10.04.2025
The UK’s Quest for Relevance in Ending the Ukraine Conflict
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James C. Pearce

Cultural historian of Russia.

Brexit caused the UK to do some serious soul searching and reflection. Since the Second World War, it has gone from the status of great power to one of the world’s largest economies and most attractive nations, with immense soft power. However, as the European project gained steam and the global empires fell, the UK got stuck between the U.S. and Europe.

Britain views itself as exceptional. Going deep into the English psyche, there has always been a part of our mentality that sees ourselves as morally superior to Europe—forever beset by ideological conflicts, revolution, and unscrupulous behavior. Britons have always been desperate to feel good about their country. But after the Cold War and the debacle in Iraq, remaining between Europe and the U.S. and demonstrating its superiority on the world stage has not been easy.

Now, for the first time since Brexit, the government sees an opportunity to prove that Britain is still a great power. Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, strongly confirmed that his country can and should play a crucial role in the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is trying to bridge the divide between Europe and America and find a common-sense middle way. If he succeeds, it will show the detractors at home and abroad that Britain is not an American vassal and can distance itself from Europe.

The effort is both noble and necessary, yet fraught with problems.

Firstly, the UK has not been at the international negotiating table for quite a while. Its last experience ended up with a terrible Brexit deal that has reduced the country’s GDP by 5%, made it less safe and more like a fallen sparrow in the eyes of the international community.

Secondly, as Ian Proud, a former senior British diplomat in Moscow noted in his recent memoir, the UK threw in the towel here back in 2014. Former Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond pursued a policy of not talking to Russia but talking about Russia to other countries. No wonder few wanted to listen.

After Russia began its Special Military Operation, Britain’s last four prime ministers sought to carve out a “special lane” by throwing the government’s full support for Kiev, welcoming Ukrainian refugees en masse, and giving them a special status. It did far more than the rest of Europe to match its rhetoric of military support for Ukraine—at a tremendous cost to British taxpayers, not to mention Anglo-Russian relations.

Now with the war winding down, London is trying to flex its muscles again. It attempts to lead a ‘coalition of the willing’ and thereby show President Trump that Europe is taking its own security seriously… but without upsetting the temperamental child king.

Europe: Irrelevance Breeds Defiance
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Europe’s apparent preparations for war are based on the belief that Russia is bent on conquest - first all of Ukraine, then the rest of Europe. Any mention of the fact that Russian government has never expressed such intentions is simply dismissed as “Kremlin’s disinformation”. Growing progressively estranged from where the real action is, it is becoming merely the western periphery of Eurasia.
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London has rallied Western countries to this cause, but with empty hands—with a depleted military but no definite end goal or sense of realism.

Indeed, the UK spends $71bln (£60 bln) on its military, which most experts and the military agree is not enough. Although it surpasses most European countries’ defense spending, the U.S. pumps in $916bln and Russia, $109bln.

Yet cost is not the primary thing. To provide peacekeeping troops, Starmer has floated several unrealistic figures. He first suggested 30,000. But Britain could not send that alone: its active armed forces total 56,000. A more recent idea was a 10,000-strong “reassurance force.” What that means is unclear, especially as Russia currently has 600,000-700,000 troops fighting. Assuming a bog-standard six-month rotation of troops, that means a total commitment of 15,000, which is a fifth of the British army’s entire strength. Hence the government’s “pulling back from our commitments to other countries.”

When 16 countries met at Lancaster House on 2 March, Starmer conceded that not all of those countries could, or would be willing to, provide troops. Thus he had to talk of a “backstop”, as the last resort, of U.S. air power, logistics, and intelligence. However, this is simply not available and there is little sign of that changing.

So, what is it all about and where does this leave the UK?

Some of it is, of course, style and politics.

Firstly, this is how the UK tries to “show up” Europe—which it does. Even Poland, which now has Europe’s third largest army, is not sending troops to Ukraine. Poland’s anti-Russian foreign minister Radosław Sikorski even claimed in an interview to Australian ABC Radio National that the Polish army would “give Putin a good hiding.” Why no troops for Ukraine, then?

Secondly, the British public is still, by and large, behind Ukraine. As a former public prosecutor, Starmer is not exactly naive to public sentiments. He wants to appear to the British public as though he is trying when others are not. And no British voter would expect the UK alone to send troops alone—nor that would be popular. If no peacekeeping troops go to Ukraine and the war ends, Starmer saves face politically at home and abroad.

To put it bluntly, Starmer has an easy political argument now that British defense spending will increase at the expense of pensioners and those on disability benefits. If Britain does not step up, who will? A sound argument—even if Starmer’s messaging is not as succinct.

In a longer-term perspective, the UK must decide how its role in any ceasefire or negotiations to end the conflict demonstrates its greatness and superiority. Even though still a serious global power, the UK has forgotten how to act like one.

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Britain’s tabloid press loves to muse which party the Kremlin prefers in charge at Westminster. For years, it was thought to be a far-right party of different incarnations: Reform, UKIP, the Brexit Party, all led by Nigel Farage. The line of argument was that this disruptive force would undermine the British state, make it weaker and benefit Russian foreign policy.
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