The South Caucasus is a significant geopolitical zone in Iran’s immediate neighborhood and a vital link connecting Iran to Russia, the Black Sea, and Europe. It is also the point of intersection of three major neighboring countries —Iran, Russia, and Turkey.
Historically, the South Caucasus has been an area of overlapping interests of major powers. Russia, Turkey, the European Union, the United States, and more recently China, have sought to establish their presence in the South Caucasus to shape regional dynamics to their benefit. This “Great Game” and the South Caucasus’s geographical, cultural, and security connection with Iran have made the region critically important for Tehran. The South Caucasus is a crucial arena for shaping the regional geopolitical balance: developments in this region inevitably affect Iran’s security and strategic interests.
From this perspective, Tehran has been closely monitoring the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement signed on 8 August 2025 under Donald Trump’s mediation. Iran’s attitude towards this agreement, explicitly voiced in the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during President Pezeshkian’s visit to Armenia, is twofold: on the one hand, Tehran welcomes the peace accord as “an important step towards lasting regional peace;” on the other hand, it is apprehensive of potential “foreign intervention near its borders.”
Regarding the first, positive aspect of Iran’s position: given the geographical interconnectedness, stability and security in the South Caucasus naturally translate into Iran’s stability and security and creates economic, transit, and energy opportunities for Iran. To promote peace and stability in the region, Iran has pursued multiple approaches, combining active diplomacy and regional cooperation, seeking to preserve the regional power balance, and remaining committed to the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the South Caucasian countries.
Thus, if the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement proves efficient and brings stability and security to the region, Tehran will undoubtedly welcome the developments as aligning with Iran’s core foreign policy objectives.
The second aspect of Tehran’s attitude, which fuels its concern and even opposition, relates to the U.S.’s involvement in the peacebuilding process, particularly, the annex to the agreement known as the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). Although the agreement emphasizes Armenia’s sovereignty over the corridor, the U.S.-brokered deal grants the U.S. exclusive developmental rights over the corridor—which extends from the Turkish border to the Caspian Sea—for up to 99 years.
Ostensibly framed as purely economic, U.S. presence is perceived by Iran as a pretext for expanding U.S. geopolitical influence and altering the power balance in the region. Tehran also views this presence as part of a broader strategy of exerting maximum pressure to contain Iran. Such a strategy not only constricts Iran’s geopolitical space but also restricts its geoeconomic opportunities, thereby generating multifaceted threats to it.
So, Iran views U.S. mediation not as a benevolent initiative for peace and the TRIPP as a transit and trade project, but rather as part of a broader strategy aimed at reshaping the region’s geopolitical map to Iran’s (and Russia’s) detriment. It is not accidental that Iran’s concerns are shared by some Russian politicians and analysts: they believe that, through the TRIPP, Armenia may lose its sovereignty, creating an environment conducive to U.S. destabilizing influence in the region.
These apprehensions are justified, especially in light of the U.S.’s hostile stance and actions towards Tehran—most notably the recent attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities and its direct involvement in Israeli operations against Iran.
Tehran’s concerns embrace four key areas:
- Security. In the context of the escalating U.S.-Iran tensions, the establishment of a U.S. presence directly along Iranian border—likely to be accompanied by the deployment of an intelligence and security infrastructure—poses a direct threat to Iran’s security. Given the U.S.’s close ties with Israel, as well as the increasing interaction between Azerbaijan and Israel in recent years, Israel’s presence will be likely reinforced along the Iranian northern border. Furthermore, in the event of an aggravation of Israeli-Iranian tensions, U.S. presence in the region will likely redouble the threat to Iranian security.
- Geopolitics. The U.S.’s long-term presence in the South Caucasus under the pretext of managing the TRIPP will inevitably alter the roles of the regional actors. Should this presence materialize, the U.S. will exert significant influence not only over the region but also over Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia’s foreign policies. It will adversely affect Iran’s position in the South Caucasus, diminish its influence in regional affairs, and change the balance of power to Iran’s disadvantage.
- Politics. The U.S.’s long-term presence in the South Caucasus may steer the region’s politics, political culture, and foreign policy towards Western orientation. This potential development runs counter to Iran’s regionalism policy, which emphasizes managing regional issues through the participation of countries without external interference. A Western-aligned approach may eventually lead to these countries seeking membership in Western institutions, including NATO, posing a serious security threat to Iran.
- Geoeconomics. The TRIPP is part of the broader Middle Corridor project, which connects Central Asia through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, and Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe. One of its primary objectives is to diminish Iran and Russia’s geoeconomic and transit roles in the region and the international trade network.
Given that Iran’s land connection to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is established through Armenia, any U.S. impact on Iran’s economic relations with Armenia will also affect its interactions with Russia and the EAEU. Collectively, these factors will exacerbate the challenges posed by anti-Iranian sanctions.
Many Iranian officials, including Ali Akbar Velayati, Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, view these challenges as tangible and pressing. Although he has emphasized that Iran will address these multifaceted threats “both with and without Russia,” given that many these challenges are faced by both countries, Tehran’s strategy is to strengthen cooperation with Russia.
Moscow’s response to the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement and the TRIPP bears similarities to Tehran’s approach, including:
- Welcoming the initiatives for establishing lasting peace in the region;
- Skepticism regarding U.S. benevolent intentions;
- Emphasizing the participation of regional countries (within the 3+3 framework) for achieving sustainable peace in the region through;
- Stressing the importance of the balance of interests in any peace solution;
- Highlighting the danger of foreign interference;
- Concern over the potential repetition of the destructive history of Western interference in the Middle East.
To establish a common strategic approach, Iran and Russia must view U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus within a broader geopolitical framework. If the TRIPP becomes operational, its geopolitical and geoeconomic impact will expand from the Mediterranean (Lebanon and Syria, currently under U.S. sway) through the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea into Central Asia. This expansion poses challenges to the Iranian and Russian shared interests, including such initiatives as the North-South Corridor and cooperation within the EAEU.
Both countries should seek to “localize” regional governance by initiating cooperative frameworks while exerting joint diplomatic pressure on Azerbaijan and Armenia to prevent U.S. increased influence in the region. Additionally, joint economic and transit projects with the South Caucasian countries would enhance regional cooperation.
