01.04.2025
The World Majority’s Social Media versus Data Colonialism
No. 2 2025 April/June
DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2025-23-2-71-74
Anna N. Sytnik

PhD in Political Science
St. Petersburg State University, Russia
Department of American Studies
Associate Professor

AUTHOR IDs

ORCID: 0000-0002-6853-6253
SPIN-RSCI: 5070-9540
ResearcherID: AAQ-9379-2020
Scopus AuthorID: 57211960340

Contacts

E-mail: a.sytnik@spbu.ru
Address: 7-9 Universitetskaya Emb., St. Petersburg, Russia

Valdai Discussion Club
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For citation, please use:
Sytnik, A.N., 2025. The World Majority’s Social Media versus Data Colonialism. Russia in Global Affairs, 23(2), pp. 71–74. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2025-23-2-71-74

 

Alternative social platforms are a new phenomenon in the global digital environment, giving some hope that the global information and communication space can escape the complete control of Western giants, whose actions are arbitrary and shaped by their home countries’ domestic politics. New digital ecosystems are developing around the world for exchanging audio, photos, and videos, and in some cases for conducting online financial transactions and more. They are created in and tailored for specific regions, countries, or language groups. 

They reflect the cultural and legislative characteristics of local markets and they compete against global players such as the American YouTube and Facebook[1] or the Chinese TikTok. Alternative social platforms oriented at the countries of the World Majority include instant messengers, social networks, video hosting and streaming platforms, videoconferencing services, educational platforms, e-commerce, banking and other financial services. Examples of these platforms include both regional leaders with tens or even hundreds of millions of users—Vkontakte in Russia, Ayoba in Africa, WeChat in China, Moj in India, LINE[2] in Southeast Asia, or Rubika in Iran—as well as solutions at the startup level, e.g., Boithok in Bangladesh or Minly in Egypt. Thus, according to the recently published report,[3] by the end of 2024, there were about 80 alternative social platforms in 133 countries.

Their emergence is driven foremost by states’ desire for control over big data and AI. So far, control over globally-popular social platforms has been concentrated in the hands of large transnational corporations, which use it for political purposes and derive benefit without compensating “donor” countries. 

The global information and communication space has developed over the past decades under the influence of large Western corporations such as Meta, X[4], and Alphabet. The rapid growth in popularity of such IT giants in the early 2000s formed a general idea of ​​what the digital reality around us might look like. At the same time, the information they collect has become a strategic resource for exerting influence by both state and non-state actors.

Personal, behavioral, and geospatial data, as well as text messages, permit analysis of public sentiment and political activity, and support states’ public messaging and maintenance of security (e.g., vs. extremism).

In addition, data on international audiences can support digital diplomacy.

However, much as inequality in access to goods, knowledge and power generated classical colonialism, unequal distribution of these resources produces “data colonialism.” Moreover, we are witnessing “artificial intelligence (AI) colonialism”: although advanced AI is trained on user data from all over the world, its management is concentrated in the hands of a few states and corporations, which adds to the imbalance of power in world politics.

The second, no less significant reason for the emergence of alternative social platforms is to be found in the restrictive policies of transnational corporations, which undermine freedom of speech and produce instability for content creators. This has been especially evident since 2022, as American companies have reduced the visibility of (‘deranked’) Russian content on social media, and deplatformed Russian media and individuals for political reasons, which has also spurred preemptive self-deplatforming. Partly in response to this, over the past 17 years, 52 developing countries have blocked various Western (mostly American) social media, thereby stimulating the development of domestic alternatives.

The third reason is the opaque regulation of disinformation by digital ecosystems in the era of post-truth, information chaos, and social polarization. Modern countermeasures are arbitrary, being dependent on politics, “ethical principles,” and corporate standards. With control concentrated in the hands of a few corporations, states struggle to neutralize disinformation campaigns increasingly powered by bots and advanced deepfakes.

Finally, the globalization of content and the loss of local context, given AI’s rapid development, have jeopardized the preservation of cultural heritage. Large social platforms are often not adapted to the needs of small nations, ethnic groups, or poorly-educated social groups. The underrepresentation of their data in AI training could even lead to their “digital extinction,” depriving small linguistic communities ​​of equal access to innovations, and politically marginalizing them.

Thus, local and regional social platforms help combat at least four challenges: data colonialism, disinformation, deplatforming/deranking, and AI’s threat to cultural heritage. Such platforms strengthen digital sovereignty, allowing countries and regions to retain control over their data, technology, and information environment, creating independent ecosystems for knowledge sharing and interaction.

 

*  *  *

While alternative social platforms are still unable to compete with global ones in their reach, the trend towards online sovereignty will continue to gain momentum in the context of growing geopolitical tensions. In the coming decades, we can expect the further regionalization of technology, as states and their associations pursue digital sovereignty.

Therefore, the World Majority’s social platforms should be viewed not only as local alternatives, but also as hubs around which a community can determine its future development.

Formation of ecosystems in the World Majority countries creates obstacles to major powers and corporations collecting user data for their own purposes. The digital anti-colonialist movement has already led to laws requiring the domestic storage of social platform data. States and cultural communities should continue developing their own platforms for preserving and popularizing national heritage—creating digital archives and incorporating cultural-linguistic diversity into AI’s training in order to avoid bias.

Bringing platforms under the control of the states where they operate is an effective tool for protecting society from disinformation. Regionally, to address this challenge, regional centers for monitoring and analyzing information may be created. Globally, states should be proportionally represented in the development of universal rules for regulating social platforms and artificial intelligence.

 

This article is an edited version of the paper written for the Valdai Discussion Club: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/social-platforms-of-the-world-majority/

 

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References

[1]    Owned by Meta Platforms Inc, which is recognized as an extremist organization and banned in the Russian Federation.

[2]    Blocked in the Russian Federation by Roskomnadzor.

[3]    https://www.colaboratoria.ru/doc/alternative_social_platforms_of_the_world_majority.pdf

[4]    X is blocked in the Russian Federation by decision of Roskomnadzor.

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