, instead emphasizing the importance of individual countries’ unique historical experiences and political thought. Such an approach is essential both for describing the current international situation and for normatively prescribing the best ways of building international relations.

The term ‘Indian political thought’ here refers to what Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2009) defined as ‘pre-theory’: “elements of thinking” by both academics and practitioners “that do not necessarily add up to [IR] theory in their own right, but which provide possible starting points for doing so.”

Practitioners have been the main source of India’s pre-theory of international relations, with the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, serving as a key figure whose ideas shaped India’s foreign policy for many years ahead. As an internationalist and supporter of a UNSC-based system of collective security (Nehru, 1997; Government of India, 1961), Nehru prioritized non-military measures, including economic sanctions, to prevent or halt aggression—if such measures were collectively implemented.

Other influential theorists of Indian foreign policy (Chauhan, 2023) include Ram Manohar Lohia, who believed that economic sanctions could support “national, democratic, and socialist forces” worldwide (Lohia, 1937), and Angadipuram Appadorai, who joined Nehru in endorsing the UN-based collective security system and UNSC-imposed economic sanctions (Appadorai, 1949).

The Nehruvian course remained the guiding principle of India’s foreign policy throughout the bipolar period. Under Nehru’s leadership, India imposed sanctions on South Africa for its apartheid regime and discrimination against ethnic Indians, which, Nehru argued, directly violated the UN Charter and Declaration of Human Rights (Government of India, 1961). Following Nehru’s death, the increasingly complex international landscape led to a shift away from idealism towards pragmatism. During this period, India also faced unilateral sanctions from Canada and Britain due to its nuclear testing.

The 1990s saw a continued shift towards neoliberalism and pragmatism, as well as further unilateral sanctions, including from the U.S., following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Indian leaders unequivocally interpreted these sanctions as aimed at suppressing India’s development, and defiantly asserted their right to pursue policies in the national interest. In response to the 1998 sanctions, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said: “Every decisive action has its consequences. But if the action is inherently in the national interest—and I believe our decision to conduct the tests is in the supreme national interest—then we have to face the consequences and overcome the challenge. Sanctions cannot and will not hurt us. India will not be cowed down by such threats and punitive measures” (PIIE, 2008). The sanctions were eventually lifted, and relations between India and the U.S. were normalized. Nonetheless, this episode significantly influenced India’s stance on unilateral Western sanctions (Chauhan, 2014; Chemplayil, 2022).

India’s Current Policies Regarding Sanctions

At the beginning of the 21st century, India transitioned from Nehruvian non-alignment to a policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. However, this shift does not signify a radical departure from the country’s established foreign policy trajectory. Some scholars argue that both Nehru’s approach and the current strategy share the objective of transforming India into a great power (Lounev, 2012). Others contend that, rather than completely abandoning the legacy of Nehruvian non-alignment, India has returned to that policy’s core principle—flexibility in pursuit of socio-economic development (Mohan, 2003; Hall, 2019).

India thus remains committed to international institutions, especially the UN, which is perceived by mainstream Indian political and academic communities as the sole legitimate source of sanctions and as a vehicle for advancing India’s interests (see, for example, calls for UN sanctions against Pakistan: Chandra S., 2010; Sareen S., 2010).

The Iranian case exemplifies India’s rejection of unilateral sanctions imposed by Western nations. Both primary sanctions against Iran, and secondary sanctions targeting foreign entities (individuals) interacting with Iran, have significantly impacted Indian businesses and politics. Although India has expressed concerns over Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program, India has refrained from endorsing the anti-Iran sanctions imposed by the U.S. In 2010, Foreign Minister Nirupama Rao stated that “we are justifiably concerned that the extra-territorial nature of certain unilateral sanctions recently imposed by individual countries, with their restrictions on investment by third countries in Iran’s energy sector, can have a direct and adverse impact on Indian companies and, more importantly, on our energy security and our attempts to meet the development needs of our people” (The Hindu, 2010). In response to the Trump administration’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran in 2018, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj said: “We recognize only UN sanctions. We do not recognize any country-specific sanctions,” emphasizing that India conducts its foreign policy independently of external pressures (NDTV, 2018). These statements can be interpreted from both pragmatic and institutional perspectives.

The Iranian case marked India’s first encounter with the threat of U.S. secondary sanctions. The second and third instances involved India’s dealings with Russia.

The discussion of secondary sanctions first arose when India and Russia struck a major deal for the acquisition of S-400 missile defense systems. This agreement underscored India’s—and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s—commitment to pursuing an autonomous foreign policy in defiance of considerable pressure from Washington and President Donald Trump (India Today, 2021). Observers noted India’s cautious approach, in particular its avoidance of Nehruvian anti-Western rhetoric (Kaura, 2018). Ultimately, in 2022, the U.S. Congress granted India a waiver.

