Russia in Global Affairs

A comprehensive research can help bridge the long-standing divide in Russian thought between the partisans of militarism’s utmost importance and the partisans of its a priori ineffectiveness.

After the end of the “previous” Cold War, the armed forces in different countries considered scenarios of large ground operations during armed conflicts with an equal or superior enemy, but such plans largely remained a theory. Hostilities in Ukraine have put these theories to the ruthless test.

The current “global turbulence” can be described as a changing world order in which the old footholds of the global security architecture are crumbling while new ones have not yet formed. The latest developments make use wonder what Russia’s relations with the two Korean states will be like in the new era.

Russia, by now, should have adapted to Russophobia and become inured to it. It may find it much more beneficial to continue its global positive and peaceful policies and actions, rather than spook the world with nuclear saber-rattling - it would certainly be a lot safer.

The battleground reality reveals there is a contradiction between the existential exigencies of the Russian state and nation on the one hand, and the existing structures and power-relations on the other.

Sanctimoniously shying away from the very thought of nuclear weapons use would be tantamount to playing ostrich. In this sense, we must thank Sergei Karaganov for stating his positon so straightforwardly. Discussing it should be part of the efforts to work out a new understanding of strategic stability in place of the one that cannot be restored any more.

The “nuclear bullet” must necessarily and demonstratively be put into the “revolver drum” the U.S. leadership is recklessly playing with. To paraphrase a now-deceased American statesman, we can say: Why do we need nuclear weapons if we refuse to use them in the face of an existential threat? There is no need to scare anyone verbally. It is necessary to prepare for a possible use practically.

Sergei Karaganov’s article on the need to make a difficult choice in favor of a preemptive nuclear strike on some NATO nation in Eastern Europe has expectedly drawn a wide response. If the proposals under consideration are risky, is there an alternative? There is. An alternative would be living with a “bleeding wound” in the form of a hostile West and Ukraine, but understanding that the confrontation with Russia is also a “bleeding wound” for the West, which will be losing resources and political capital.

We must remember that mutual trust between society and the government has always been the basis of military success in history. When it is irrevocably violated, then no semantic euphemisms can help.