Russia in Global Affairs

Breaking arms control agreements is much easier than concluding them, but history shows that rejecting arms control agreements never improves one’s security and always damages it, a lesson that Moscow and Washington should heed.

Moscow appears to be unprepared for polycentrism as it has not yet grasped its basic rule, which was well known to Russian chancellors of the 19th century: one should make compromises on individual issues in order to have closer relations with other centers of power than they have among themselves.

If we give up the norms and instruments of nuclear arms control developed over the past half century, we will eventually end up with nothing. Instead, we should urgently save this invaluable structure and improve this system in a prudent way, adapting it to new challenges and threats.

Moscow appeared to be unprepared for polycentrism as it has not yet grasped its basic rule, which was well known to Russian chancellors of the 19th century: one should make compromises on individual issues in order to have closer relations with other centers of power than they have among themselves.

The role of nuclear deterrence in the great powers’ efforts to ensure their security will continue to decline, despite Russia’s current attempts to assign a more significant role to it and notwithstanding the present deadlock in nuclear disarmament.

The role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the status and security of the Russian Federation seems to be over-exaggerated. It was the over-reliance on the nuclear potential (and military might in general) that finally ruined the Soviet Union, as it deprived it of an incentive to carry out a profound political and economic modernization. Russia must not repeat that mistake of relying too much on nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security and international prestige.

A “machismo” – completely down-to-earth, highly anti-idealistic and rigidly pragmatic – position by Russia cannot but evoke a strong response from the majority of the national elite and the general public. This hard stance looks especially appealing if one recalls the na?ve idealism of the late 1980s and the political tossing about and humiliations of the 1990s.

The West is faced with the difficult problem of choosing a policy toward Russia in the course of its long, deep and very contradictory transformation. Until now, the U.S. and many of its allies have been going from one extreme to another over this issue: from high hopes to bitter disillusionment, from excessive involvement to utter indifference and disregard, and from enthusiasm to suspicions and hostility.

Putin can with the stroke of a pen fire any government official or the Cabinet as a whole, dissolve the State Duma or a local legislature, or put the squeeze on an oligarch. However, the president is powerless to get rid of a whole class of the Russian post-Communist nomenklatura, or compel them to act contrary to their corporate interests.