India’s independent policy has been increasingly challenged by anti-Russian sanctions since the aggravation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022. India capitalized on severed Western-Russian ties to increase its purchases of Russian energy, yielding unprecedented growth in bilateral trade, which has continued to flourish along with political cooperation. For this, India has faced Western criticism and the threat of deteriorated relations and secondary sanctions.

Indian officials have responded with a pragmatic, nonideological defense of their policies (The Hindu, 2022; Global Times, 2022; Hindustan Times, 2022; Cnbctv18, 2022; Business Standard, 2022; Mint, 2023). There has been no fundamental rejection of unilateral coercive measures by Western nations. Instead, India has highlighted how the conflict generates or aggravates the Global South’s problems, which motivate India’s cooperation with Russia despite sanctions (Hindustan Times, 2023). This emphasis on pragmatism, economic interests, and energy security marks a significant departure from Nehruvian anti-colonialism and non-alignment.

BRICS has gone further than India, condemning sanctions—including against Iran and North Korea (Özekin and Sune, 2023)—on grounds of their harm to developing nations and on grounds of principle. From the 2013 Durban Summit to the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS declarations condemned “unilateral military interventions, economic sanctions, and arbitrary use of unilateral coercive measures in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international relations. We emphasize that no country should enhance its security at the expense of the security of others” (BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, 2017). A similar provision is contained in the 2023 Johannesburg Declaration adopted at the 15th BRICS Summit in August 2023, albeit in a revised and less articulate wording: “We express concern about the use of unilateral coercive measures, which are incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter and produce negative effects, notably in the developing world” (XV BRICS Summit Declaration, 2023).

BRICS’s stance on sanctions is consonant with those articulated by various political forces in India. However, this alignment has not been solidified in doctrinal documents or regulations governing the response to unilateral sanctions (Chemplayil, 2022, or legal framework for addressing potential secondary or primary sanctions (Tirkey, 2019).

India’s main political forces—the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Indian National Congress (INC), the Communist Party, and various regional parties—have formed a consensus on maintaining sovereignty and strategic autonomy in the face of Western pressure, especially if sanctions threaten India’s economic or geopolitical interests.

The BJP under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has adopted a policy of balancing between the West and Russia, refraining from endorsing anti-Russian sanctions and emphasizing the need to prioritize India’s national interests (Fubini, 2023).

The INC, the primary opposition party, calls for strategic autonomy and nonalignment with Western sanctions. INC leader Rahul Gandhi has stressed the importance of maintaining ties with traditional partners like Russia notwithstanding Western pressure (NDTV, 2023).

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other leftist parties have traditionally opposed Western hegemony and imperialism. They criticize cooperation with Western nations as a threat to India’s sovereignty and reject sanctions as tools of pressure on developing countries (CPIM, 2022).

And regional parties, regardless of their differences, tend to support an autonomous foreign policy that distances itself from sanctions and Western hegemony. For instance, the Trinamool Congress Party, led by Mamata Banerjee, calls for strengthening ties with neighboring countries and opposes external interference in regional affairs (Sarki, 2023). The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), led by Muthuvel Karunanidhi Stalin, supports strategic independence and opposes domination by any external powers, including the West. The Marathi nationalist Shiv Sena Party advocates for enhancing India’s defense capabilities and opposes external pressure, including sanctions (Chacko, 2011).

India’s Influence on the Global South

India holds significant ideological, political, and economic influence within the Global South, shaping its agenda on the world stage and leading “by example” of an independent international actor. Consequently, India’s political thought and practice have the capacity to influence, to varying degrees, other developing counties’ approaches to sanctions.

India’s influence has been especially strong in the ideological sphere, as the works of Indian political thinkers had an important role in the process of decolonization and directly influenced foreign policy approaches of the Global South countries. The interconnection of Indian political thought and the political theories of post-colonial nations is vividly exemplified by the 1955 Bandung Declaration: five of the ten articulated principles of international relations are the Panchashila, i.e., the five tenets of peaceful coexistence outlined in the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954. These principles—mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—were championed by the Indian government and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Politically, India has historically played a pivotal role within the Global South, shaped by its colonial past and struggle for independence. This experience has enabled India to establish itself as a cornerstone of anti-colonial and post-colonial solidarity. India had a key role in convening the Bandung Conference and founding the Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to provide newly liberated states with an alternative to the Cold War alliances.

These efforts reflected India’s commitment to combating neo-colonial influence and strengthening the collective voice of liberated nations in world affairs.

