Russia in Global Affairs

Almost 35 years ago, US President Ronald Reagan settled down in the White House to watch the latest Hollywood blockbuster WarGames as part of his regular Sunday film night. The film, starring a young Matthew Broderick, depicted a teenage computer hacker accidentally breaking into top-secret Pentagon supercomputers that controlled US nuclear weapons.

The U.S. president probably expected to declare that he had a “very good” meeting with the formidable Vladimir Putin and had achieved what none of his White House predecessors had. Instead, Donald Trump’s performance, particularly at the press conference, inflicted on him accusations of na?vet? and even treason, and his retractions hardly repaired the damage. This is disquieting news for Putin: instead of a much needed defrosting of U.S.-Russian relations, America's anti-Russia policy may get harder still.

Many bad things have been said about nuclear weapons in the decades since they first came into existence. Indeed, in the middle of the 20th century the human race developed a means of confrontation with the potential to destroy the entire world were it used on a large scale.

In the eyes of many, the possession of the nuclear bomb is a symbol of special military-political might and of belonging to a select group. The experience of the difficult negotiations with Ukraine, in the course of which Kiev was persuaded—in the long last—to give up the nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the U.S.S.R., can be of use to those who now have to address similar problems with other countries.

A new agreement on deeper reductions in strategic offensive arms—limiting the number of strategic warheads to 1,000 for each party—could serve as a positive example of cooperation and give a chance to reach mutual understanding in other areas.

The U.S. and Russia will most likely return to pragmatic relations after years of an ideologically-driven foreign policy under President Obama. However, both countries will probably harden their stance towards the other, and dramatic breakthroughs are unlikely.

Russia should rethink what it has inherited from the Soviet Union in nuclear matters, the role of nuclear weapons, and their relevance in the future. Furthermore, Russia should consider how it can best use to its own advantage the opportunities offered by the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this regime can be modified to meet the realities of the new century.

The priority of U.S.-Russian relations once again, as in the 1970s, is the development of stabilizing rules of conduct in case of an unauthorized military clash or conflict with third countries. The situation, however, may change. Will Moscow and Washington be able to keep the logic of mutual assured destruction, which for half a century has ensured peaceful bilateral relations?

Russia’s negative image in nuclear security, export controls and nonproliferation dates back to the early 1990s; it is based on a combination of real problems that existed at the time and Hollywood-like stories in the media. Until recently, that image has often stood in the way of practical contacts and politicized nuclear energy cooperation between Russia and the United States.