Russia in Global Affairs

The willingness to see behind everything a conspiracy of dark forces and the belief that everything happens for a reason, well-known to us from our own history, have now spectacularly become commonplace. So, since the topic triggered such a powerful response, we decided to take it further by asking members of the academic community in different countries how they assess the current state of affairs in “memory politics.” They came up with a very broad range of opinions, which we gladly share with our readers.

The online session “International Relations and Memory of WWII Today”, organized by the European University in Saint Petersburg and the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, was held on November 23. The participants in the panel discussion, moderated by Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of “Russia in Global Affairs”, included Alexei Miller, Tony Brenton, Sergei Kislyak, Ulrich Brandenburg, and Philip David Zelikow.

On November 23 at 18:00 a.m. MSK (GMT+3) will be an online session, titled: “International relation and memory of WWII today.” featuring Fyodor Lukyanov, Alexei Miller and prominent diplomats. The session will be within the framework of the International Conference “Memory of the Second World War – Glorification, Condemnation, Accusation, Justification, Explanation”, organized by EU SPb and Foreign and Defence Policy Council.

Next year we will celebrate two great and interconnected anniversaries – the 75th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic and Second World Wars, and the establishment of the UN. Reflecting on the spiritual and moral significance of these landmark events, one needs to bear in mind the enormous political meaning of the Victory that ended one of the most brutal wars in the history of mankind.

There is a great risk of getting mired in counterproductive discussions about the frontiers of the European model of historical development. References to the history of one region or another or one nation or another as “European” or “non-European” are unscrupulously used today inside the EU itself and along its periphery when it comes to discussing whether the region or nation deserves to be a member of a united Europe.

Irredentism may cause all the risks stemming from the strong identity of a great power and its imperial heritage, which fuels the temptation to regard the modern borders as “casually drawn” and “unfair,” to get mixed with nationalism. This is a very dangerous cocktail.

In the political turmoil of recent years, the Ukrainian authorities have been harshly cracking down on the alternative historical memory kept by millions of people in the country. Even after the loss of Crimea and part of Donbass Ukraine cannot be considered a consolidated nation with one identity and a common view on history.

Moscow needs to revise its attitude to the key element of the former world order based on the centers of power—the concept of zones of exclusive influence. This will help it neutralize negative processes in the post-Soviet space, a region which it considers a zone of its exclusive influence.

New Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that after WWII Poland did not receive adequate compensation from Germany for the damage it had suffered and has the right to bring the topic of reparations to the agenda of Polish-German negotiations.