Economically, India plays a dual role within the Global South. It advocates for economically disadvantaged regions, promoting South-South cooperation and a just global order, while simultaneously aligning its interests with those of developed nations. This duality complicates its potential position as a leader of the Global South. India’s participation in multilateral forums such as the G20 and BRICS reflects this ambivalence, as it seeks to balance its domestic priorities with the needs of less influential countries while striving for recognition as a global power. Maintaining this balance is an intricate task, as India has to maintain its status as a cooperative world power among developed nations while fulfilling its commitments to protecting the interests of developing regions—an expectation that, during the Nehruvian era, encouraged India to adopt anti-Western positions (Cooper, 2021).

India’s active engagement in multilateral organizations and initiatives reaffirms its dedication to safeguarding the interests of the Global South. Within the UN’s Group of 77, India consistently advocates for policies addressing global inequalities, focusing on trade, climate change, and sustainable development. This reinforces India’s image as a proponent of cooperation, challenging traditional power structures dominated by developed countries. However, disparities in socio-economic development and geopolitical interests within the Global South create obstacles to maintaining a unified identity (Haug, Braveboy-Wagner, and Maihold, 2021).

India’s anticolonial legacy significantly shapes its resistance to hegemony. It advocates global governance reforms based on historical justice and sovereignty of postcolonial states.

India’s pursuit of a multipolar world order aligns with anti-colonial objectives aimed at countering the dominance of a powerful few.

Other developing nations have leveraged their influence to resist the economic and political diktat of developed nations in various ways, including abstention from sanctions regimes.

Nonetheless, India’s role in the Global South is fraught with complexities. Its emergence as a regional power has brought new challenges to the traditional North-South dichotomy, complicating its identity as an advocate for marginalized countries. Although India is perceived as a leading voice for the Global South, its growing economic clout and engagement with global markets increasingly align it with developed nations, raising tensions and questioning its role of a counter-hegemonic force. Furthermore, the increasing diversity within the Global South prompts questions about India’s ability to effectively represent the varied needs of all developing countries. The differences between leading states in the Global South and less developed nations highlight the fluidity of the Global South as a category (Waisbich, Roychoudhury, and Haug, 2021).

In this article, it is pertinent to examine the issue of sanctions within the context of the Global South’s developmental problems and political thought in general, as it will provide further insight into how sanctions are perceived in India. A recurring thesis found in much of the literature on this topic is that sanctions imposed by the West against Global South countries are viewed as manifestations of unilateral dictating, reflecting a desire to impose interests that conflict with those of developing nations. In the context of the North-South dichotomy, sanctions regimes appear as a useful power tool for developed countries, where developing countries prove to be most vulnerable (Timofeev, 2018). This raises the issue of unilateral sanctions’ legitimacy and ethics of use. Some analysts say that sanctions are often used by major powers for control of postcolonial countries, suppressing movement towards decolonization, and imposing neoliberal values and interests. “As decolonization and anti-imperialism accelerated and consolidated … imperial reaction would accordingly intensify and expand the deployment of sanctions as an instrument of colonial restoration”  (Sial, 2022). Such a conspicuously postcolonial approach to sanctions is often echoed by Indian politicians (as shown above) and Indian academia. Indian Professor Debangana Chatterjee (2022) notes “the racial tilting of the West’s sanctions policies, the complex power bias of the sanctions and the intricate politics of otherization, of which racism becomes key.”

However, following India’s departure from Nehruvian anti-colonialism and non-alignment, New Delhi is unwilling to engage in an ideological antagonism with the Western powers. Thus, the impact of India’s approach towards sanctions on the policy of other developing countries is rather limited as it tries to stay away from direct leadership among Global South nations and rejects anti-Western rhetoric.

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Under the BJP, Indian official rhetoric regarding sanctions has completed its shift from Nehruvian anti-Westernism and pro-UN institutionalism towards dry pragmatism, although still emphasizing developing countries’ problems. This shift is driven by a desire to avoid antagonism with the West.

However, the domestic consensus on foreign policy issues—including on cooperation with Russia despite secondary sanctions—could empower Modi to adopt a clear and sustainable sanctions policy rooted in India’s political tradition. The question remains whether India needs such clarity.

The lack of decisive action may suggest that clarity is not required at this moment, indicating that India does not feel compelled to assert its position overtly—in all likelihood, to maintain flexibility in line with its policy of multi-alignment. This, however, introduces additional uncertainty into an already volatile world order.

Historically, India was seen as a leader of the Third World, exemplified by its role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Today, New Delhi aspires to establish itself among the great powers, distancing itself from its former position as a leader of the developing world, but continues to be a significant voice for the Global South, including on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and anti-Russian sanctions, which Indian officials argue are harmful to the Global South. Establishing a more stable and clear Indian position on sanctions might not only reinforce India’s foreign policy independence, but also enhance its leadership role in the Global South.